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ABSTRACT
As a result of the Uruguay Round (UR), the impact on the international rice market is
profound. In addition, another round of the WTO trade negotiations has started and the impacts
of potential policy changes on rice trade are unknown. The major U.S. benefit of the UR has
been the access to the Japanese market. However, the U.S. share of this import market has been
unstable and the share of Korean rice market is zero percent. Therefore, this study attempts to
analyze the potential implication of U.S. rice exports to Japan and Korea.
The Japanese and Korean rice economies as well as U.S. export demand are analyzed
using empirical supply and demand models. This study captures the dynamics inherent in
supply and demand of the Japanese and Korean rice sectors.

For the study, the supply

parameters are estimated using two stage least squares (2SLS), and the demand equations are
estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS).
Since rice is a political commodity, this study incorporates the political influence of
various interest groups in the policy-making process. The analysis measures the pattern of the
implicit political weights given to the interest groups, considering a Political Preference
Function (PPF).
In the final stage, the estimated elasticities and political weights are incorporated in a
noncooperative dynamic game framework to analyze the possible impacts of policy changes in
the three countries. This study analyses various policies, including several reasonable scenarios
regarding changes in Japanese and Korean tariff equivalents from 2% to 8% with respect to
U.S. export programs, such as credit guarantee and market development programs.
The results show that the best export policy option from the U.S. perspective is obtained
at a 4% tariff reduction for Japan and Korea under a combination of U.S. market access

ix

program and foreign market development program. The results suggest that the U.S. policy
makers might focus more on the U.S. export policy options than the tariff reduction of Japan
and Korea. However, it depends on how the policies are implemented, given the state trading
enterprises and implicit trade barriers in both countries.

x

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Under the Uruguay Round (UR) agreement the rules governing international trade in
agricultural products were fundamentally changed (Gilbert and Wahl, 2000). Members of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) agreed to a process of tariffication of non-tariff agricultural
trade barriers (NTBs), to bind those tariffs, and to subject them to reductions. They also agreed
to institute disciplines and reduction commitments on export subsidies and other domestic
support mechanisms. Significant progress has been made towards subjecting agriculture to the
same disciplines as trade in manufactures.
The multilateral trade agreement reached through the UR negotiations is important and
extensive. Besides forming the WTO, it includes general tariff reductions and new rules
relating to services, intellectual property, trade related investment and general subsidies. It also
includes important new procedures for dispute settlement (Tangermann, et. al., 1997).
As a result of the multilateral trade negotiations, the world rice economy is becoming
more market oriented. The impact of trade liberalization on the international rice market is
profound because rice trade has been highly restricted in both developed and developing
nations. In addition, another round of the WTO trade negotiations has started and the impacts
of potential policy changes on rice production and trade flows in the world rice industry are
unknown.
Japan and South Korea are industrial market economies with agriculture contributing less
than 5% of their gross national products. These two countries are also major markets for U.S.
agricultural exports (Wailes, et al., 2000).
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The agricultural systems of Japan and South Korea have been largely focused on rice
production with major political and economic support given to rice producers. Because of the
special importance of rice, these countries have followed similar policies of high levels of
protection in their rice economies to achieve self-sufficiency in production. These policies
include banning foreign rice imports and maintaining their domestic rice price level above their
border price. A result of this strong protection is that Japan has incurred rice surpluses for two
decades, requiring expensive acreage diversion programs to help curb the over-supply. South
Korea has also developed a surplus rice problem with burdensome stock levels since 1987 (Lee,
1997).
The situation surrounding the Japanese and Korean rice industries has changed
drastically. The biggest change was the partial opening of the rice market. As a result of the
UR agreement, Japan and Korea were required to guarantee some minimum access (MA) level
of rice imports on regular basis.
This partial opening of these rice markets had a significant impact on the domestic rice
industries in both countries, especially on prices and production. In fact, the reality is that
farmers and the governments of Japan and Korea are suffering from the larger minimum access
(MA) imports through suppressed domestic rice prices. In addition, imported rice is supposed
to be used partially as foreign aid, but this cannot be a long-run solution for either country.
The Uruguay Round negotiations resulted in agreement by Japan and South Korea to
relax their rice import bans with minimum access requirements. Japan agreed to imports equal
to 4% of consumption in 1995, increasing to 8% by the year 2001. Korea agreed to a minimum
access of 1% of consumption in 1995, increasing to 2% by 2000 and 4% by 2004 based on the
consumption of the year of 1986-88. These minimum access requirements are essentially
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treated as mandatory import quotas, although either country is free to import more than the MA
if they wish.
The minimum access quotas in Japan have been implemented using two mechanisms: 1)
state trade purchases under the Food Agency of Ministry of agriculture, Fishery, and Forestry
(MAFF) and 2) the simultaneous buy and sell (SBS) auctions for private trade (USDA/Attaché
report, 1996). Food Agency purchases have been largely isolated from direct food markets,
with purchases going to food aid, industrial use, animal feed and stocks. The share of the quota
allocated to the two mechanisms has largely been an internal policy matter.

However,

burdensome stocks and external pressures have motivated MAFF to increase the share of the
MA quota through the SBS from an initial 3% to 22% more recently.
Rice imports are a very emotional and political issue in Korea, leading the government to
spend a great deal of resources in trying to ensure self-sufficiency. Korea has not imported any
significant amounts of rice since it was forced to import over 2.0 million metric tons (MMT) in
1981/82 over a two-year period after the 1980 crop was severely damaged due to unusual cold
weather.
In the UR agreement, Korea insisted that there should be some exemption from the
tariffication in the case of basic foodstuffs such as rice and beef. However, Korea committed a
full range of market liberalization at the UR negotiations with only the exception of rice, of
which tariffication was postponed 10 years.
Despite protests from the U.S. government, Korean MAFF has announced that all rice
imported during the initial years was for processing purposes only. The U.S. government’s
position is that this is against the spirit if not the rules of the UR agreement.
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Among competitors, many local experts expect China to be a major supplier over the
long term. China has reportedly developed new varieties of rice to meet Korean taste. This rice
is being grown by ethnic Koreans in the northeastern provinces of Jilin, Liaoning and
Heilongjinag (USDA, 1998).
The price of Chinese rice is about one-eighth that of similar rice produced in Korea, and
has been a major rice exporter to Korea. China also has the obvious advantage of lower
transportation cost due to its close proximity to Korea. Vietnam and Thailand are also
reportedly making plans to export their long-grain rice. Australia is also aggressively seeking to
gain a share of any medium-grain rice imported by Korea.
Korea imported 51,000 MT of Indian rice to meet its Market Access requirements in
1996. This rice was intended to meet its 1995 obligations. Since then, Korea imported an
additional 64,000 MT of medium grain rice from China to meet it 1996 MA requirements in
1996. In addition, Korea imported 81,000 MT from China and 13,000 MT from Thailand in
1999 (USDA, 2000).
Korea’s MA commitment is in effect until 2004.

Korea’s strategy for meeting its

commitment includes the purchase of only lower quality rice, equivalent to U.S. No. 3 or lower.
This is done in order to avoid table competition for its heavily subsidized domestic rice.
1.1.1 Recent Changes
In December 1998, the Japanese government notified the WTO of its decision to
introduce rice tariffication beginning April 1, 1999. Under tariffication, a specific duty of
351.17 yen per kilogram (kg) was applied to imports outside of the MA volume. In and after
Japanese fiscal year (JFY) 2000, April to March, a specific duty of 341 yen per kg was applied
to imports outside of MA (MAFF, 1999).
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Japan’s tariffication agreement has three components. First, a secondary tariff applied to
rice imports above the MA import levels where the mark-up associated with the tariff
equivalent of the MA is considered the primary tariff. The initial secondary tariff rate is set at
351.17 yen per kg for 1999 (approximately $3,000MT) followed by a 2.5% reduction to 341
yen in 2000. Second, in agreeing to the possibility for over quota imports, Japan was allowed to
reduce the annual increase in MA imports from 0.8% to only 0.4%. Third, the new policy adds
a safeguard tariff of an additional 33%, triggered at 125% of the previous 3-year moving rice
import volume (USDA, 2000).
The result of tariffication is lower import volumes than what would have occurred with
the original MA quota, 38 thousand MT less in 1999 and 76 thousand MT less in 2000. The
prohibitive tariff essentially results in capping of Japanese rice imports until reductions in the
tariff rate are negotiated in the next round. Japan’s MA quota will remain at the 7.2% of base
period use until another agreement is reached (Table 1.1). Despite the negative effect on trade
volume of Japan’s recent tariffication, the MA quotas have resulted in an expansion of total
world rice trade of approximately 5% and over 30% more trade of high quality medium grain
rice (Wailes, 2000). Opening of the import market, along with domestic market reforms in
Japan, has resulted in lower domestic market prices by 10 to 15% (USDA/AttachP report,
2000).
Table 1.1 Japanese MA Obligation for Rice (MT).
Without Tariffication
Volume % of consumption
JFY* 1998
JFY 1999
JFY 2000

606,000
682,000
758,000

6.4 %
7.2 %
8.0 %

With Tariffication
Volume
% of consumption
606,000
644,000
682,000

*:Japanese fiscal year (April to March)
Source: USDA
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6.4 %
6.8 %
7.2 %

1.1.2 U.S. Exports to Japan and Korea
The United States accounts for less than 2% of global rice production, but exports more
than 12% of world trade. Most countries produce only one type of rice. However, the United
States produces both types (japonica in California, and indica in Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas,
Mississippi, and Missouri) and is in a unique position in that it can export significant amounts
of both types (Song and Carter, 1996). Despite this, the U.S. rice programs, marketing loan
payments and marketing loan programs, essentially treat rice as a homogenous product (Wailes,
2000) and do not provide clear market signals corresponding to changing market conditions by
subspecies (Childs and Lin, 1989). Rice is treated as a homogenous crop in the sense that (a) a
single target price and acreage reduction program (ARP) rate is applied to all rice types, and (b)
the rice grading system does not distinguish California medium grain (japonica) from southern
long grain (indica) (i.e., it applies the same loan rate and marketing loan repayment rate). This
distinction becomes more critical under freer trade, because the largest potential importers,
Japan and Korea, have strong preferences for japonica rice.
From 1967 to 1982, Korea imported 8 million metric tons (MMT) of rice and U.S. rice
exports supplied 65% of that market, mostly from California (Schnepf and Just, 1995).
However, by the mid 1980s, Korea attained self-sufficiency in rice due to generous government
programs, while imports were essentially banned. After losing its largest importer, Korea, in
1983, California accumulated rice stocks, relative to the southern states. Since 1983, the U.S.
has exported no rice to Korea. In the meantime, the U.S. market share in the Japanese import
market has been about 50% since 1995. However, the U.S. market share in Japan decreased in
recent years due to heavy competition among the major export countries, such as Australia,
China, and Thailand.
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1.2 Problem Statement
Traditional leading rice exporters, such as Thailand and the United States, have gradually
lost market share to newly emerging exporters, primarily Vietnam and India. The U.S. lost
second position to India in 1995 (USDA, 2000) and was the fourth leading exporter in 1996
(Wailes, 2000). With unexpected reductions in exports by India, the U.S. moved up to third
place in 1997 and 1998.
The impact of the UR agreement on the U.S. rice industry has been favorable. The major
benefit has been the access to the Japanese market. The U.S. share of this market has been
about 50% as opposed to the Korean market, in which its market share is zero. However, the
U.S. share of the Japanese market has gradually decreased and been unstable due to strong
competition with major exporters as mentioned above.
The uncertain factors in Korea, in terms of potential U.S. rice exports, are Korea’s stock
and political situations. How these factors will affect future U.S. exports is still uncertain at this
time. In the past, in terms of stock, the Korean government has kept a minimum four-month
reserve for both price stabilization and food/military security reasons and the policy-making
process in rice trade is a politically sensitive matter.
Nevertheless, the U.S. rice industry can potentially increase its market share in Japanese
and Korean rice import markets, given that both countries will likely be required to expand their
imports in the next round of the WTO negotiations. Expanded market access remains one of the
most important issues for rice trade. The UR can claim credit for part of the expansion in rice
trade in the 1990s, but the two rice markets remain highly protected. For instance, the tariff rate
quota (TRQ) for Japan will remain at 682 thousand MT until a new agreement is negotiated.
Tariffication established a prohibitive tariff and reduced the terms of MA quota that would have
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resulted without tariffication. Both the tariff level and quota will receive considerable attention
in the next round. Similar pressure will be on the MA quota for South Korea along with a push
for tariffication (Wailes, 2000; Cramer, et al., 1999; Koo, et al., 1996).
Looking at the historical and recent structural changes in both countries, it is useful for
the U.S. rice industry, especially the export market, to examine how much market share the U.S.
can potentially obtain in the Japanese and Korean markets. In addition, it is important to
examine how changes in Japanese and Korean rice policies, as related to their WTO
commitments, will impact the U.S. market.
Japanese and Korean imports have stimulated resource adjustments in the rest of the
world, including Australia, China and the United States, countries that have been the primary
beneficiaries of Japanese and South Korean market access. This has occurred because Japan
and Korea are the primary consumers and importers of japonica rice. Therefore, changes in
both countries rice policies have a large impact on the U.S. rice industry as well as the world
rice market.
1.3 Justification
The existing research on Japan, Korea, and the U.S. export market is quite limited and is
not linked, in the sense that the existing studies focus specifically on either the Japanese or
Korean rice market (Im, 2000; Koo and Taylor, 1999; Park, 1996; Kako, et al, 1995). In
addition, some studies examined implications of the rice trade liberalization for U.S. rice
policies and the world rice market, considering Japanese and Korean markets as a part of their
studies (Wailes, 2000; Cramer, et al., 1999; Lee, 1997; Song and Carter, 1996). However, these
studies did not examine nor forecast potential U.S. market share in Japanese and Korean
markets. Furthermore, there is no analysis that examines the linkage between U.S. exports and
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the other two countries’ imports. Therefore, this study focuses specifically on Japanese and
Korean rice markets from the U.S. perspective, considering the linkage between U.S. rice
export policies and the other two countries’ potential import policies. This study can help
policy makers in these three countries and the people engaged in international rice trade to
better understand and improve decision-making with regard to the rice economies of Korea and
Japan.
Since the U.S. share of the Japanese rice import market has been relatively unstable in
recent years, an analysis of the Japanese import market from the U.S. perspective is needed. In
addition, Korea imported rice from the U.S. until the early 1980s. However, prior to the GATT
negotiations, the Korean government suspended rice imports, with the exception of years when
they had unusual bad weather. As a result of the GATT negotiation, Korea must meet its MA
commitment each year until 2004. Korea has had tremendous pressure from rice exporting
countries such as the Cairns group and the U.S. concerning its MA requirement. Nevertheless,
Korea has not imported its MA commitment from the U.S.; India and China have been the
major rice suppliers for Korea. However, China and India are volatile exporters, moving from
net importers in one year to net exporters in the next (Wailes, 2000). Therefore, an analysis of
the Korean rice economy and import policy will benefit the U.S. rice industry.
1.4 Objectives
The issue of uncertainty regarding potential U.S. rice exports to Japan and Korea will be
analyzed by combining an econometric analysis with game theoretic-model to determine the
impact of various policies. To conduct the game theoretic analysis, econometric models of
supply and demand for Japan and Korea and an export demand model for the U.S. will be
estimated. The estimated elasticities will be used to initialize the simulation model, which uses
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the game theoretic approach. In addition, political weights of various interest groups will be
determined, and the weights will be incorporated into the model. For the policy analysis,
several potential import policies of Japan and Korea will be considered for U.S. rice export
policies.
The general objective of this study is to determine the potential U.S. rice exports to Japan
and Korea. The goal of the analysis is to determine the implications for U.S. export policies.
The specific objectives to accomplish this are:
1) To estimate econometric models of supply and consumption behavior for Japan and Korea,
and export demand for the U.S. as an input to initialize the empirical model;
2) To determine the political weights of relevant interest groups of the three countries as an
input to initialize the empirical model;
3) To conduct a game theoretic analysis to determine the optimal policy options of Japan and
Korea for U.S. rice exports, incorporating econometric estimates and the political weights of
different interest groups determined in specific objective 2) and;
4) To analyze the potential policies of Japan and Korea and determine the best export policy
options for the U.S.
1.5 Literature Review
An extensive literature has evolved in the past decades using economic theory to
determine the impact of policy reform and trade liberalization of agricultural commodities.
This section outlines recent studies concerning Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. rice industries,
including econometric analyses, political economic analysis of rice in the three countries, and
game theoretic analyses.
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Wailes, Ito and Cramer (1991/a) have provided a comprehensive study of the Japanese
rice market prior to the GATT reforms. The Japanese rice economy is described in the context
of the 1991 trade liberalization discussions. This study examined the high-cost Japanese rice
production structure that is supported by managing the rice surpluses. They also analyzed the
implications of trade liberalization for the world rice market in another study (1991/b). The
authors used a multi-product quadratic programming model to investigate the impacts on the
world market. The study focused on the changes in Japan s rice market. Dyck, Huang and
Wailes (1993) reviewed South Korea, Japan and Taiwan s farm structures and rice economies.
Kako, Gemma and Ito (1995) have estimated a Japanese rice model adopting two scenarios,
which were analyzed with respect to future per capita expenditure, rice prices and meat prices.
Myung (1989) analyzed the effects of the government s price intervention in Korea s rice
economy. The study used a partial equilibrium approach to examine the effects on the rice
markets with and without government intervention. In this study, the author used a Nerlovian
supply model in the logarithmic form. The Nerlovian lagged supply function was fitted to the
observed data in order to obtain supply elasticity estimates. For the demand model, the study
used the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) model. Park (1995) estimated supply and
demand models for the Korean rice economy over the period from 1965 to 1993. the analysis
was conducted for three scenarios; 1) no imports of rice, 2) imports assumed to follow the UR
agreement (2-4%), and 3) both rice imports and processing use assumed to increase to 10% of
domestic consumption. However, a limitation of his study is that he did not evaluate the
international impacts. A study by Koh (1996) analyzed recent changes in Korea s rice acreage,
yield, consumption and government policy. Koh also provided a brief historical background of
Korean rice policy and the import situation.
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Grant, Beach, and Lin (1984) estimated U.S. acreage response by each state instead of by
grain types.

They have estimated state-by-state rice-planted acreage for the five major

producing states using the effective farm price and a lagged dependent variable. They also have
estimated rice demand for seed, food, brewing, commercial exports, government exports, and
rough rice exports. However, they did not consider the effects of government policy details
such as acreage set-aside programs or deficiency payments. Chen and Ito (1992) estimated U.S.
rice demand and supply models using the implicit revenue function approach. The study also
demonstrated the utility of a switching procedure that allows evaluation of supply response
behaviors for time periods governed by multiple farm programs in a system of equations.
However, they treated rice as a homogeneous crop.

Song and Carter (1996) estimated U.S.

supply and demand disaggregating types. They analyzed several scenarios according to the
GATT agreement and the impacts of the global rice trade liberalization on the U.S. Wailes,
Cramer, Chavez, and Hansen (2000) constructed a model called Arkansas Global Rice Model
that consists of 22 sub-models and the rest of the world (ROW). The model is a representation
of the world rice economy, and is used to simulate world rice trade. They disaggregated rice
types such as indica and japonica solving for Thai 5% f.o.b. rice price and California price.
They used econometric and partial equilibrium approach to closed the model such that world
imports and exports are equal in each year.
The new political economy or endogenous theory of economic policy recognizes that
policy-makers are rational agents who select policy-maximizing objectives, subject to political
and economic constraints.

There has been interest from both a theoretical and empirical

perspective in examining the effects of government price stabilization (or support) programs on
commodity market performance. The main issue in this area has been the desirability of price
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stabilization in terms of its welfare effect on interest groups. Different approaches have been
adapted to analyze income support and price stabilization policies.
For agricultural policies, much of the literature focuses on the integration of political and
economic markets and the endogenization of government policies (Zusman and Amiad, 1977;
Anderson and Hayami, 1986). The approach, called new political economy, shows that the
government as a rational agent may be manipulated by powerful interest groups. A fast
growing literature on the political economy of agricultural policy has introduced new analytical
methods for dealing with the political influences of special interest groups in the policy making
process (Rausser and Foster, 1990). The political economy approach to agricultural policy has
developed along two paths, which depend on how the political process is viewed. These two
approaches to modeling the political economy of farm programs are the political preference
function (PPF) approach and the clearing-house government (CHG) model.
The PPF approach assumes that policymakers maximize a political preference function in
which different interest groups in society have different weights in the function.

The

fundamental assumption of the PPF approach is that current policies reflect a political economic
equilibrium summarizing all the relevant political power among interest groups. Empirical
work began in this area with Rausser and Freebairn (1974) who estimated political preference
weights under the U.S. beef import quota. Similar studies are Lianos and Rizopoulos (1988) for
the Greek cotton sector, and Oehmke and Yao (1990) for the U.S. wheat sector. Multi-country
and single-commodity political preference function studies are Sarris and Freebairn (1983) and
Paarlberg and Abbott (1986) for the world wheat market. Tyers (1990) applies estimated
political weights to the welfare incidence of EC agricultural policy reforms and evaluates their
political feasibility. Recently, some theoretical assessments of the political preference function
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approach have been discussed in the literature (von Cramon, 1992; Bullock, 1994, 1996).
Bullock provides a theoretical explanation of the PPF methodology and assumptions. He
argues that one can estimate political power with a PPF only if observed policies are Paretoefficient, which may depend on the assumed number of interest groups and policy instruments.
To ensure that observed policies are efficient, he shows that PPF studies must choose the
number of policy instruments to be exactly one less than the number of interest groups.
Game theory has appeared in agricultural economics research primarily in studies of
international trade and political economy problems that inherently deal with collective action.
In trade models, countries formulate policies considering other countries’ alternative behaviors
that affect access to markets or prices received in those markets (Karp and McCalla, 1983). In
political economic models, producer groups formulate and argue for price/production policies
and argue against the policies supported by rival producer and consumer groups; in so doing,
they must anticipate demands made by rival groups and actions undertaken by other law
makers.
Agricultural trade research has for a long time recognized the importance of imperfect
competition. McCalla (1966) first argued that wheat trade should be explained as a duopoly
involving the United States and Canada. Carter and Schmitz (1979) claimed that in the wheat
market, power resided with the buyers, who were able to extract rent by imposing a tariff or
some other kind of trade barrier. Carter, McCalla, and Sharples (1990) examined the linkage
between imperfect competition and political economy of trade policy. Most approaches have
utilized the conjectural variations method (Paarlberg and Abbott, 1986; Kolstad and Burris,
1987), an approach not included by strict game theorists among their tools (McMillan, 1986;
Tirole, 1988). Some recent approaches have followed explicit game theoretic methods (Karp
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and McCalla, 1983; Hillberg, 1988; Johnson, Mahe, and Roe, 1993; Kennedy, von Witzke, and
Roe, 1994).
In addition, Kydland (1975) compared open loop and feedback solutions for suitable
equilibrium solutions for cooperative and dominant player dynamic games. He argued that the
feedback solution is generally more appropriate as an equilibrium concept.

For the

interdependency of trade, Karp and McCalla (1983) provide an application of dynamic
difference game to the world corn market. The difference game provides a plausible model for
evaluating the effects of trade restrictions. These effects include the direct impact on prices and
quantities and the retaliation of trading partners. The total effect can be disaggregated to
determine the impact on various interest groups within nations.
In trade policy debates, it is often argued that domestic industries should receive
temporary protection from import competition (MAFF, 1997). Immediate trade liberalization
and ensuing inflows of foreign products and capital would jeopardize domestic firms, while
protection would allow the domestic industries to introduce new technologies and products,
thereby effectively competing with their foreign rivals. Any such protectionist measure should
be temporary, because, under permanent protection, the lack of competitive pressure reduces
incentives for domestic firms to rationalize their operations and to hold down costs (Matsuyama
and Itoh, 1986; Matusyama, 1990). A similar argument arises in the context of infant industry
protection. Temporary support by governments sometimes helps new industries grow strong
enough to meet international competition. But indefinitely imposed protection often results in
perpetual industrial stagnation (WTO, 1997). In that sense, game theory is a fruitful ground for
conceptualizing micro-level transactions, particularly those that take place in more isolated
markets or among cooperating groups (Horowitz, Just, and Netanyahu, 1996).
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These various studies described in the above literature review give an overall picture of
the concerns associated with the rice markets, and provide a sense of the magnitude of the
issues involved with the government rice policies and international rice trade.
1.6 Outline of the Dissertation
This dissertation will be organized into five chapters. Chapter One consists of the
research problem statement, justification of the research, objectives of the study and a
description of research procedures. Chapter Two reviews the rice economies of Japan, Korea
and the U.S. export market. The theoretical framework for the econometric estimation, the PPF
determination, and the game theoretic approach will be discussed in Chapter Three. The
empirical approach will be conducted to determine the Nash Equilibrium import and export
policies for these three countries, and the results will be discussed in Chapter Four. The
summary, conclusions, and suggestions for further study will be contained in Chapter Five.
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CHAPTER 2
JAPANESE AND KOREAN RICE ECONOMIES
2.1 Japanese and Korean Rice Economies
The rice economies of Japan and Korea are distinguished by small-scale rice farms. The
two countries radically reformed their land tenure systems in the late 1940s and early 1950s
(Dyck, et al., 1993). The land reforms were important economic and social changes during the
postwar period since they resolved long-simmering class conflicts in rural society and enabled
millions of households to become freeholders, with economic status, at least by the 1950’s,
comparing favorably to that of the urban working class (Tweeten, 1993). The two economies
taxed agriculture to some extent in the earlier decades of the post-WWII era. All shared a
common experience of suffering poverty and hunger before they became industrially developed.
In Japan, there were 4,661 thousand farm households in 1980, among which 3,721
thousand rice farm households. The number of rice farm household accounted for 79.8 % of
total farm households in 1980. However, the number of farm household decreased dramatically
to 3,239 thousand households and 2,134 thousand rice farm households, accounting for 71 % of
the total farm households in 1999 (Table 2.1).
For Korea, there were about 1.38 million farm households cultivating 1.9 million
hectares of agricultural land in 1999, implying that the average farm size is about 1.37 hectare
(Table 2.1).
The agricultural statistics of MAFF (ministry of agricultural, fishery and forestry) and the
USDA indicate that the average area of farms in the two countries has grown only slightly since
those countries land reforms in the late 1940s. The average arable land per farm household in
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these two countries increased from 1.02 ha in 1980 to 1.5 ha in 1999 (Table 2.1). On rice
farms, the average area has been less than 1 hectare even though it has been increasing.
Table 2.1. Farm Structure in Japan and Korea, Selected years.
1980
1985
1990
1995
Total farm households (A)
(1000 households)
Korea
Japan
Total arable land (B)
(1,000 ha)
Korea
Japan
Average arable land
(per household (ha), B/A)
Korea
Japan
Rice farm households
(1,000 households)
Korea
Japan
Land for rice
(1,000 ha)
Korea
Japan
Average rice land
( per household, ha)
Korea
Japan

1999

2,155
4,661

1,926
4,376

1,767
3,835

1,501
3,444

1,382
3,239

2,196
5,461

2,144
5,379

2,109
5,243

1,985
5,038

1,899
4,866

1.02
1.17

1.11
1.23

1.19
1.37

1.32
1.46

1.37
1.50

1,837
3,721

1,649
3,437

1,525
3,063

1,205
2,301

1,064
2,134

1,233
2,377

1,237
2,342

1,244
2,074

1,056
2,118

1,066
1,788

0.52
0.64

0.75
0.68

0.82
0.68

0.88
0.77

1.00
0.84

Source: MAFF, Republic of Korea, various years.
MAFF, Japan various years.

These two countries’ governments have adopted diversion programs to reduce
government stocks and program costs, to increase the average rice area per farm, and to reduce
the higher production costs compared with those of U.S.
Most of the farm households are headed by an aging population, 55 to 65 years of age or
older, who have poor prospects for earning comparable incomes in other occupations and whose
assets consist largely of high-valued farm land (Wailes, 1994).
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A general feature of both countries is an aging farm population (generally over 55) with
rice farming being mostly a part-time farming operation with high dependence on off-farm
income. Currently these two countries have high rice production costs compared to border
prices due to the small scale of farming, relatively high labor costs, and high land costs.
Table 2.2. Rice Production Cost for Selected Years in Japan, Korea, and the U.S.
Japan
South Korea
U.S.
Year
(US$/ha)
(US$/ha)
(US$/ha)
1981
1983
1984
1986
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

7,527
7,350
7,326
10,545
12,520
13,200
15,576
16,106
17,989*
15,529
13,877*
12,988*

2,616
2,932
2,971
2,996
5,456
5,089
4,953
4,984
5,341
5,497
4,818
3,651*

877.8
867.8
875.7
875.2
968.0
932.9
982.2
1,046.3
1,058.4
1,130.6
1,130.4
1,105.2

Source: MAFF, various years, and USDA 2001.
*: due to exchange rate.

The economic conditions of rice farm households and the rice markets in Japan and
Korea are much more complex since the structure of rice agriculture in both countries has
changed markedly over the last two decades and continues to change.
Given their similar backgrounds and the importance of rice production, the rice
economies of Japan and Korea have many characteristics in common. These two countries
experienced hunger during war years and land reform conflicts, creating strong pressure to
continue the status quo of small farm ownership and self-sufficiency in rice production. These
two countries taxed agriculture as a national policy to successfully help develop the industrial
sector.

Therefore, there is strong public support to preserve agriculture now.

The farm

structure is dominated by small scale rice farms and mostly operator-owned rather than rented
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rice farms. They produce high quality japonica medium-grain rice as a staple food. During the
past several decades, they have been experiencing a decrease in per capita rice consumption,
and normally produce rice surpluses as a result of highly protectionist government programs.
2.1.1 Korean Rice Farm Structure
More than 65 percent of rice farm households operate less than 1 hectare of farmland in
1999, as shown in Table 2.3. The number of rice farm households in each class of farm size has
been decreasing. However, the number of rice farm households with more than 2.0 hectares has
been fluctuated. This implies that the structural changes in rice farm sector has been affected by
Korean financial crisis occurred in 1997. Rice farmers need to get any type of loan from the
government, agricultural cooperation, and banks to expand their rice farmland. However, it was
extremely difficult to get a loan from any financial organizations since the financial crisis. In
spite of all efforts for structural changes, the majority of the farmers are still operating smallscale farms.
Table 2.3. Number of Korean Rice Farm Households by Farm Size, Selected Years
(Units: 1,000 households (%)).
Year
Below 0.5ha
0.5-1.0 ha
1.0-2.0 ha
Above 2.0 ha
Total*
1980

529(28.8)

646(35.2)

543(29.6)

119(6.5)

1,837(100.0)

1985

467(28.4)

601(36.5)

483(29.3)

96(5.8)

1,647(100.0)

1990

422(27.6)

475(31.1)

475(31.2)

150(9.9)

1,525(100.0)

1995

354(29.4)

353(29.3)

341(28.4)

157(13.1)

1,205(100.0)

1996

355(30.3)

339(29.0)

327(27.9)

151(12.9)

1,172(100.0)

1997

353(30.9)

332(29.0)

308(27.0)

150(13.1)

1,143(100.0)

1998

381(34.7)

312(28.4)

274(25.0)

131(11.9)

1,098(100.0)

1999

380(35.8)

304(28.5)

260(24.5)

120(11.3)

1,064(100.0)

Source: Korean MAFF, various years.
*: Non-crop farm households are excluded.

In Korea, the family farm is broadly defined as a farm, which is operated by a farm
household, meaning that both the farm operator, and all farm laborers, are family members.
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This concept of a family farm was first adopted by the Korean government in the process of
enacting the Farmland Reform Law in 1948-50 (Park, 1996). The fundamental structure of
Korean agriculture, the owner-operated family farm system, was established during this period.
In the Farmland Reform Law, the maximum farmland holding by a farm household was limited
to 3.0 ha of cropland (MAFF, 1995). In fact, it was not possible for a farm family to manage
more than three hectares of farmland in the 1950s, due to the low level of farm mechanization.
The proportion of part-time rice farm households has been increasing, while the
proportion of full-time farmers has been decreasing until 1996 as shown in Tble 2.4. For
example, the proportions of full-time and part-time households in total farm households were
76.2 percent and 23.8 percent respectively in 1980. In 1996, they were 56.5 percent and 43.5
percent, respectively (Table 2.4). This suggests that the part-time household was an inevitable
solution to the problem of income parity with non-agricultural households given the small farm
size.
Table 2.4. The Number of Rice Farms by Type in Korea (Unit: 1,000 households).
Year
Total*
Full-time
Part-time
1980
1985
1990
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

1,837(100.0)
1,649(100.0)
1,525(100.0)
1,205(100.0)
1,172(100.0)
1,143(100.0)
1,098(100.0)
1,064(100.0)

1,399(76.2)
1,299(78.8)
909(59.6)
682(56.6)
662(56.5)
671(58.7)
694(63.2)
677(63.6)

438(23.8)
350(21.2)
616(40.4)
523(43.4)
510(43.5)
472(41.3)
404(36.8)
387(36.4)

Source: MAFF, 2000.
*: Non-Marketing farm households are included.

In the end of 1997, however, the Korean economy confronted with the worst financial
crisis in its history. The underlying causes of the Korean financial crisis are intermingled by
internal and external factors (Han, 1999). Financial shocks resulted in a lot of self-employment
bankruptcies and a sharp increase in unemployment rate, almost to 10%. As a result, people
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who previously engaged in general economic sector as part-time farmers started becoming fulltime farmers. As a result, the proportion of the full-time rice farms has increased since 1997
when the financial crisis occurred.
In addition, most young capable farmers have been migrating to urban areas to find more
highly paid jobs, leaving only the older and less occupationally mobile farmers in rural areas.
In 1990, approximately 56 percent of the Korean farmers were more than 50 years old as shown
in Table 2.5. The proportion increased to 68 percent in 1999. The substantial proportion of
older farmers may be a primal cause of the lack of vitality and international competitiveness of
Korean agriculture because it is unrealistic to expect that the older farm operators will adopt
new farm technology, and invest more to improve their farm operations. Therefore, a dramatic
increase in productivity and farm income cannot be expected in the near future.
Table 2.5. Rice Farm Labor Trends in Korea (Unit: %).
1990
1995
1996
1997
Total
– 19
20 – 29
30 – 39
40 – 49
50 – 59
60 –

100.0
0.00
0.06
15.3
21.6
32.6
23.7

100.0
0.00
0.03
12.8
19.7
28.0
36.1

100.0
0.00
0.03
11.7
19.6
26.8
39.0

100.0
0.00
0.03
10.5
18.6
26.8
41.5

1998

1999

100.0
0.00
0.03
10.5
18.4
27.2
40.6

100.0
0.00
0.03
9.7
18.2
25.3
43.3

Source: Korean MAFF, various years.

In general, production costs are much higher than those of the U.S. because of the high
farmland prices (Table 2.2). Therefore, small size farms find it difficult to purchase farmland
for enlarging their farm size.

As shown in Table 2.2, the production cost in Korea is

approximately five times higher than that of the U.S. in 1996, but decreased to three times
higher in 1999. This did not mean that the Korean production costs decreased dramatically due
to the structural reform. This was mainly due to the Korean currency depreciation since the
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financial crisis in 1997. The exchange rate was 805 Won/$1 in 1996, but it was 1400 Won/$1
in 1997 (MAFF, 1998).
2.1.2 Japanese Rice Farm Structure
Japan s agricultural land reform, rigorously implemented throughout the country,
abolished absentee ownership by 1950 and transferred two million hectares of farmland into the
hands of small-scale cultivators, mostly former tenants (Goto and Imamura, 1993). Ceiling
provisions for individual holdings were set at 12 hectares in Hokkaido and 3 hectares in the rest
of the country. However, the agricultural land reform in 1950s did not change the average size
of individual farms (Tweeten, 1993).
Table 2.6. Number of Japanese Rice Farm Households by Farm Size*
(Unit: 1,000 households (%)).
Year
Below 1.0 ha
1.0 ha – 2.0 ha
Above 2.0
Total
1990
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

1,753(60.8)
1,740(75.6)
1,689(74.9)
1,687(75.8)
1,658(75.9)
1,643(77.0)

782(27.2)
380(16.5)
382(16.9)
366(16.4)
357(16.4)
334(15.7)

348(12.1)
180(7.8)
183(8.1)
174(7.8)
169(7.7)
156(7.3)

2,883(100.0)
2,301(100.0)
2,254(100.0)
2,227(100.0)
2,184(100.0)
2,133(100.0)

Source: MAFF, Japan, 2000.
*: Non-marketing farm households are excluded.

The area of arable land in Japan decreased from 5,461 thousand ha in 1980 to 4,866
thousand ha in 1999 (Table 2.1). Table 2.1 shows that the number of farm households was
4,661 thousand households in 1980 and decreased to 3,239 thousand households in 1999,
resulting in an average farm size of about 1.5 hectare.
Most Japanese rice farms are very small in size (Table 2.6). The share of farms of less
than 1.0 hectare was 60.8 percent and that of over 2 hectares was only 12.1 percent in 1990. In
1999, the farms below 1 hectare increased to 77 percent and the number rice farming over 2
hectares were decreased to 7.3 percent due to the diversion program and trade liberalization. As
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shown in Table 2.1, the Japanese farm size has been increasing gradually but it is still small.
For rice farms, the number of farms has been decreasing due to the diversion program and trade
liberalization as well. The average rice farm size is still less than 1 hectare although it has been
increasing.
Table 2.7. The Number of Farms by Type* in Japan, 1990-1999
(Units: 1,000 households, %).
Marketing Farms
Non-marketing Farms*
Year
Total
Full-time
Part-time
1990
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

3,835(100.0)
3,444(100.0)
3,388(100.0)
3,344(100.0)
3,291(100.0)
3,239(100.0)

473(12.3)
428(12.4)
432(12.8)
436(13.0)
434(13.2)
433(13.4)

2,497(65.1)
2,224(64.6)
2,171(64.1)
2,133(63.8)
2,088(63.5)
2,041(63.0)

865(22.6)
792(23.0)
785(23.2)
775(23.2)
769(23.4)
764(23.6)

Source: MAFF, various years.
*: Non-marketing farmers, as part-time, produce agricultural products to consume, not to sell.

Small farm size has contributed to the fact that rice in Japan is produced predominantly
by part-time farmers (Table 2.7). More than 80 percent of Japanese farmers are part-time
including non-marketing farms. Therefore, the importance of part-time farming has to be
considered in the Japanese farm structure.
The rapid decrease of new entrants to rice farming beginning in the 1960s is consistent
with the aging of the current population of farmers. More than 50 percent of farmers in Japan
are 50 years of age or older (Immamura, 1993). Younger generations fail to enter farming not
because of low income from farming. Even if they can become high-income earners in farming,
or they are the inheritors of high-income family farms, many of them still will not enter farming
because they prefer to work in non-farm corporations, which provide more satisfying work for
them.
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Table 2.8. Japanese Rice Farm Labor by Age, 1999 (Unit: thousand people).
Total
19 – 29
30 – 59
60 – 64
64 <
6810
(100.0)

484
(7.1)

3295
(48.4)

805
(11.8)

2227
(32.7)

Source: MAFF, 2000.

As shown in Table 2.8, approximately 45 percent of rice farmers were older than 60
years of age in 1999. Therefore, we cannot expect either fast productivity increase adopting
cutting-edge technology or dramatic changes in their rice farm structure.
Table 2.9 shows production costs by farm size in 1998. Total costs per hectare decrease
as size increases from less than 0.5 hectares to more than 5 hectares. Labor cost per hectare
decreases from US$ 6,425 for farms less than 0.5 hectares to US$2,640 for farms greater than 5
hectares. In addition to labor, more efficient utilization of equipment contributes to economies
of size.
Table 2.9. Rice Production Costs by Farm Size in Japan, 1998 (U.S.$/ha).
Average < 0.5 0.5-1.0 1.0-1.5 1.5-2.0 2 .0-3.0 3.0-5.0 > 5.0
Equipment* 6,192 8,134 6,911
Labor
4,353 6,425 5,121
By-product -258 -267
-264
Interest
394
164
190
Rent
2,307 2,573 2,459
Total
12,988 17,028 14,416

6,225 5,762
4,385 3,947
-236
-245
233
452
2,434 2,368
13,041 12,284

5,495
3,734
-248
533
2,314
11,828

4,989
3,234
-252
677
2,112
10,760

4,836
2,640
-288
805
1,702
9,695

Source: MAFF, 2000, Japan.
*: Including fertilizer, chemicals, and machine.

Large-scale farms may be able to cut costs substantially. Table 2.9 shows that farm
size/structure is a major constraint to lowering the national average cost of rice production and
the substantial cost reductions could be achieved in Japan by enlargement of farms. However,
current average rice production costs in Japan are several times higher than those in major rice
exporting countries such as Thailand and the U.S.
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2.2 Rice Supply and Demand in Japan and Korea
Rice supply and demand in Japan and Korea share many similarities. The production
structure and policies for the rice sector have many common characteristics. As these countries
have become more wealthy industrial countries, they have experienced a similar long-term
decline in per capita rice consumption.
In terms of production, rice is the major crop grown in Japan and Korea, accounting for
37 percent and 56 percent of the total planted acreage in 1999, respectively. Although rice
production has been relatively stable during the past 20 years, it has come from improved yield.
The supply of paddy land for rice production has been stable over time due to the limited
availability of land, as well as the low substitutability in land use between paddy and upland.
Improvements in rice yields are mainly due to the adoption of new varieties, mechanization, and
improved production practices in both countries (Im, 1999; Park, 1996). Table 2.10 and 2.11
indicate that the yield in Japan and Korea has increased by 31 percent and 52 percent in 2000,
compared to 1980, respectively.
On the consumption side, an increase in per capita income created a change in food
consumption patterns in both countries. In addition, as per capita income has grown, per capita
consumption of rice has declined gradually. This is mainly due to the change in the dietary
pattern of consumers in favor of protein food such as meat and vegetables (MAFF, 1995).
However, the total consumption in rice has been stable in both countries due to an increase in
population and higher demand in processing industries.
2.2.1 Japan
Rice production in Japan has decrease gradually with changes in food consumption
patterns and with the recent changes in the rice marketing system.
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As rice consumption began to decrease, the build-up of rice stocks began to place
pressure on the government budget. Due to this pressure, the rice diversion program was
initiated in 1970 on a trial basis with an incentive subsidy for areas diverted from rice
production. Rice area declined to 2,377 ha by 1980. Since 1970, several types of diversion
programs have been implemented depending upon the level of rice stocks and the government
budget situation (Ito, et al., 1997). As a result, the area planted to rice in Japan decreased from
2,377 thousand ha in 1980 to 1,788 thousand ha in 1999 (Table 2.1). Total production declined
to 8,636 thousand metric tons (MT) (milled) in 2000 from 10,612 MT (milled) in 1985.
Rice yields increased by more than 20% from the level of 3.73 MT/ha (milled) in 1980 to
a level of 4.88 MT/ha (milled) in 2000 (Table 2.10). Since 1985, yields have been relatively
stable ranged between levels of 4.53 to 4.93 except for the crop failure in 1993, when yields
declined to 3.33 MT/ha due to cold weather. Yield growth has been primarily due to varietal
improvements and chemical inputs but also due to the diversion programs as less productive
rice land has generally been diverted to alternative crops (Kako, et al., 1997; MAFF, 1998).
Table 2.10. Supply and Utilization of Rice in Japan, 1980-2000.
Area Yield Production Consumption Per Capita Stocks Imports Exports
Year 1,000ha MT/ha
--- 1,000MT --Kg
--- 1,000MT --1980
1985
1990
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

2,377
2,342
2,074
2,139
2,212
2,118
1,977
1,953
1,801
1,788
1,770

3.73
4.53
4.61
3.33
4.93
4.62
4.77
4.67
4.53
4.67
4.88

8,873
10,612
9,554
7,129
10,903
9,781
9,413
9,123
8,154
8,350
8,636

10,100
10,150
9,620
9,400
9,350
9,300
9,250
9,200
9,100
9,450
9,300

Sources: MAFF, 2000; USDA/PS&D, 2000.
N/A: not available.
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78.9
74.6
70.0
69.2
66.3
67.8
67.3
66.7
62.5
N/A
N/A

4,000
1,110
1,005
731
1,883
2,615
3,078
3,094
2,492
1,831
1,297

75
20
17
2,623
9
451
600
499
554
639
730

909
0
0
0
410
200
300
574
210
200
600

Annual per capita rice consumption decreased from 78.9kg in 1980 to 62.5kg in 1998.
The Japanese diet has shifted to larger shares of dairy products, meats, and wheat products,
although the government has tried to increase rice consumption with a school lunch program
and other promotional activities (Wailes, et al., 1999). The total consumption has decreased
from 10,100 thousand MT (milled) in 1980 to 9,300 thousand MT (milled) in 2000 (Table
2.10). While rice has not lost it s significance as a food staple, it has become a less important
component of the Japanese diet. The decline in rice consumption is continuing in spite of high
government expenditures to promote rice consumption, such as the school lunch program.
The Japanese rice market was closed to imports except for processed rice products and
for occasional severe domestic production shortfalls as occurred in 1980 and 1993 before the
GATT agreement was reached on Japanese minimum access imports (USDA, 1995). However,
the Japanese refused to eat imported rice in 1980 because the imported rice was not the japonica
type. Therefore, the Japanese government reexported the rice imported in 1980. In 1993, rice
imports reached a peak of 2,623 thousand MT (milled) (Table 2.10).

Stocks have been

normally about 10 to 15 percent of production, and production has been controlled by an
elaborate supply management program in Japan involving fixed delivery quotas for producers
and massive rice diversion programs with heavy subsidy payments (MAFF, 1994).
Japan had a turbulent year for rice production and trade in 1993/1994. Because of cool
and rainy weather, the 1993/1994 rice harvest plunged to 7.129 million metric tons (MMT), the
lowest in almost 50 years (Lee, 1997). Faced with a disastrous crop and low domestic stocks,
Japan temporarily abrogated its almost total ban on rice imports and signed contracts to import
2.45 million tons. When Japanese traders began to import rice, the impact on world rice prices
was immediate and strong but fleeting: in the fall of 1993, prices initially soared, but dropped
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considerably by $80/MT in 1994 (Figure 2.1). A recovery in Japan s 1994/1995 rice crop, to
10.9 MMT, along with large rice crops for most of the major exporters in 1994, led to
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significantly lower world rice prices in 1994.

Year
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Figure 2.1 Japanese and Korean Imports and the World Rice Price.
Japan has imported all its rice from the United States, China, Australia, and Thailand.
The first three countries provided mainly short-to-medium grain (japonica) rice, while Thailand
supplied mainly long-grain (indica) and some glutinous rice (USDA/Attaché report, 1997).
Thai and Chinese rice has sold at a significant discount to the U.S. and Australia rice as Chinese
japonica is of very poor quality, while Thai indica rice has not been well received by Japanese
consumers, who prefer high-quality japonica rice. Domestically grown rice has sold at a large
premium to all imported rice, but U.S. rice has fared well compared with rice from other
countries. Consumers have reluctantly purchased blended domestic and foreign rice as many
customers preferred to buy domestic and imported rice packaged separately (MAFF, 1999).
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2.2.2 Korea
The South Korean government has intervened in the rice market through both output and
input pricing.

The government has intervened in the rice market because rice is a very

important part of both Korean culture and economy. The total planted acreage of rice decreased
from 1,233 thousand ha in 1980 to 1,072 thousand ha by 2000. Rice yields increased from 3.24
kg/ha in 1980 to 4.94 kg/ha by 2000 (Table 2.11).
Rice yields fluctuated until the 1960s, with either floods or droughts seriously affecting
the yields. In the 1970s, the government invested in large-scale irrigation projects for paddy
fields, developed new high-yielding varieties (Tongil), and also improved traditional japonica
varieties. Consequently, rice yields increased in the mid 1970s and became stable thereafter,
except for 1980 when unusually cold weather was detrimental to yields (Song, et al., 1995).
Table 2.11. Supply and Utilization of Rice in Korea, 1980-2000.
Area Yield Production Consumption Per Capita Stocks Import Export
Year 1,000ha MT/ha
--- 1000MT --Kg
--- 1000MT --1980
1985
1990
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

1,233
1,237
1,244
1,136
1,102
1,056
1,050
1,052
1,059
1,066
1,072

3.24
4.55
4.51
4.18
4.59
4.45
5.07
5.18
4.82
4.94
4.94

4,000
5,626
5,606
4,750
5,060
4,694
5,320
5,450
5,100
5,263
5,291

5,432
5,807
5,490
5,300
5,300
5,200
5,100
5,112
5,038
5,003
5,000

132.4
128.1
119.6
110.2
108.3
106.5
104.9
102.4
99.2
96.6
N/A

1,495
1,251
2,151
1,393
1,006
615
912
805
980
1,355
1,776

2,245
0
2
4
3
115
0
77
113
115
130

0
0
17
0
150
0
0
0
0
0
0

Source: PS&D, MAFF.
N/A: not available.

Due to this production shortfall in 1980, the government imported more than 2.2 MMT
of rice from the United States, mostly from Louisiana and California (Song and Carter, 1996).
The actual shortfall was only 1.4 MMT. The excess rice imports resulted in excess stock
problems. The ending stocks jumped to 1.5 MMT in 1980 (Table 2.11).
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Good harvests followed after 1980, so the self-sufficiency rate exceeded 100 percent
throughout the 1980s. A poor harvest in 1993 reduced self-sufficiency to 86 percent but it
recovered to 100 percent by 1996. On the other hand, Korean rice production has increased
from 3.0 MMT in the early 1960s to more than 5.0 MMT since late 1970’s, and this was
possible due to the introduction of the Tongil high-yielding variety. Acreage planted to Tongil
accounted for 15.8% of the total rice acreage in 1972 and 76.2% in 1987. Beginning in 1992,
the government refused to buy Togil and farmers immediately stopped production, resulting in
some rice yield decline (Rainey, 1993; MAFF, 1994).
Total paddy rice production has ranged from 4 MMT in 1980 to 5.6 MMT in 1990, and it
was 5.3 MMT in 2000. Significant reductions in production in 1993 and 1995 prompted the
government to import 115 thousand MT in 1995. This import level was in excess of MA
required by the World Trade Organization (WTO).
During the period of 1980-2000, Korean rice consumption has decreased from 5.43
MMT in 1980 to 5.0 MMT in 2000. Ending stocks fell to 0.98 MMT in 1998, but increased to
1.78 MMT in 2000 (Table 2.11). Overall per capita consumption of rice in the 1980 was
132.4kg, but it has decreased gradually to only 119.6 kg by 1990. In the 1990s, the overall per
capita consumption has continued to decline to 96.6 kg by 1999.
2.3 Japanese and Korean Rice Policy Changes
2.3.1 Japan
Japan s current rice policy has its roots in the country s economic development policy
following World War II. At that time the government sought to encourage rice production
through investment in rural infrastructure, research, and extension, while keeping producer rice
prices low (Coyle, 1981). The government s policy was carried out under the Staple Food
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Control Law ($The 42 Act#). The purpose of the law was to control food and to carry out the
adjustment of supply, demand and prices and also to control distribution in order to secure food
for customers and to ensure stability in the national economy. The 42 Act gave the government
exclusive control over the purchase, sale, and pricing of major foods such as rice, wheat, barley,
and potatoes (MAFF, 1995; Kako, et al., 1997).
In addition, Japan s agricultural development initially was further stimulated by land
reform. The reform measures transferred ownership of approximately one-third of all farmland
to former tenants, imposed maximum sizes on farms, prohibited non-farm residents from
renting out more than one hectare, and effectively outlawed the sale of land between farmers.
The average family farm size, approximately 1 hectare, was considered a reasonable size for
family labor in view of the labor productivity of that time (Susumu and Ito, 1993). Since then,
however, Japan s rice policy has had the effect of (1) curtailing the establishment of more
efficient and larger farms and (2) encouraging cultivation of rice on a part-time basis.
During the early 1960s, the producer price was roughly at parity with the world price.
Producer rice prices subsequently began to increase rapidly, however, ultimately doubling
between 1960 and 1969. This rapid increase far exceeded the modest increase in prices paid in
the international market. In 1969, the Japanese producer price was more than double the world
price (Tweeten, 1993).
Resale prices for rice set by the Japanese Food Agency (JFA) were also high. Just as
higher producer rice prices were encouraging production, rising retail price levels also
dampened demand, thereby contributing to a decline in total as well as per capita rice
consumption in Japan. Under this artificial stimulus, Japan became $self-sufficient# in rice by
the late 1960’s. The increase in the resale rice price above world market levels was made
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possible by restrictions on imports. Japan s imports from the United States, which had averaged
around 162 thousand MT of milled rice annually from 1964-1967, were sharply curtailed to an
average of about 2 thousand MT in 1968 and 1969 (Wailes, et al., 1993).
High support prices not only resulted in the accumulation of increasing levels of surplus
rice in government stocks, but also contributed to increasing government budget deficits.
To cope with excess production, the government sought to divert farmers to other crops
and to dispose of surplus government rice stocks. The JFA responded to overproduction
primarily in two ways: diversion programs and surplus disposal schemes. These efforts failed
as rice stocks again doubled by the end of the decade (MAFF, 1992).
Beginning in 1969, the government implemented a series of diversion programs designed
to induce rice farmers to divert land planted as paddy to the production of other crops.
However, this program did not work as expected.
With per capita rice consumption decreasing and excess production remaining at high
levels, in 1971, the JFA established a new, long-term program, the Rice Production Control and
Diversion Program. The JFA s goal was to cut annual rice production by 2 million tons by
inducing farmers to shift about 15 percent of the total paddy field area to other crops.
The diversion program operated through a combination of $administrative guidance# and
economic incentives. This consisted of recommendations, advice, or directives issued by the
JFA.

The JFA supplemented its administrative guidance with a package of economic

incentives. The principal measure consisted of direct incentive payments for diversion to other
crops. The JFA also took measures to subsidize additional investment costs associated with
switching from rice to other crops, such as the acquisition of new machinery and livestock and
land improvement to transform paddy to upland fields. Despite the JFA s efforts, however, rice
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production, stimulated by the high producer prices, continued to exceed target levels in four of
the five years the program was in effect. During this period, the JFA also sought to use a rice
purchase program to reduce production.
The JFA launched a second diversion program in 1976, the Comprehensive Paddy Field
Utilization Program. Target levels of the second diversion program were reduced somewhat.
Under the new plan, incentive payments also varied depending on the crop selected.
Nonetheless, production in 1977 again exceeded the JFA s target level.
The JFA initiated a third program in 1978, the Paddy Field Utilization Reorientation
Program, a diversion plan scheduled to operate through 1987. The program set an annual
reduction target of 1.7 MMT of rice for the first two years of the program, and increased
upwards to 2.45 MMT in 1980. Japanese imports of U.S. rice during that period averaged only
about one thousand MT per year for a total domestic market of about 10 MMT.
In 1986, the government announced that it would divert a total of 70 thousand hectares
each year between 1987-1989. This was necessary because of higher than normal rice stocks
held as a result of three consecutive bumper harvests from 1984 to 1986. With a fourth bumper
crop in 1987, and increasing stock levels, the government decided to expand the rice land
diversion by an additional 52 thousand hectares for the 1988 crop (Ito, et al., 1997). The
oversupply problem had been further exacerbated by declining consumption as the Japanese
diet diversifies further away from rice to other grains and to red meat.
Recently, the situation in the Japanese rice industry has been changing drastically
because of the implementation of the GATT Uruguay Round agreement. The GATT agreement
allows Japan to exempt rice from tariffication for the period 1995-2001. Even this partial
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opening of Japanese rice market has been shown to a large impact on the domestic and
international rice industry (Cramer, et al., 1996).
Besides the MA rice imports, the Japanese rice sector faces the following emerging
issues. First, domestic rice production costs are far above the international prices due to the
small scale of farming, relatively high labor costs, high land costs, and over investment in farm
machinery. Since Japan has partially opened the rice market, it became critically important to
reduce the gap between domestic production costs and those of the major rice exporting
countries. The government has implemented various measures to reduce the production costs
by promoting structural improvement policies and accelerating technological change. However,
Japan s rice farm size has been static. Although the number of large scale farms has increased
slightly, the average rice harvested area per rice farm household was 0.64 ha in 1980 and it has
not increased significantly since then. Rice production costs in Japan still far exceeds that of
rice exporting countries (Table 2.2).
Second, rice is an inferior good in Japan, and a decrease in rice consumption will likely
continue in the future (Ito, 1996). On the other hand, rice supply would increase as a result of
the MA rice import and rice yield increase. Therefore, the rice diversion program may have to
be strengthened in the future in order to maintain a balance between supply and demand. The
rice diversion program requires all rice producers to divert the same proportion of paddy field
from rice production regardless of their farm size. Thus, the rice acreage diversion program
discouraged full time and core farmers from trying to expand their scale of operations. Many
researchers pointed out the importance of improving the rice diversion programs not to provide
disincentives for more efficient large scale rice farms (Kako, et al., 1996).
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Third, the average age of rice farmers has been increasing because of the decline in the
number of young farmers staying on the farm. This is due to the inferior income from rice
farming and less favorable working conditions compared with non-agricultural economic
activities. Most of the rice is produced by small scale part-time farm households with a high
dependence on off-farm income.
Under the Uruguay Round minimum access agreement for rice, the government of Japan
(GOJ) committed to purchase 379 thousand MT of rice on a milled basis. Of the total minimum
access rice, 9,811 MT were allocated for the Simultaneous Buy and Sell (SBS) tenders. The
U.S. captured 53 percent market share under the SBS tenders and approximately 46 percent of
the minimum access tenders. These tenders were completed in December 1995, and actual
imports were completed by the end of the Japanese fiscal year 1995. The GOJ also used 560
thousand MT of foreign rice, which was imported in 1994 on an emergency basis, as food aid to
North Korea and other developing countries. The GOJ also implemented the New Food Law in
November 1995 replacing the Staple Food Control Law, which had existed over the previous 50
years. Under the new law, some market-oriented principles were introduced into the Japanese
rice market but the Japanese Food Agency (JFA) of the MAFF continues to control rice
importation, and continues to exert strong influence over domestic distribution.
In the meantime, as mentioned in Chapter one, the Japanese government notified the
WTO of its decision to introduce rice tariffication beginning April 1, 1999. Under tariffication,
a specific duty of 351.17 yen per kilogram (kg) was applied to imports outside of the MA
volume. In and after Japanese fiscal year (JFY) 2000, April to March, a specific duty of 341 yen
per kg was applied to imports outside of MA (MAFF, 1999). Japan’s tariffication agreement of
April 1 has three components: (1) a secondary tariff applied to rice imports above the MA
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import levels (where the mark-up associated with the tariff equivalent of the MA is considered
the primary tariff). The initial secondary tariff rate is set at 351.17 yen per kg for 1999
(approximately $3,000/MT) followed by a 2.5% reduction to 341 yen in 2000; (2) in agreeing to
the possibility for over quota imports, Japan was allowed to reduce the annual increase in MA
imports from 0.8% to only 0.4%; (3) the new policy adds a safeguard tariff of an additional
33%, triggered at 125% of the previous 3-year moving rice import volume (USDA, 2000).
2.3.2 Korea
Agricultural prices have been unstable and low during the past half century. Low wage
rates kept food prices from increasing. In addition, low inflation rates and high savings were
needed to achieve high economic growth and to increase the export of industrial products. In
particular, low domestic food prices were forced by imported agricultural products, not by the
highly increased productivity of domestic agriculture (Song, et al., 1995).
As a result, the domestic agriculture system experienced severe damage. Naturally,
farmers had a low income growth rate compared with the non-farm sector. An international
comparison of the ratio of revenue from agriculture shows that the GNP decreased from 40% to
7% in the Netherlands over took 165 years, 110 years in Denmark, 113 years in Great Britain,
96 years in the U.S., 94 years in France, 92 years in Germany, and 73 years in Japan; however,
only 26 years in Korea (Lee, 1996). Korea s rapid decrease in the ratio of agricultural revenue
to the GNP resulted in a harsh sacrifice for the agricultural sector through reduced agricultural
prices.
Low rice prices continued in the 1960’s, and the export of industrial products was
accelerated. The manufacturing sector became highly developed as well, therefore changing the
whole economy of Korea. But agricultural development lagged behind the industrial sector. In
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the late 1960’s, the government procurement price was lower than the market price.
Subsequently, Two Price Systems for Barley (1969) and Rice (1970) were begun in the early
1970’s. These policies were aimed at upgrading the self-sufficiency rate of domestic foodgrains.
The purpose of rice policy in Korea is to contribute to food security and the stability of
the national economy, achieving self-sufficiency of table rice (MAFF, 2000). This policy has
the following objectives: efficient production of rice, alignment of demand and supply of rice
and maintenance of reasonable prices. In order to achieve its goal of self-sufficiency of table
rice, MAFF has strengthened its rice production policy, focusing on improving quality.
Since the 1970s, the rice policy has been changed to a mixed market system aimed at
solving food shortages by adoption of a two price system, and the procurement and distribution
of the higher yielding (but lower quality) Tongil rice variety. In the 1970s, the rice policy was
designed to achieve self-sufficiency for rice and to protect the producers and consumers by the
two price system.
In the 1980s, a surplus of rice developed. Although, in 1981, the government imported
substantial volumes of rice to deal with the crop shortage in 1980. In this period, agricultural
markets were based on the theory of liberalization of comparative advantage and the
stabilization of agricultural price.

As a result, agricultural imports into Korea increased

drastically during this period (Lee, 1997).
From 1990, the rice policy was more concerned with the burdensome rice stocks and a
deficit in the government grain account. The government intervened in the rice market and
began to sell the government stocks for price stabilization. As a result, the market price of rice
declined and the private market system became extremely unstable.
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At that time, direct

management by the government was changed into an indirect management system, including
agricultural cooperative associations. The main components of the indirect management system
were: 1) allowance of seasonal variation in price, 2) introduction of the deficiency payment
system that the government supplements the difference between the purchase and the market
prices, and 3) abolition of the rice control fund (MAFF, 1997).
During this period, the full scale import of agricultural products was initiated under
pressure by developed countries. For instance, !The Super 301’ trade legislation in the U.S.
forced Korea to open its agricultural markets. Another international legal code that led to the
liberalization of Korean agricultural markets was the Uruguay Round agreement of the GATT.
Accordingly, liberalization was made for 234 commodity areas.
Thereafter, the main stream of agricultural policy was transformed from the policy of
self-sufficiency to the policy of import liberalization, from price policy to structure policy, and
from agricultural income policy to non-agricultural income policy, etc.
Since the early 1980s, as mentioned earlier, several steps have been taken to dismantle
barriers to imports and to reduce export promotion measures.

This policy was aimed at

improving the efficiency and competitiveness of the Korean economy as it moved into a
transitional phase of economic development.
Perhaps equally disturbing is the apparent change in direction in MAFF s basic policies.
As mentioned earlier, MAFF has focused almost entirely on rice production policy, as
evidenced by the fact that over 90 percent of support expenditures are to rice farmers. A change
occurred in 1994 following the Uruguay Round agreement, with resources being gradually
shifted from rice to other areas, including production of cash crops, marketing facilities and
rural infrastructure.
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Traditionally, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry has focused almost entirely on
rice production policy. A more forward-looking policy was adopted in 1994 following the
Uruguay Round agreement, with resources being gradually shifted from rice to other areas,
including production of cash crops, marketing facilities and rural infrastructure as mentioned
earlier. This past year, due in large part to political considerations, these forward-looking
policies have been modified in favor of a renewed emphasis on rice production. This is seen as
an attempt to minimize the highly politically-sensitive issue surrounding rice imports.
Starting in 1997 the Korean government introduced a new program, a direct payment
system to encourage small and medium-sized rice farmers to retire and transfer productive lands
to form larger operations. Productivity would then be enhanced through greater economies of
scale (USDA/Attaché report, 1998).
As of 1999, rice income accounted for 39.1 percent of farm income. In 1999, the average
rice income per farm household was $6,125, agricultural income was $15,662, and farm income
was $18,759. The average rice acreage per farm was 1.0 ha and the rice income/ha was $7,919
(MAFF, 2000). Rice remains as the most important agricultural crop. Accordingly, Korean rice
growers are experiencing a general consensus of alarm. The main reason for alarm is because
the Korean rice price is very high compared to the foreign rice price, thus Korean rice does not
have a competitive edge over the foreign rice. In 1999, the annual average producer price of
Korean rice was $1,616/mt, whereas the international price was $499/MT (f.o.b., California
Medium No.1), which means the Korean price is over 3 times higher than the international
market price. Naturally, the domestic rice industry is challenged to become more cost efficient
if it is to develop a competitive rice production system.
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According to the UR agreement, Korea was bound to specified import levels under the
minimum access rules. Korea has to increase rice imports under the minimum access rules
from 1.0 % in 1995 to 4.0% of base year consumption (1986-1988) by 2005. In 1995, Korea
was supposed to import 51 thousand MT of rice for the first year of UR/GATT agreement
implementation. However, Korea imported 115 thousand MT in 1995, which is mainly due to
production shortfall. In 2000, Korea imported 130 thousand MT of rice as the UR agreement
commitment.
Despite protestations from the U.S. government, Korean MAFF has announced that all
rice imported during the initial years was for processing purposes only. The U.S. government’s
position is that this is against the spirit if not the law of the UR agreement.
Among competitors, many local experts expect China to be a major supplier over the
long term. China has reportedly developed new varieties of rice to meet Korean taste. This rice
is being grown by ethnic Koreans in the northeastern provinces of Jilin, Liaoning and
Heilongjinag (USDA, 1998).
The price of Chinese rice is about one-eighth that of similar rice produced in Korea.
China also has the obvious advantage of lower transportation cost due to its close proximity to
Korea. Vietnam and Thailand are also reportedly making plans to export their long-grain rice.
Australia is also aggressively seeking to gain a share of any medium-grain rice imported by
Korea. As a matter of fact, China has been a major rice exporter to Korea. For example, Korea
imported 51 thousand MT of Indian rice to meet its MA requirements in 1995. This rice was
intended to meet its 1995 obligations. Since then, Korea imported additional 64 thousand MT of
medium grain rice from China to meet its 1996 MA requirements in 1997. In addition, Korea
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imported 81 thousand MT from China and 13 thousand MT from Thailand in 1999 (USDA,
2000).
Korea’s MA commitment is in affect until 2004. Korea’s strategy for meeting its
commitment includes purchase of only lower quality rice, equivalent to U.S. No. 3 or lower, to
avoid table competition for it’s heavily subsidized domestic rice.
The WTO Agreement also requires a reduction of domestic production subsidies, which
is also leading to a further reduction in rice production in Korea. While the Agreement allows
for decoupled income compensation, which means a production-neutral subsidy, Korea is not
implementing this direct payment system for all farmers yet (MAFF, 2000).
2.4 U. S. Rice Exports
The U.S. is a leading exporter of rice in the international market, accounting for about 12
percent of global rice trade although the U.S. accounts for less than 2 percent of global rice
production. The U.S. currently ranks fourth among major exporters, behind Thailand, Vietnam,
and China. More than 40 percent of the U.S. rice crop is exported each year, making the U.S.
market sensitive to movements in international prices (USDA, 2000).
Most countries produce only one type of rice, but the United States produces both types
(japonica in California, and indica in Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, and Missouri)
and is in a unique position in that it can export significant amounts of both types (Song and
Carter, 1996). However, the U.S. rice programs, marketing loan payments and marketing loan
gains, essentially treats rice as a homogenous crop (Wailes, 2000) and does not provide clear
market signals corresponding to changing market conditions by subspecies (Childs and Lin,
1989). Rice is treated as a homogenous crop in the sense that (a) a single target price and
acreage reduction program (ARP) rate is applied to all rice types, and (b) the rice grading
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system does not distinguish California medium grain (japonica) from southern long grain
(indica); i.e., it applies the same loan rate and marketing loan repayment rate. This distinction
becomes more critical under freer trade, because the largest potential importers, Japan and
Korea, have strong preferences for japonica rice (Wailes, 2000; Haley, 1992).
The total volume of U.S. exports ranged from 2.5 MMT to 2.8 MMT (milled basis) from
1995/96 to 1999/2000. However, this is well below the 1994/95 record of 3.3 MMT. The U.S.
was the largest exporter of rice most years from the late 1960’s through 1980, with Thailand
occasionally out-shipping the U.S. However, Thailand has been the leading exporter of rice
every year since 1981, largely due to expanded area.

By the mid-1990’s, Vietnam had

recovered enough from decades of war and political upheavals to become the second largest
exporter. The country had returned as an exporter only in the late 1980’s after a 30-year
absence. In the late-1990’s, China emerged as a major exporter due to declining per capita
consumption and several years of bumper crops, making the country the third largest exporter.
From 1967 to 1982, Korea imported 8 million metric tons (MMT) of rice and U.S. rice
exports supplied 65% of that market-mostly from California (Schnepf and Just, 1995).
However, by the mid-1980’s, Korea attained self-sufficiency in rice due to generous
government programs, and imports were essentially banned. After losing its largest importer,
Korea, in 1983, California accumulated rice stocks, relative to the southern states. Since 1983,
the U.S. exported no rice to Korea.
In the meantime, Japan accounts for the bulk of U.S. medium grain brown rice exports.
In 1999/2000, Japan imported nearly 150 thousand MT of medium grain brown rice from the
U.S., down from a year earlier record 250 thousand MT. Japan divides its rice purchases
between milled and brown rice, with each type’s share varying each year. The U.S. typically
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supplies half of Japan’s total rice purchases.

The U.S. exports about 10 thousand to 14

thousand MT of short grain brown rice each year. Japan accounts for two-thirds, most of it sold
under the Simultaneous-Buy-Sell (SBS) portion of their total WTO commitments.
The U.S. market share in Japanese import market has been about 50% since 1995.
However, the U.S. market share in Japan decreased in recent years due to heavy competition
among the major export countries, such as Australia, China, and Thailand. For example, the
U.S. has recently lost substantial market share in the SBS to Australia and China.
2.4.1 Government Rice Programs
Rice farming in the U.S. has been affected by federal legislations since the enactment of
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. The main objectives of U.S. rice policy have been to
support farm price and income, and thus to provide the safety-net for rice farming. To achieve
the policy goals, various policy instruments have been adopted that can be classified by three
basic categories: (1) price support programs, (2) supply control programs, and (3) income
support programs.
Price support has been provided by non-recourse loan program since 1941. Under this
program, producers may pledge their production as collateral for obtaining loans from the
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). Once they have placed their rice under loan, producers
have a 9-month period in which to redeem their loans. At the end of that period, they must
decide whether to redeem the loan or forfeit their rice to the CCC. Producers have incentives to
redeem the loan if the market price rises above the loan rate plus interest charges.
Alternatively, they may default on the loan and forfeit the collateral rice to CCC without
penalty, when the market prices are unfavorable. Thus, the loan rate may serve as a guaranteed
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minimum farm price to producers. Only farmers participating in the government farm programs
are eligible for such loans.
During the early 1980’s, loan rates well above market prices deteriorated U.S.
competitiveness in world markets by serving as a “floor price” for U.S. rice. Loan rates in
excess large quantities of rice to be forfeited to the government and a large U.S. price premium
in international markets. As a result, the price support program was modified to introduce the
marketing loan program for rice in the 1985 farm legislation.
The marketing loan program links loan repayment rates to the prevailing world price of
rice rather than the higher announced loan rate (ALR). Rice producers can repay loans at the
lower of a USDA-calculated world price (loan repayment rate or LRR) or a set percentage of
the loan rate. Alternatively, producers can receive an equivalent loan deficiency payment with
agreement to forgo placing their crop under loan. The difference between the ALR and the
world price (LRR) is called the marketing loan gain, when the world price is below the ALR. If
the world price is above the ALR, the LRR equals the ALR (Livezey, 1993).
Supply control programs for rice were changed by the 1981 farm legislation, which
terminated acreage allotments and introduced the concept of crop acreage base for individual
farms that is eligible for government program benefits. For rice, the acreage base is the average
of the acreage planted to rice and the acreage considered planted to rice on the individual farm
in the 3 preceding crop years (Schnef and Just, 1995). Supply controls have been implemented
through acreage control programs such as the Acreage Reduction Program (ARP) and the Paid
Land Diversion (PLD) program, and planting flexibility programs such as the 50/92 program,
the normal flex acres (NFA) program, and the optional flex acres (OFA) program.
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The ARP has been used as supply control method since 1982, requiring land to be
diverted from a farm’s rice base acreage and put into approved conservation uses. Compliance
was required for eligibility for loans and deficiency payments. Acres reduced under ARP are
not eligible for program payment but are considered planted to rice for acreage base purposed.
The Secretary of Agriculture has discretion in setting an ARP level, which can range from zero
to 35 percent of base acres. Other measures, such as the PLD program and the Payment-in-kind
(PIK) program were used together with ARP in 1983 to reduce rice acreage and the large
government stocks. The PIK was an acreage reduction program under which farmers received
the commodity normally grown on acreage they withdrew from production.
Planting flexibility programs were introduced to allow producers to plant another crop
without a reduction in the established crop acreage base so that producers can make production
decisions in response to market conditions, rather than being locked into certain crops to
maintain acreage base. Specific programs of planting flexibility were the 50/92 program in the
1985 farm legislation and the triple base provisions in the 1990 farm legislation.
Under the 50/92 program, rice growers who under plant their permitted acreage by
planting between 50 and 92 percent of the permitted acreage and devoting the remaining
permitted acres to a conservation use would receive deficiency payments on 92 percent of the
permitted acreage. The 50/92 program was changed to the 50/85 program in 1994 under which
farmers are eligible to receive payments on only 85 percent of maximum payment acres
(Broussard, 1992).
The concept of “triple base” increased planting flexibility. Normal flex acres (NFA)
made up the 15 percent of crop acreage base, which is not eligible for deficiency payments.
Crops other than rice can be planted on NFA without decreasing established base. Optional flex
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acres (OFA) are an additional 10 percent of maximum payment acres that can be planted to rice
while receiving deficiency payment or to other crops without losing established acreage base.
Thus, maximum payment acreage is equal to the crop acreage base less NFA or any ARP.
Under a combined NFA and OFA, up to 25 percent of crop acreage base can be flexed out of
rice and planted to another crop while the crop acreage base is protected for future years
(Salassi, 1991). As shown in Table 2.13, the ARP was used as a major tool for supply controls
during 1982-1990, while the 50/85-92 program and the NFA/OFA provisions became more
important starting 1991. However, as a result of the UR agreement, the U.S. agreed to lower its
rice tariffs by 36 percent in six equal installments by 2000 starting in 1995. The United States
also agreed to establish quantity and budgetary ceilings for export subsidies and reduce these 21
percent and 36 percent by 2000. The U.S. does not currently provide direct export subsidies for
rice exports. The U.S. continues to include rice in international food aid shipments the Export
Enhancement Program (EEP) provided targeted export assistance in former U.S. markets, but
there have been no EEP sales for rice in 4 years.
The 1996 Farm Act, enacted more than a year after the UR was concluded, contained
important policy reforms that reduced trade-distorting domestic support policies eliminating
50/85-92 and NFA/OFA programs in 1996. Under the 1996 Farm Act, producer support in the
U.S. is provided in the form of direct payments that are not tied to current planting levels, thus
fitting in the UR “Green Box” category where policies are exempt from the UR reduction
commitments.
Since rice is a program crop, participating rice producers are eligible for production
flexibility contract payments (PFCs). In 1997/98, the PFC payment rate was $2.71 per cwt,
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compared with a market price of $9.70. Participating producers received payments on 85
percent of their contract acreage based on their program yield.
In addition to annual PFC payments, a marketing loan program is provided to U.S. rice
producers. Producer support under the marketing loan program includes both loan deficiency
payments and marketing loan gains. Payment rates are based on the difference between the
announced world price and the established loan rate, with payments resulting when the
announced world rice price is less than the loan rate. The marketing loan program fits the UR
“Amber Box” category.
Table 2.12. Farm Program Base Acres, Program Acres Idled, and Participation,
1982/83-1999/2000.
Contract acres
Partici- ARP
Acres idled / Diverted / Flexed
*
Crop Total Enrolled 1/ pation as a
ARP CRP 50/85-92 NFA/OFA Total
Year
rate percent
82/83
83/84
84/85
85/86
86/87
87/88
88/89
89/90
90/91
91/92
92/93
93/94
94/95
95/96
96/97
97/98
98/99
99/00

--- 1,000 acres --3,969 3,093
3,946 3,857
4,183 3,517
4,234 3,814
4,249 3,978
4,160 3,998
4,155 3,918
4,168 3,906
4,154 3,890
4,155 3,947
4,139 3,989
4,143 4,000
4,158 3,969
4,182 3,962
4,176 4,158
--4,157
--4,161
--4,152

--- percent --77.9
15
15
97.7
15
547
84.6
25
785
90.1
20
682
93.6
35 1,305
96.1
35 1,325
94.3
25
950
93.7
25
939
93.7
20
735
95.0
5
196
96.4
0
0
96.5
5
199
95.4
0
0
94.7
5
197
99.6 2/NA 2/NA
99.9 2/NA 2/NA
99.9 2/NA 2/NA
99.9 2/NA 2/NA

*: Diverted acres are excluded.
1/ Enrolled for area reduction or contract payments.
2/ Eliminated under the 1996 farm act.
Source: USDA, Rice Situation and Outlook yearbook, 2000.
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--- 1,000 acres --NA
NA
NA
0
NA
NA
NA
739
NA
NA
NA
785
NA
NA
NA
1,241
1
174
NA
1,480
3
241
NA
1,569
4
138
NA
1,092
9
245
NA
1,193
13
287
NA
1,035
13
654
454 1,143
13
446
448
907
13
481
469 1,162
13
258
433
703
13
279
427
916
6
2/NA
2/NA 2/NA
4
2/NA
2/NA 2/NA
4
2/NA
2/NA 2/NA
3
2/NA
2/NA 2/NA

There were no marketing loan payments from 1996/97 through 1997/98, and payments
were negligible in 1998/99. However, low world prices are responsible for sizable marketing
loan payments in 1999/2000. Because of economic hardships stemming from falling farm
incomes and weather-related disasters, the U.S. Congress provided supplemental emergency
assistance payments to recipients of PFC payments in both 1998/99 and 1999/2000. These
emergency payments increased payments to rice producers by 50 percent in 1998 and doubled
the total level of direct payments in 1999 (Child and Hoffman, 1999).
2.4.2 Government Programs for U.S. Rice Exports
There are four types of government programs for U.S. rice exports. First, under PL 480,
the U.S. sells rice on concessional credit terms and donates rice to needy countries either
bilaterally or through the World Food Program.

Second, USDA provides export credit

guarantees (GSM-102) and intermediate Export Credit Guarantee (GSM-103) for commercial
financing of U.S. agricultural exports.

Third, the Export Enhancement Program (EEP)

facilitates U.S. rice sales to markets where the U.S. competes with subsidized exports from
other countries. Finally, USDA funds the creation, expansion, and maintenance of foreign
markets for U.S. agricultural products. In addition, several other programs can assist U.S. rice
exports such as the Emerging Market Program, the Qualities Samples Pilot Program, and the
Cochran Fellowship Program.
PL 480
The PL 480 food aid program is comprised of three titles. Title I is administered by
USDA. Titles II and III are administered by the Agency for International Development (AID).
Each title has different objectives and provides agricultural assistance to countries at different
levels of economic development.
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Title I provides government-to-government sales of agricultural commodities to
developing countries under long-term credit arrangements. Title II provides for donations of
U.S. agricultural commodities by the U.S. government to meet humanitarian food needs in
foreign countries. Commodities may be provided to meet emergency needs under governmentto-government agreements, through public and private agencies, including intergovernmental
organizations such as the World Food Program, and other multilateral organizations. Nonemergency assistance may be provided through private voluntary organizations, cooperatives,
and intergovernmental organizations.

Commodities requested may be supplied from the

Commodity credit Corporation (CCC) inventory acquired under price support programs or
purchased from private stocks. Title III provides for government-to-government grants to
support long-term economic development in least-developed countries.
Credit Guarantees
The programs encourage exports to buyers in countries where credit is necessary to
maintain or increase U.S. sales, but where financing may not be available without CCC
guarantees.
GSM-102 and GSM-103 underwrite credit extended by the private banking sector in the
U.S. to approved foreign banks using dollar-denominated, irrevocable letters of credit to pay for
food and agricultural products sold to foreign buyers. New and experienced exporters can
benefit from export guarantee programs.

Theses programs promote exports by providing

exporters greater access to credit and credit risk protection. The GSM-102 covers credit terms
for up to 3 years, and the GSM-103 covers longer credit terms for up to 10 years (USDA, 2000).
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Under Supplier Credit Guarantee Program, the CCC guarantees a portion of payments
due from importers under short-term financing, up to 180 days, that exporters have extended
directly to the importers from the purchase of U.S. agricultural commodities and products.
Market Access Programs
The Market Access Program (MAP) uses funds from the CCC to aid in the creation,
expansion, and maintenance of foreign markets for U.S. agricultural products. The MAP forms
a partnership between non-profit U.S. agricultural trade associations, U.S. agricultural
cooperatives, non-profit State-regional trade groups, small U.S. businesses, and the CCC to
share the costs of overseas marketing and promotional activities such as consumer promotions,
market research, trade shows, and trade servicing.
Foreign Market Development Program
The Foreign Market Development (FMD) program uses funds from the CCC to aid in the
creation, expansion, and maintenance of long-term export markets for U.S. agricultural
products.

The program fosters a trade promotion partnership between USDA and U.S.

agricultural producers and processors who are represented by nonprofit commodity or trade
associations called Cooperators (Childs and Burdett, 2000).
Export Enhancement Program
The EEP facilitates U.S. rice sales to markets where the U.S. competes with subsidized
exports from other countries. The EEP was originally intended to counterbalance subsidized
exports by the European Union (EU). Thus EEP has traditionally been used to assist medium
grain exports to countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea. In recent years, the EEP’s purpose
is to counterbalance subsidized exports from specified exporters, i.e., not just the EU.
However, with declining EU rice exports in recent years, the importance of EEP subsidies has
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diminished. In fact, EEP has been eliminated by 1996 FAIR Act. Therefore, there have been
no rice EEP sales since August 1995 and no shipments since late 1995 (USDA, 1999).
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CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this study, the linkage of the Japanese and Korean rice imports and U.S. rice exports
are analyzed using a game theoretic approach along with econometric supply and demand
models and the political preference function (PPF) determination.
The Japanese and Korean rice economies are analyzed using empirical supply and
demand models and the elasticity estimates. For the U.S., the export demand will be estimated
using an empirical econometric model. The elasticities are estimated as well. For U.S. rice
exports, the domestic supply and demand will not be estimated because this study focuses on
the linkage between the Japanese and Korean imports and U.S. exports, not on the U.S.
domestic rice economy. For the reason, U.S. export demand will be estimated.
In addition, a political preference function (PPF) approach is applied to measure the
implicit political weights of interest groups of these three countries that represent the policyinfluencing powers.
This study analyzes the possible impacts of policy changes in these three countries
incorporating the econometric and the PPF determination approaches into a game theoretic
approach. Game theory is useful in understanding the nature of market outcomes when such
policies matter.
3.1 Supply and Demand Specification
To conduct the analysis for U.S. rice exports, it is essential to coherently estimate the
market models for the two countries and export demand for the U.S. In describing the structure
of the domestic rice economy, the essential components of the Korean and Japanese rice market
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models are supply and demand functions. Producer supply and consumer demand are based on
microeconomic foundations.
For producers, we assume that there is a profit maximizing producer with the production
function f(x), where x ∈Rn is an input vector. Furthermore, assume the output price, p, and
input costs w ∈Rn+ are exogenous. Then the producer’s profit maximization problem can be
written as: Max π (x) = pf(x) – wx. A set of input demand functions are derived by solving the
first order conditions as: x* = x*(p,w) which are the producer’s factor demands that express
optimal choices as functions of output price (p) and factor prices (w). Output supply can be
derived from the maximum profit functions by applying Hotelling’s lemma: y* = y*(p, w). This
set of equations shows output supply of the profit maximizing producer, which is a function of
output price and input prices, and is homogeneous of degree zero in all prices.
Consumer demand is derived from a utility function that defines consumer preferences.
Defining the utility function as U(q), where q ∈Rn, then the consumer utility maximization
problem is Max { U(q): q ∈Rn , pq ≤ M}. Solving the first order necessary condition for q, the
Marshallian market demand is derived as a function of price (p) and income (M): q*= q*(p, M)
(Varian, 1992).
Agricultural producers operate in an environment with uncertain yields and prices.
Farmers typically make production decisions at the beginning of the season, knowing neither
the market price for their products at harvest time nor the weather conditions during the season
that will determine their yields. Various models could be applied to the commodity markets
depending on the objective of research and the market structure. For the purpose of this study, a
distributed lag structure is specified to describe the dynamic responses of supply and demand
caused by the price expectations and adjustment process. The assumption that the economic
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system has a distributed lag structure is often justified on the ground that changes in an
endogenous variable caused by an exogenous shock may occur through time, and the impacts of
exogenous changes on the dependent variable take time to work.
Various theories lead to specific distributed lag models. Initially, such a model was
associated with Koyck’s (1954) study of investment. However, the Koyck model is ad hoc since
it is obtained by a purely algebraic process and has no theoretical underpinning. Two
approaches are developed to specify the lag model: the theory-based approach and the databased approach (Judge et al, 1985). The theory-based distributed lag model includes Nerlove’s
partial adjustment model. In this approach, the forms of the lag are the result of behavioral
assumptions.
In this study, Nerlove’s partial adjustment model is hypothesized as an appropriate model
for capturing the dynamics inherent in supply and demand of the Korean and Japanese rice
sectors. Since rice farmers tend to have a lagged response to market prices due to the fixity of
costly inputs and imperfect information, the partial adjustment model can be hypothesized as an
appropriate model for the study. The partial adjustment model has been widely used in the
analysis of the supply and demand for particular commodities. Among the most typical studies,
the work of Nerlove (1958, 1983), Rao (1989), Fan, Wailes and Cramer (1994), Song and
Carter (1996), Love and Rausser (1997), Cramer, et al. (1999) are related to agricultural
commodities. This short selective list suggests that the partial adjustment model is particularly
appropriate for the analysis of agricultural commodities.
Dynamic specifications of supply and demand response models have been popular since
Nerlove (1958) used the partial adjustment model of supply response. In the partial adjustment
model, the actual value of the dependent variable adjusts by some constant fraction of the
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difference between the actual and desired values. This can be justified by citing technological,
institutional or psychological inertia.
In Korea and Japan, adjustment inertia may be directly related to an unfavorable
production structure and heavy regulation in the rice sector. In addition, Eckstein (1984) shows
that a dynamic rational expectations supply equation derived from the farmer optimization
problem is equivalent to the Nerlovian supply response model in that both models have the
same reduced forms. Eckstein (1984) shows that the dynamic supply equation derived from the
farmer optimization problem, which considers dynamic constraints on land allocations through
the cost function, can justify the Nerlovian supply equation.
Furthermore, habit formation seems to be a predominant characteristic of agricultural
demand behavior, particularly for a national staple food like rice in Japan and Korea. With rice
being an important staple food, consumers may also buy stable quantities that are different from
the equilibrium quantities indicated by their static demand equation. This implies that
consumers tend to adjust only partially to changes in optimal purchase quantities. Thus, the
partial adjustment model is also thought to be an appropriate model for explaining the dynamic
nature of the Korean and Japanese rice consumption. In consumer demand it is assumed that
consumers do not adjust their consumption behavior instantaneously to changes in price and
income due to habit formation.
The dynamic econometric model specified in this study is characterized by a combination
of a partial adjustment process both in supply and demand, and cobweb type price expectations
in supply response. The long-run adjustment responses are embodied in this model due to factor
fixity in supply and habit formation in demand.
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Supply and demand responses for rice are specified in terms of domestic production and
consumption. The dynamics and the relationship between short-run and long-run responses can
be seen by the specified market model within the partial adjustment model framework.
3.1.1 Supply Model
We assume that the supply of rice is determined by profit-maximizing producers. They
maximize their net revenue received from their outputs subject to technical and regulatory
constraints. Based on the theory of the producer, the relationships can be expressed as functions
of expected output price and input prices. Like other agricultural producers, however, rice
farmers tend to have a lagged response to the market price because of fixed inputs such as land
and machinery. Also, the rice price in the previous year may be a major factor in the current
year’s planting decision, since the price of rice has been controlled by both countries’
governments after the harvesting season. Thus, the previous period’s price is used as an
expected price. When this naive expectation is combined with the partial adjustment behavior,
the acreage response equation can be derived.
A Nerlovian expected price and partial adjustment model is used to specify each country
model. Nerlove (1958) assumed that farmer’s reactions are based on price expectations and/or
area adjustments. In the partial adjustment model, the actual value of the dependent variable
adjusts by some constant fraction of the difference between the actual and desired values. The
basic concept of the Nerlovian model is as follows: Models of supply response can be
formulated in terms of yield, area harvested, or output response of individual crops. For
instance, the desired area to be allocated to a crop in period t is a function of expected relative
prices and a number of shifters:
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Q*t





β P*t + λ Zt +U t

(3.1.1)

In equation (3.1.1), Q*t is the desired cultivated area in period t; P*t is the expected price; Zt is a
set of other exogenous shifters, principally private and public fixed factors and truly exogenous
variables such as the price of major inputs; and Ut accounts for the unobserved random variable
DIIHFWLQJ WKH DUHD XQGHU FXOWLYDWLRQ ZLWK H[SHFWHG YDOXH RI ]HUR 7KH



β , and λ are

parameters (or elasticities if the variables are expressed logarithmically) and β is the long-run
coefficient (elasticity) of supply response.
Because full adjustment to the desired allocation of land may not be possible in the short
UXQWKHDFWXDODGMXVWPHQWLQDUHDZLOOEHRQO\DIUDFWLRQ RIWKHGHVLUHGDGMXVWPHQW

Qt ! Qt-1 = (Q*t ! Qt-1)

(3.1.2)

where QtLVWKHDFWXDODUHDKDUYHVWHGRIWKHFURS

-adjustment coefficient.

LVWKHSDUWLDO

Equation (3.1.3) and (3.1.4) indicate the producer’s price expectation mechanism linking
P* and W* to observable P and W values.
Pt* = Pt-1

(3.1.3)

Wt*= Wt-1

(3.1.4)

The reduced-form equation relating acreage and prices is found by solving equations
(3.1.1)-(3.1.4) for acreage in terms of the observable variables of the system, yielding
Qt = b1 + b2Pt-1 + b3Zt-1 +b4Qt-1+ et

(3.1.5)

where b1 = αδ , b2 = βδ , b3 = λδ , b4 = 1- δ and et = δ Ut.
This hypothesizes that the current acreage response depends on the expected output and
input prices as well as on the acreage in the previous year. The larger the coefficient of
adjustment ( δ ), the faster the acreage adjustment is completed. If δ = 1, then complete
adjustment occurs in the current period so that the short-run acreage response is equal to the
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long-run equilibrium. The short-run supply elasticity with respect to the output price is easily
derived from equation (3.1.5).
The lagged dependent variables are used in some specifications since it is assumed that
producers adjust to changes in market condition over time rather than instantaneously following
Nerlove.
In addition, the area harvested affects rice yield. When a government implements a
diversion program, producers divert less productive land first if they are given a choice. The
other factors affecting yield is technology (TT).
The domestic yield equation is specified as:
YHAt = f(AHAt, TT, D)

(3.1.6)

PDt = YHAt * AHAt

(3.1.7)

where AHAt = area harvested in time period t
YHAt = yield in time period t
TT = time trend
PDt = production
D = dummy variable to indicate a natural disaster and/or other unexplainable variations.
3.1.2 Demand Model
We assume that the demand for rice is determined by utility-maximizing consumers
subject to the budget constraint. Based on the neoclassical theory of utility maximization,
consumer demand for rice is described as a function of the own price, prices of substitutes, and
income. The dynamics of demand, which is postulated as resulting from habit formation in this
study, is analyzed similar to the producer case. For example, if we assume that rice
consumption is gradually affected by the consumer’s price through a geometric lag, one-year
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lagged consumption could be selected to impose a lagged distribution effect on the current
consumption behavior. Then, the consumption function is derived as follows:
CONt* = δ 0 + δ 1 Pt + δ 2 PSt + δ 3 It +ut

(3.1.8)

CONt – CONt-1 = π ( CONt* - CONt-1)

(3.1.9)

where CONt* is desired consumption which depends on consumer price (Pt), substitute prices
(PSt), income (It), and a disturbance term (ut).
Equation (3.1.9) is the partial adjustment process arising from habit formation. The
coefficient of adjustment is denoted by π . Combining the above two equations yields a firstorder difference equation,
CONt= δ 0 π+ δ 1 π Pt + δ 2 π PSt + δ 3 π It + (1- π )CONt-1+ π ut.

(3.1.10)

The observable and estimable consumption equation is as follows:
CONt= c1 + c2 Pt + c3 PSt + c4 It + c5 CONt-1+ et

(3.1.11)

where c1= δ0 π , c2= δ 1 π , c3= δ 2 π , c4= δ 3 π , c5 =1 - π , and et = π ut.
The short-run and long run elasticities with respect to the retail price are defined as: η LR
= η SR/ π . One would expect that the own-price effect will be negative and that the income
effect will be positive in the case of normal goods, with the sign reversed if rice is an inferior
good.
In this study, consumption is specified in terms of per capita demand rather than the
aggregate consumption level. An important issue in empirical work on market demand is the
aggregation problem. Estimating the aggregated consumption parameters with any reliable
confidence is not easy. The difficulties encountered when proceeding from individual demand
equations to aggregate demand equations are generally referred to as ‘the aggregation problem’.
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Per capita relationships have the additional advantage of being more meaningful and stable
relationships (Varian, 1992; Houthakker and Taylor, 1970)
Actually it has often been argued that regression analysis of aggregated consumption
could not give plausible estimation of parameters. Therefore, in this study, the domestic rice
consumption is specified in terms of per capita rice demand. When we use aggregate
consumption data divided by population to implement models derived from the theory of an
individual consumer, we think of them as relating to a representative consumer whose behavior
reflects the average consumer. Domestic consumption is defined as per capita consumption
times population. Then, the aggregated consumption is calculated as
TCONt = CONt* POPt

(3.1.12)

where TCONt represents the total rice domestic consumption and POPt is total population
determined exogenously in year t.
3.1.3 The Specification for U.S. Export Demand
Product differentiation is considered a critical factor in understanding rice trade flows
(Siamwalla and Haykin, 1983; Cramer, et al., 1991). One difficulty in trying to differentiate
among rice products is that there is no standard classification in use. Strong preferences for
particular rice types are based primarily on cooking and taste characteristics (Wailes, 2000).
In this study, especially for the export demand model, U.S. rice is modeled as a
heterogeneous commodity, and is categorized into two groups: California rice (japonica), and
southern states’ rice (indica) to avoid aggregation bias that may occur when rice is treated as a
homogeneous product (Batemen, 1988; Cramer, et al., 1993; Song and Carter, 1996; Wailes,
2000).
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California short/medium grain rice is acceptable in Japan and Korea. Therefore,
California short/medium grain rice is considered as japonica and southern states’ rice is
considered as indica. In fact, It could be argued that since Korea imported Louisiana mediumgrain rice in the early 1980s, southern medium–grain can be considered japonica, which Korea
and Japan would consume. However, Korea imported Louisiana rice when threatened with an
extreme food shortage. At that time Korea actually produced high-yielding varieties of a
japonica-indica hybrid. In addition, Japan imported 2.6 million MT from the U.S., China, and
other countries in the early 1980s when unusual cold weather caused a food shortage. But
Japanese refused to eat the imported rice and the Japanese government reexported the imported
rice to developing countries. Therefore, the way we differentiate the type of rice described
above would be reasonable.
The export demand is specified as a function of the relative price of rice types (i.e., the
ratio of the domestic price of type i to the world price of type i), quantity of rice exported via
specific government export programs for both types of rice, world ending stock, and other
exogenous variables. The specification is as follows:
EXPit = f (Pdit/Pwit, GOVit, ESTWit, EXit)

(3.1.14)

where EXPit = the Export quantity for type i
Pdit/Pwit = ratio of the domestic price of type i to the world price of type i
GOVit = quantity of government-assisted rice exports for type i; Export Enhancement
Program (EEP) and Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)
ESTWit = world ending stock for type i
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EXt = other exogenous variables that affect export demand, Japanese japonica imports
and beginning stocks for indica, and so forth (Song and Carter, 1996; Watanabe, et
al., 1990; Goldstein and Khan, 1976).
3.1.4 Estimation and Evaluative Statistics
There are two equations in the supply system and the error terms are correlated with each
other. As a result, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the regression coefficients are
inconsistent because quantities allocated to the separate supply components take place
simultaneously (Green, 2000; Kennedy, 1998, Judge, et al, 1985). For the study, the supply
parameters are estimated using two-stage least squares (2SLS).
The demand equations, per capita consumption and U.S. export demand, are estimated by
ordinary least square (OLS). The OLS is chosen over other estimators to derive empirical
results for the adaptive expectations model for the following reasons. Kennedy (1998) suggests
that it is possible to use the OLS estimator and simply accept its asymptotic bias. This can be
defended in several ways. First, although the OLS estimator is biased in small samples so also
are all alternative estimators. Furthermore, the OLS estimator has minimum variance compared
with alternative estimators such as two-stage least squares (2SLS), and instrumental variable
(IV). Second, according to Monte Carlo studies, the properties of the OLS estimator are less
sensitive than the alternative estimators to the presence of estimation problems such as
multicollinearity, errors in variables or misspecifications.

In addition, there is substantial

justification for the continued use of OLS in relationships containing lagged dependent
variables, provided the disturbance term is serially independent (Green, 2000; Judge, et al.,
1988).
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In addition to the estimated structural coefficients of the model, the estimation
approaches used in this study generate several statistics. These include Durbin’s h test (DW-h),
t statistics, and others where appropriate.
Based on various statistical tests for autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, and normality,
the model specification tests are conducted in the single equation context to determine if the
estimation method employed in this study is appropriate.

DW-h test is conducted for

autocorrelation, the White’s test are carried out for heteroscedasticity. In addition, the BeraJarque normality test is conducted as well (Judge, et al., 1985).
For model validation, the rms (root-mean-square) simulation error, the rms percent
error, and the mean simulation error are used. In addition, Theil’s inequality coefficient, a
useful simulation statistic related to the rms simulation error and applied to the evaluation of
historical simulations, is used for the study (Green, 2000; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991; Judge,
et al., 1985).
3.2 Determination of Political Weights
3.2.1 Political Preference Function (PPF)
In choosing agricultural policies, governments consider the effects of their policies on the
welfare of various groups such as producers, consumers, and taxpayers. In addition, since
agricultural policies can make some groups better off at the expense of others, governments
must weigh the welfare gains of one group against the welfare losses of others. These trade-offs
can be represented by a Political Preference Function (PPF), a weighted, additive function of
commodity quasi-rents, indirect utility of consumers, and the costs of agricultural policies to
tax-payers (Roe, 1993).
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The political preference function approach views policy decisions as the outcome of a
political bargaining process. It claims that an appropriate political preference function can
reveal the role of interest groups in determining endogenous policies, which leads to the
policymakers’ political willingness to redistribute income through policy adjustments. In the
political preference function, it is assumed that there exists a rice policymaker who acts to
arbitrate the conflicting objectives of interest groups that seek to maximize their own benefits
from the rice policy. As an arbitrator of competing interest groups, the policymaker selects the
levels of a set of rice policy instruments so as to maximize his/her political preference function.
With this assumption, the political preference function approach can measure the political
willingness to redistribute income among interest groups in the course of setting the levels of
rice policy instruments. This implies that the policy decision is determined endogenously
according to the pattern of the implicit political weights given to the interest groups (Bullock,
1994; Gardner, 1987; Paarlberg and Abbort, 1986).
The political preference function approach typically assumes that the government
chooses policy instruments so as to maximize a welfare criterion function consisting of interest
groups’ welfare measures. Formally, the government problem can be expressed as:
Max PPF( ω (x, b))

(3.2.1)

subject to ω (x, b) ∈ F={ ω  ω = ω (x), x ∈X},
where PPF is the government’s political preference function, which is assumed to be
monotonically increasing in its arguments. ω represents a vector of welfare levels of interest
groups. Also, let b denote a vector describing market structure, which is assumed to be
exogenously given. X denotes the set of policy instrument levels from which the government
can feasibly choose x, and F denotes the set of technically feasible policy outcomes.
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Since ω indicates the vector of interest groups’ welfare that can be brought about by
government policy, the constraint in equation (3.2.1) implies that a rational government
operates its policy level along a transformation contour, denoted as F. The first order necessary
conditions for the above maximization problem imply that the contour of the PPF should be
tangent to the boundary of F. Therefore, a political preference function approach can measure
the political weights only by assuming that the observed policy is Pareto optimal.
Consider the general case of a policymaker who has m ≥ 1 policy instruments and n ≥ 2
interest groups. The vector ω (x)=( ω1 , ω 2 ,..., ω n ) represents a vector of welfare levels of interest
groups such that each group’s welfare depends on the level of policy instruments, and x=(x1, x2,
…, xm ) is the policy instrument vector.
Under the assumption of PPF maximization, the relevant first order necessary conditions
for x* to maximize the PPF as in (3.2.1) are derived by:

∂ω ( x*)   PPF2   ∂ω 1 ( x*) 
 ∂ω 2 ( x*)
,..............., n
−
 ∂x
∂x1   PPF1   ∂x1 
1

 
 

∂ω n ( x*)   PPF3   ∂ω 1 ( x*) 
 ∂ω 2 ( x*)
,...............,
−
 ∂x
∂x2  *  PPF1  =  ∂x2 
2

 
 


  M  

M ,...........................,M
M

 
 

 ∂ω 2 ( x*) ,................, ∂ω n ( x*)  − PPFn   ∂ω 1 ( x*) 
 ∂xm
∂xm   PPF1   ∂xm 
where

PPFi =

(3.2.2)

∂PPF
, which represents the marginal value that the policymakers place on the
∂ω i

economic surplus accruing to interest group i( i=1,…,n) and

∂ω i
denotes the marginal welfare
∂x j

change of interest group i according to the change in the level of policy instruments j.
The above optimal condition (3.2.2) can be expressed in matrix form as:
(3.2.2)/ A -1 * λ i1=A1
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where A-1 is an m by n-1 matrix whose elements are

elements are −

∂ω i
, λi1 is an n-1 by 1 vector whose
∂x j

PPFi
, i=2…n which indicate the marginal rates of substitution along the
PPF1

indifference contour (Im, 1999).
PPF studies generally define λ i1 as the political weight for interest group i, relative to the
weight for interest group 1. A1 is an m by 1 vector whose elements are

∂ω 1
, j=1, 2, …,m.
∂x j

Now, our interest is to find a political weight vector ( λi1) from the equation (3.2.2) or (3.2.2)/.
The first order necessary conditions for the above maximization problem imply that the PPF
approach can measure the marginal rates of substitution from observed data to infer the implicit
political weights of interest groups that are not directly observable.
The nature and number of arguments that can be included in a political preference
function is unrestricted. Basically, the political preference function originates from the social
welfare function and can be expressed in various functional forms, such as exponential,
additive, logarithmic, and multiplicative. In practice, however, the linear-additive form is
almost always used for reasons of mathematical simplicity. In addition, we need to consider
which policy instruments and interest groups are important. In reality, many policy instruments
are available or used by governments, and many interest groups influence policy decisions.
Therefore, we need to aggregate or omit some interest groups, or ignore the availability of some
policy instruments, and use a simplified econometric model to estimate parameters. In other
words, empirical PPF researchers have to decrease the dimension of the true political economy
(Gardner, 1987).
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The approach is graphically illustrated in Figure 3.1 with the help of the surplus
transformation curve formulated by Gardner (1983, 1987). Figure 3.1 represents a surplus
transformation curve for one policy instrument (m=1) and two interest groups (n=2). For
simplicity, assume that taxpayers get the same welfare weight as consumers. The surplus
transformation curve is the locus of all Pareto-optimal combinations of producer and
consumer/taxpayer surplus that policymakers can generate given the constraint of only one
instrument available. Such a curve (AA) is shown in figure 3.1 for the case of a policy, which
improves the welfare of producers of a commodity at the expense of consumers and taxpayers.
This curve represents the supply side of the market for intervention; its shape and location
depend not only on the underlying supply and demand functions, but also on the type of policy.
The demand side of the market for intervention is represented by W, which might be called
political indifference curves. The political indifference curve can be derived by totally
differentiating the government’s political preference function and setting d(PPF) equal to zero.
Point b is where policymakers maximize their political utility such that the political indifference
curve is tangent to the surplus transformation curve.
In the absence of government intervention in the commodity market, economic surplus is
distributed between producers and consumers as indicated by point e. The policy adopted has
the effect of reducing the welfare of consumers and taxpayers by the amount ce and increasing
the welfare of producers by bc. The dead-weight loss generated by the policy is bd.
However, with the political preference approach, the political equilibrium is found at
point b where the government maximizes its utility and the marginal rate of transformation is
the slope of aba. At the political equilibrium, aba is also the marginal rate of substitution
between producers and other interest groups’ welfare in the policy objective function. If we
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Consumer + Taxpayer Surplus
Figure 3.1 Determination of optimal policy with political weights.
Source: Gardner, 1987; Im, 1999.
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assume that the set of policy choices available to the policymaker is continuous and unbounded,
and if the Pareto frontier is strictly concave, we can determine the equilibrium weights from the
first-order conditions of the policymaker’s maximization problem. Observed policy levels reveal
the weights on the policy preference function, given the structure of the economy. Although a
major limitation of this model is that the underlying political process that determines the
preference weights is not specified, this approach can be a useful tool for explaining policy
selections, predicting future policy paths and normatively evaluating alternative policy reforms.
For the PPF model of the political economy of the rice markets, we must identify interest
groups and policy instruments. This study uses a group distinction employed in conventional
welfare economics (n=3): producers, consumers and taxpayers, which have their own
independent objective functions. Rice producers are assumed to maximize producers’ surplus
(PS), consumers maximize consumers’ surplus (CS), and taxpayers minimize net government
expenditures (GS) on the rice policy.
For policy instruments, a two-price policy (m=2) is considered for Japan and South
Korea, which has been an integral part of the both rice economies and has undoubtedly created
large welfare effects on interest groups, and producer price and retail price for the U.S. Rice is
often sold to consumers at prices below purchase prices, although the consumer price is much
higher than the international price in Japan and South Korea. In fact, the two-price policy
influences the private market through the operation of purchase and release price levels, and the
amount associated with the government’s stock and import management. In this study, the
producer and consumer prices, which reflect the results of a combination of price and quantity
operation, are regarded as the policy instruments.
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The policymaker is assumed to set consumer and farm prices for rice in order to
maximize a political preference function, which includes each interest group’s welfare measure.
It is consistent with the maximization of the following political preference function:
Maximizep U = U(PS(P), CS(P), GS(P): α ),

(3.2.3)

where U represents the policymaker’s policy preference based on producer surplus (PS),
consumer surplus (CS), and government budget surplus (GS), where the latter represents
taxpayers’ welfare. P= (PS, PD) is a vector of rice price levels, where PS and PD are producer and
consumer prices, respectively. α denotes a vector of parameters representing the underlying
commodity model.
Each group’s welfare depends on the level of policy instruments. Expressions for
producer surplus, consumer surplus, and government surplus are derived from the commodity
model. Based on this structure, the government chooses the optimal producer and consumer
prices so as to maximize equation (3.2.3). The optimal price policy can be obtained by
differentiating the political preference function with respect to the producer price, PS and the
consumer price, PD. The first order conditions are:

∂U
∂PS
∂CS
∂GS
= λP
+ λC
+ λG
= 0,
∂PS
∂PS
∂PS
∂PS

(3.2.4)

∂U
∂PS
∂CS
∂GS
= λP
+ λC
+ λG
= 0,
∂PD
∂PD
∂PD
∂PD

(3.2.5)

where λ P =

∂U
∂U
∂U
, λC=
and λ G =
∂PS
∂CS
∂GS

Each λ i (i= P, C, G) is a political weight that the government places on the interests of
producers, consumers and government budget. The political weights represent the results of
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competing policy influencing efforts of interest groups and measure the degree of
policymaker’s political willingness to favor a group.
3.2.2 Derivation of the Political Weights
It has been widely recognized that the political (or welfare) weights reflecting the
bargaining power and policy-influencing efforts play an important role in determining
government behavior in agricultural policy. There are three general approaches to obtaining the
political weights in a model of political economic behavior: 1) the direct approach, consisting of
interviews with policymakers to determine the political weights, 2) the indirect approach, also
known as the revealed preference method, in which policy decisions are assumed to optimize
the political preference function subject to appropriate constraints so the policy preference
weights can be inferred, 3) the arbitrary approach, in which the researcher simply chooses
political weights according to his own beliefs (Sloof, 1998).
It has been accepted that the usefulness of the direct and arbitrary approach for policy
setting and evaluation is limited (Love, Rausser and Burton, 1990). Along this line, the
revealed preference approach has been developed to quantify the invisible policy influencing
efforts of the interest groups. Within this structure, it is assumed that political weights of
interest groups are inferred from past policy action. The basic assumption of the revealed
preference method is that past levels of policy instruments are outcomes of optimizing the
political preference function by the policymaker.
3.3 Game Theoretic Approach
This study analyzes the possible impacts of policy changes in these three countries using
a game theoretic approach. Game theory is useful in understanding the nature of market
outcomes when such policies matter.

Agricultural policy games are now played on a
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transaction-by-transaction basis in an uncertain market environment and where payoff functions
are also changing over time (Johnson, et al., 1993). The policy analysis in the game theoretic
approach looks specifically at the behavior of the rice price, import policy, and export policy
variables. This study addresses policy analysis including several reasonable scenarios with
respect to tariff equivalents.

Overall, a game theoretic approach is adopted to determine

potentially possible policy options for U.S. exports on each policy change in Japan and Korea.
The game theoretic approach focuses on the equilibrium for Japanese and Korean rice import
policies and the U.S. export policies.
3.3.1 Axioms of Game Theory
Game theory is concerned with the study of situations involving two or more decision
makers such as individuals, organizations, or governments. Decision makers are designated as
players. The players often have partly conflicting interests and make individual or collective
decisions (Dockner, et. al., 2000). In a game, the fortunes of the players are interdependent: the
actions taken by one particular player influence not only his own fortune but also the fortunes of
the other players. Such interdependence is well known from many areas of economics and
international trade.
Game theorists make a distinction between two kinds of games: cooperative and
noncooperative. Supposing that a game is played in a noncooperative way means that the
institutional environment is one in which the players cannot or will not make binding
agreements to follow some joint course of action. Players are rivals and all players act in their
own best interest, paying no attention whatsoever to the fortunes of the other players. A
fundamental problem for any player in a noncooperative game is that of strategic uncertainty:
when a player must act, he does not know for sure how the other players will act.
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Noncooperative game theory offers a formal methodology to try to resolve the strategic
uncertainty and predict what could be the outcome when rational players have acted in
accordance with their plans.
The categorization of games as cooperative and noncooperative should be seen as a
recognition of the fact that often there is more than just one way in which a particular game can
be played. It is less advisable to think that the set of all games in some exogenous way has been
divided into cooperative and noncooperative ones. Depending on the underlying institutional
characteristics, a game may be analyzed as cooperative or noncooperative.
The main part of game theory takes its starting point in a set of hypotheses concerning
the kind of behavior that players are assumed to have. Fundamental axioms are that players are
rational and think strategically.

Being rational means that a player has clear preference,

represented by a payoff function. Payoff can be expressed in terms of utility, profit, sales
revenue, negative cost, or any other quantitative measure. Rationality includes that a player
knows the number of opponents and the set of all possible strategies that are available to them,
and that he can form probabilistic expectations about any uncertainty that may influence the
play of the game.
The number of players, the sets of strategies available to them, and the payoffs are
essential elements of what game theorists call the rules of the game. The rules are the theorist’s
formal description of a game and they should be derived from the institutional environment in
which the game is supposed to be played, rather than being chosen on an ad hoc basis. The
theory includes the assumption of common knowledge, which means that all players know the
rules of the game and each player knows that his opponents know the rules, and that the
opponents know that he knows the rules, and so forth. All players are aware that they face
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rational opponents and all players think strategically. The latter means that, when designing his
strategy for playing the game, a player takes into account any knowledge or expectation he may
have regarding his opponents’ behavior.
At the same time, game-theoretic models are sometimes criticized for employing too
many unrealistic behavioral assumptions and for including only a small number of the features
of a real-world institutional environment. People who insist on realistic models say that this
produces the right solution to the wrong problem. Here we should be aware that models
sensations of real world phenomena, but even very simplified models do not necessarily
produce useless predictions. The predictions that result from simple models are correct on their
assumptions and one strength of formal modeling lies in the fact that everyone can verify the
validity of the conclusions derived from the model. In contrast, a fair part of the strategic
recommendations offered by policy makers on strategic decision-making cannot be verified and
any faith placed in such advice is largely a matter of trust (Dockner, et. al., 2000; Norman and
Thisse, 2000; Sloof, 1998; Gardner, 1995).
Usually there are three elements of a game theoretic study. First, it is necessary to
scrutinize the institutional environment in which the game is supposed to be played in order to
obtain a plausible set of rules of the game and to select the relevant variables and their
relationships. Next, a mathematical structure must be designed, a game theoretic model that
reflects in a simplified way the pertinent aspects of the strategic problem. Third, the interesting
properties of the model must be rigorously deduced.
3.3.2 Basic Noncooperative Game Theoretic Model
Noncooperative game theory uses two types of models: the strategic form and the
extensive form. The strategic form includes the following three elements:
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(1) A set of players N = {1,2,..., N }.
(2) For each player i ∈ N a set of feasible strategies U i .
(3) For each player i ∈ N a real-valued function J i such that the value J i (u1 , u 2 ,..., u N )
represents the payoff of player i ∈ N if the N players use the strategies

(u1 , u2 ,..., u N ) ∈ U 1 × U 2 × ...× U N .
The notion of a player’s strategy is fundamental in game theory. We may think of a
strategy as a player’s contingent plan, to be determined before playing the game. A strategy is a
function that tells the player how to select one of his feasible actions whenever he must make a
move, for all possible events as the history of the game. Thus, a strategy is a mapping from the
set of possible histories of the game to the set of feasible actions. It is important to note that a
strategy prescribes a player’s choice of action for all possible histories of the game, including
those histories that will never be observed.
When the strategic form is used, the game theoretic model includes a list of all possible
strategies of all players. Each player is supposed to select before the play of the game one of
his feasible strategies. Each player makes this choice independently of any other player and
there is no communication or cooperation among the players when they make their strategy
choices. No player is informed about the choice of strategy of any other player and this is what
causes the problem of strategic uncertainty.
There is no explicit element of time involved in a strategic form game. Nevertheless, a
strategic form game can represent a game that is played over several time periods. In a game
played over time, a rational player can determine in advance a complete, contingent plan for all
his actions that he must take during the whole game. Such a plan, a strategy, specifies what
particular action the player should take in any situation that may occur at any instant of time
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during the game. The actual play of the game then amounts to the implementation of the
players’ predetermined strategies.
The extensive form of a game is used for games played over time and is represented by a
game tree. The extensive form includes a description of the sequence in which possible chance
events will occur during the game. Although these questions of timing are only implicit in the
strategic form, the concept of a player’s strategy can be seen as an object of both an extensive
and a strategic form game. In the extensive form, a player waits to take his action until the
game has reached a certain instant. The rule by which he chooses his actions, depending on the
information he has gathered up to that instant, is his strategy.
Depending on the specific game model one wishes to analyze, each of the two forms has
its advantages and disadvantages. In most games that evolve over time, the extensive form is
superior to the strategic form since the extensive form explicitly depicts the order of moves,
which information is revealed during the course of the game, and how players take such
information into account. On the other hand, in dynamic games of some complexity, the
extensive form becomes unmanageable.
3.3.3 Dynamic Game
Many strategic problems in economics and international trade are not properly modeled
as static games since policy makers can make decisions at more than one point of time. A first
question would be: How does one distinguish between dynamic and static games? There is no
general agreement on the use of the terms ‘static game’ and ‘dynamic game’. One might say
that a game in which time is not explicitly involved is a static game, supposing that ‘dynamic’
refers to the fact that variables are explicitly dated. However, let us consider a Cournot duopoly
game played in the following way. The firms have to choose their respective output levels

77

independently of each other at each of T successive time instants 1,2,..., T . After the firms have
made their output choices at time instants s ∈ {1,2,..., t } , these choices will be known to both
firms when they have to choose their outputs at the subsequent time instant t + 1. Now suppose
that, before the game starts, each firm must make an irrevocable choice of every output quantity
that the firm will produce at time instants 1,2,...,T . Thus, each firm must commit itself in
advance to a fixed sequence of outputs. This game certainly includes time but one could
maintain that such a game should not be called a dynamic game. The argument is that during
the play of the game the firms get no opportunity to react strategically to the rival’s actions,
using incoming information on actions taken.
The following definition of a dynamic game takes into account the reasonable
requirement that players should be able to select strategies that are based on information being
revealed during the play of the game. A game is said to be dynamic if at least one player can
use a strategy that conditions his single-period action at any instant of time on the actions taken
previously in the game. Previous actions are those of the rivals but also a player’s own actions.
To analyze a dynamic game, we need to start by describing in which order the players
take their actions and what information is available to a player when he takes action. In what
follows we confine our interest to dynamic games in which all players’ actions are observable
by all players. The game is said to be one of perfect information. Hence any player, when
taking an action at time t, has perfect knowledge of all previous actions. These are his/her own
past actions and those of his rivals, but can also include acts of nature if there are exogenous
uncertainties in the game. In such a game we say that players move simultaneously at time t if
no player knows about the actions that the other players take at time t. Notice that this
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terminology is not meant to exclude games in which no two players make decisions at the same
time, since one can include ‘inaction’ as a feasible action at a particular instant.
Since all past actions till time t-1 are common knowledge among the players at decision
time t, it makes sense to speak of the history of actions by time t. The history of actions by time
t is a sequence of action profiles u1 , u2 ,..., ut −1 , where any such profile is a set of N individual
actions of the players. The initial history is the history before the starting point of the game and
is an empty set (Norman and Thisse, 2000; Sloof, 1998; Gul, 1997; Karp and McCalla, 1983).
The terminal history is the one after which no more actions occur. Payoffs of the players can be
defined as functions of the terminal history but could also be taken as sums of per period
payoffs.
3.3.4 The Difference Game
The imperfections of the markets and the government interventions in the three countries
raise questions about results obtained from models of the limiting cases of perfect competition.
This kind of market involves power, reaction functions, strategies, and feedback and is
inherently dynamic. The game theoretic approach, which models the interaction of two or more
agents with conflicting objectives, provides a method for analyzing imperfectly competitive
markets such as rice markets in Japan, South Korea, and the U.S.
In addition, in actual life the instruments of the economy can be under the control of
different policymakers who each may have conflicting view on target values or the relative
importance of the targets. In the U.S., for instance, it is unlikely that the Congress or the
Administration, controlling fiscal policy, and the Federal Reserve Board, controlling monetary
policy, hold the same views on what the targets of their policies should be. It is also not clear
that much cooperation is taking place between these entities.
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What particularly complicates the situation, is that one cannot just predict the policy of
the other policymaker and go ahead taking that as a given. One must also, if one is rational,
take into account the effect that one’s own policy will have on the other policymaker’s policies
in the future. Since trade policies are interdependent, some sort of game framework is attractive
(Dockner, et.al., 2000). If games are discarded, the model must assume that traders do not
respond to their partners’ policies (no interdependence) or assume that their response is known.
The first assumption is unacceptable, and the second simply postulates reaction functions when
the goal is to derive them.
The difference game addresses these criticisms described above. First, we can include
any number of players, on either one side or on both sides of the market, as well as a residual
sector which may be either a net importer or exporter. Second, the dynamic nature of supply
and demand is explicitly taken into account by means of the state equation. Finally, the solution
gives us endogenously determined reaction functions and resulting tariffs/taxes, prices, and
quantities traded (Karp and McCalla, 1983).
There are n players, each with control vector uit where i = 1, 2, …, n and t = 1, 2, …, T-1,
where T is the end of the game. The evolution of the state, yt, is given by the difference
equation
n

yt = A t yt − 1 +

∑Bu

it it

i =1

+ Ct ; y0 given

`

(3.3.1)

The objective of player i is to maximize Vi ( y0 ) , where
T

Vi ( y0 ) =

∑ (r ′ y
t =1

it

t

+ yt′ Rit yt ); i = 1, 2, …, n.

(3.3.2)

The vectors and matrices A, Bi, C, ri, and Ri are given. They indicate the effect on the
current state of the previous state (A) the current controls (Bi), and the exogenous changes (C);
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ri and Ri give the effect of the current state on player i’s single-period payoff. Equation (3.3.1)
is written as a first-order difference equation, but by imbedding previous values of yt and ut in
the state vector, higher-order difference equations can be reduced to this form. The inclusion of
the controls in the state vector allows the function Vi to depend on both the controls and the
state (Karp and McCalla, 1983; Kydland, 1975).
In this game, we need to specify upon which information a player conditions his strategy.
This issue is referred to as the choice of a strategy space or an information structure.
Suppose that player i chooses action uit at time t. This choice can be based upon different
sets of information, but we always assume that all players know the value of the initial state
vector. An open-loop strategy is a strategy that is conditioned on current time only, that is, a
minimal information. Like any other type of strategy, an open-loop strategy is fixed at the start
of the game. This implies that each player believes that his actions have no effect on his
opponents. In an open-loop Nash equilibrium each player is right about what his opponents will
do, but he is wrong in that they would not respond to deviations from his strategy.
The use of open-loop strategies has been criticized for being static in nature, not allowing
for genuine strategic interaction between the players during the play of the game (Sloof, 1998).
For feedback solution we assume that at each time period a noncooperative solution is
chosen as a function of the state variable at that time. This means that each player, instead of
taking as given a sequence of decisions for the other players, takes as given decision rules for
each time period t that are functions of the state variables yt-1. In making his decision, player i
know that it will affect the state variables. A change in the state variables will change the other
players’ decisions in the future. This change in the other players’ decisions will have an effect
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on future losses for player i. This fact is taken into account in the feedback solution when
player i makes his decision.
Feedback controls incorporate a conjectural variation.

Each player knows that his

actions will affect his opponents’ actions, and he considers this in choosing his rules. In a
feedback Nash equilibrium each player’s conjecture about how his opponents will respond to
changes is correct (Karp and McCalla, 1983; Breshahan, 1981). Feedback controls allow the
player more rationality and flexibility; therefore, we choose to use them rather than open-loop
controls. A further advantage of the feedback controls is that in obtaining them we can derive
the reaction functions u*i(t, yt-1) (Paarlberg and Abbott, 1986).
It seems reasonable in many models to assume that each decision maker will determine
the effect of his decision on the state variables and consider how other players will react in the
future. For example, in an oligopolistic industry each firm may take into consideration the
effect of its decision on market shares and assume that the other players will react in certain
ways to different sizes of the market shares. This seems particularly reasonable if we think in
terms of stability, that is, view the equilibrium solution as the end result of a process with all the
players groping for decision rules that are such that, given the others’ actions, nobody has any
incentive to change the rule, and where forecasting errors are corrected as the players learn
more about the other players’ behavior.
It is known from control theory that when the objective function is quadratic and the
equation of motion linear, optimal controls can be expressed as a linear function of the state
(Dockner, et.al., 2000). Therefore, it is not surprising that in the difference game the Nash
equilibrium reaction functions are also linear in the state.

In fact, the algorithm used to

determine these functions is a generalization of the method of dynamic programming used in
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the control problem. The stacked vector of controls in period t is determined by the reaction
function
ut = d t + Et yt −1

(3.3.3)

where d t and Et are independent of the state which means the initial condition, y0 , does not
affect the reaction function; it does, however, affect the value of the controls.
Let supply in any country be a linear function of last period’s domestic price, and
demand a linear function of this period’s domestic price. Domestic price equals world price
plus the tariff imposed by the nation. If we take the nation’s single-period objective function to
be the sum of consumer and producer surplus and tariff revenues, then that function is
composed of linear and quadratic terms involving world price and the tariff in the current and
the previous period. If we imbed the current and lagged controls and the lagged state in a new
state vector, the single-period objective is the sum of a linear and quadratic term involving the
augmented state. The total payoff is then the discounted sum of these single-period objective
functions and has the form of equation (3.3.2). Excess supply or demand for any nation is
linear in the current and previous period’s price and tariff.
The linear-quadratic Nash difference game can be used to model trade of a commodity
like rice. A simple case involves two players, each with a single control ui, a unit tariff or
export tax. The two active players can be both importers, both exporters, or one of each. There
is a third, passive player, which comprises the rest of the world (ROW). The response of ROW
is assumed known and exogenous. Domestic supply in country i, qis , is a function of last
period’s producer price, and domestic demand in country i, qid , is a function of the current
period’s domestic price as mentioned in section 3.1. These functions are given by equation
(3.3.4).
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qits = α it + βit ( Pwt −1 + uit −1 )

(3.3.4)

qitd = ait − bit ( Pwt + uit )

World price in period t is given by Pwt , so that country i’s domestic price is Pwt + uit .
Country i’s objective is to maximize the discounted sum of producer and consumer surplus and
tariff/tax revenue. The single-period payoff to country i involves terms which are linear and
quadratic in Pwt , Pwt −1 , uit , uit −1 , plus a term that involves only intercepts and coefficients of
(3.3.4).
The evolution of world price, Pw, is given by setting supply equal to demand. Therefore,
if we rearrange equation (3.3.4), equation (3.3.5) can be derived (Karp and McCalla, 1983;
Kydland, 1975).
 u1t 
u 
2t 
Pwt = θPwt −1 + (δ1 , δ 2 , δ 3 , δ 4 ) 
+h
 u1t −1 


 u2 t − 1 

(3.3.5)

where h is (ait − α it ) / bit , θ is − βit / bit , and δ 1 = − 1, δ 2 = − 1, δ 3 = − β1t / b1t , and δ 4 = − β 2 t / b2 t .
The parameters θ , δi , and h are obtained from the parameters in (3.3.4). Now we have a new
state, yt′ = f ( Pwt , u1t , u2 t , Pwt −1 , u1t − 1 , u2 t − 2 ) . The equation of motion for y is given by
y t = θyt −1 + δut + h

θ
0

1
The actual matrix is as follows: yt =  1

0
 0

(3.3.6)1

δ3
0
0
1
0

δ4
0
0
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
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0
0
0
0
0

 Pwt −1 
0 
u1t −1 

0 
  u2 t −1 
0 
+
  Pwt − 2 
0
u 
0  1t − 2 
 u2 t − 2 

 δ1
1

0

0
0

0

δ2 
0

1   u1t 
+

0   u2 t 
0

0

 h
 0
 
 0
 
 0
 0
 
 0

A supply utilization accounting identity, or trade balance in an open economy, captures
the effects of producer and consumer behavioral adjustments to policy and, hence, prices on
trade:
Eit = qits ( Pwt −1 + uit −1 ) − qitd ( Pwt + uit )

(3.3.7)

where Eit is exports from country i (imports if negative); qits is supply (production) in country i,
which depends on Pwt −1 + uit −1 , producer support prices (decoupled producer subsidy offered via
price intervention) in country i, and qitd is demand (consumption) in country i, which depends
on Pwt + uit , the domestic market price in country i, according to a demand function. World
market equilibrium requires

∑E

it

= 0.

(3.3.8)

Price linkages relate border prices to domestic market prices using policy instrument
settings (export subsidies and producer support via price interventions):
Pd i = Pwt + ( Swi + uit + Ci )

(3.3.9)

where Pwt is the world price, Swi is the export subsidy (import tariff) offered by country i, and
C is other government intervention via price control, and
PS i = Pd i + ( Sqi + Di )

(3.3.10)

where Sqi is a decoupled producer subsidy in country i, and Di is other government support to
rice producers via price intervention.

Furthermore, we can incorporate political payoff

functions into the dynamic game of each player to maximize each country’s welfare. The
reason is that each country would try to maximize its own welfare considering different interest
groups political weights in the policy making process. Therefore, incorporating the dynamic
game into the dynamic game political payoff functions gives equation (3.3.11).

85

Vpi = WqiVi ( y0 )Vsi ( Pwt , Sqi , Ci ) + WdiVi ( y0 )Vdi ( Pdi , Swi , Di )
− Wg i ( Swi Qi + Sqi Qi + Ci Qi + Di Qi )

(3.3.11)

where Vpi is the political payoff in country i, Vsi is producer surplus for region i, Vdi is
consumer surplus for region i, and Sqi is decoupled producer support (or direct payment) in
region i as mentioned earlier. Welfare weights are Wqi for producer, Wdi , for consumers, and
Wgi for government budget expense (Abbott and Kallio, 1996).

Initial equilibrium quantities, prices, and supply and demand elasticities are taken from
the econometric estimation and the weights are taken from the political preference function
(PPF) analysis for this game theoretic approach.
Solving this model, assuming that governments set export subsidies or tariffs to
maximize political payoff in a manner corresponding to the UR agreement, may represent
alternative institutional arrangements. The United States is examined by specifying objectives,
which are related to exports. Nash equilibria will be found, assuming the United States, Japan,
and Korea independently maximize their own welfare, with the subsidy or tariff level of its
opponents as given. The GATT agreement is represented by imposing subsidy expenditure
limits in each player’s maximization problem. Nash equilibria are solved for the intersection of
these best response functions by iteratively solving each region’s problem given the opponents’
strategies, subsidy, and tariff, using GAMS.
In addition, the goal of this analysis is to look at the implications of a change from
minimum access to the tariffication of imports in Korea, continuation of tariffication in Japan at
an alternative different tariff equivalent than the current tariff equivalent, and export policy
options toward Japan and Korea for the U.S.
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
This chapter presents and discusses the results of the empirical models for the three
countries. This chapter will be divided into three sections, and organized as follows. The first
section is devoted to a discussion of the empirical results of the econometric models. In
particular, the section focuses on the estimation methods and evaluative statistics. The second
section presents the derivation of the political weights for the three different interest groups for
Japan and Korea, and for exporters from the U.S. An empirical game theoretic approach is
presented and discussed in the final section.
4.1 Econometric Estimation
4.1.1 Empirical results and interpretation
Based on the theoretical considerations and the market structure concerning the dynamic
commodity model in the previous section, the empirical econometric models for the three
countries’ rice markets are specified for the period 1960-1999.
According to economic theory, supply can be influenced by prices, technology, costs and
other factors. For domestic consumption, it can be hypothesized to be influenced by prices,
income levels, and the price of substitutes according to economic theory. For Japan and Korea,
the model is composed of three equations: domestic acreage response, yield, and per capita
consumption. Two identities are defined to impose the aggregate domestic production and
consumption. Domestic production is defined by acreage response times yield, and domestic
consumption is defined by multiplying population times the estimated equation for per capita
consumption and adding in other use. The general functional forms and variables for the rice
supply and demand estimation are presented as follows:
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Japanese Yield:
JYIED = f(TECH, D, u1t)

(4.1.1)

Japanese Area Harvested:
JARHV = f(JARHVt-1, JPRODPt/CPIt, JPRODCt/CPIt, u2t)

(4.1.2)

Japanese Per Capita Consumption:
JPCCON = f(JRETPt/CPIt, JINCOMt/CPIt, JPCCONt-1, u3t)

(4.1.3)

Korean Yield:
KYIED = f(TECH, D, u4t)

(4.1.4)

Korean Area Harvested:
KARHV = f(KARHVt-1, KGPOPt-1/CPIt-1, KDIVRt, u5t)

(4.1.5)

Korean Per Capita Consumption:
KPCCON = f(KRETPt/CPIt, KINCOMt/CPIt, KPCCONt-1, u6t)

(4.1.6)

U.S. Export Demand:
UEXDEM = f(WOLDPJt/UPROPIt, UGEXPt, WENSTt, D, u7t)

(4.1.7)

Production:
JPROD = JYIED * JARHV

(4.1.8)

KPROD = KYIED * KARHV

(4.1.9)

Consumption:
JCONP = JPCCON * JPOP + OTHER

(4.1.10)

KCONP = KPCCON * KPOP + OTHER

(4.1.11)

where TECH = Technology
JARHVt-1 = Lagged Japanese Area Harvested (1000 ha)
JPROPt = Japanese Producer Price (yen/MT)
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CPIt = Consumer Price Index
JPROCt = Japanese Production Cost (yen/ha)
JRETPt = Japanese Retail Price (yen/MT)
JINCOMt = Japanese Income ($)
JPCCONt-1 = Lagged Japanese Per Capita Consumption (kg)
KARHVt-1 = Lagged Korean Area Harvested (1000 ha)
KGPOPt-1 = Lagged Korean Government Purchase Price (won/MT)
KDIVRt = Lagged Korean Diversion program (ha)
KRETPt = Korean Retail Price (won/MT)
KINCOMt = Korean Income ($)
KPCCONt-1 = Lagged Korean per capita Consumption (kg)
WOLDPJt = World Price ($/MT)
UPRODPIt = U.S. Producer price ($/MT)
UGEXPt = U.S. Government Export Program (1000 MT)
WENSTt-1 = Lagged World Ending Stock (1000 MT)
D = Dummy Variables
uit = Error Terms
POP = Population
OTHER = Other Consumption (1000 MT)
The structural model in this study is estimated based upon annual time series data from
1960 to 1999 with all prices and income variables deflated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
The rice yield and area harvested equations are estimated by Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS)
and the per capita consumption and U.S. export demand equations are estimated by
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conventional ordinary least squares (OLS) and the autoregressive degree of one (AR(1)) as an
attempt to correct for autocorrelation.
The estimation results of the model are shown in table 4.1. The consumer price index is
omitted for convenience. In addition, the value of the Durbin’s h statistic is also given for each
equation since the lagged dependent variable appears as an independent variable.
Equations (4.1.1) and (4.1.4) indicate that the yield is a function of technology and a
dummy variable for Japan and Korea. The dummy variable is used to explain poor weather
conditions in 1980 and 1993. A time trend is used as a proxy for technological developments
and advancements. Japanese and Korean yield equations have a coefficient of adjusted R2 of
0.80 and 0.87, respectively. All of the variables are statistically significant at the 5% level of
significance. D-W statistics of the equations, 1.78 and 2.13, respectively, show that there is no
autocorrelation in the equations.
The results of the acreage response estimation show the expected signs for all
explanatory variables that are implied in the theory of production. Except for the constant
terms, all parameter estimates are different from zero at the 5% level of significance. The
prices received by rice farmers in both countries have a positive impact on the acreage response,
as expected. The production costs for Japan and the diversion program for Korea have a
negative impact on the supply response. The coefficient estimate of the lagged dependent
variables show a stable geometric lag process and supports the existence of a lagged distribution
of the dependent variables. The high estimates of the lagged acreage variables for Japan and
Korea, 0.84 and 0.93 respectively, imply that it takes time for farmers to change the paddy land
for rice cultivation in response to the price signals. The short-run supply elasticities with
respect to the output at the mean for Japan and Korea are 0.11 and 0.13, respectively. However,
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the long-run supply elasticities are estimated as 0.75 and 0.89, respectively. The high values of
the long-run elasticities are caused by a high estimate of the lagged dependent variables.
Except for the constant terms, all independent variables in the per capita consumption
equations show strong statistical significance and expected signs. All coefficient estimates are
significant at the 5% level of significance. Rice consumption is negatively related to own price
as well as income, which implies that rice is an inferior good in Japan and Korea. This is a
phenomenon, which has been experienced over the last decade in Japan and Korea as their
income levels have risen. The coefficients on the one year lagged dependent variables are also
significant at the 5% level of significance. It implies that there exist gradual changes in diet
patterns, which impact rice consumption. In fact, the increases in the income levels have
transformed the Japanese and Korean diet by substituting rice with consumption of meats,
fruits, and vegetables.
The price elasticities for Japan and Korea are computed at -0.096 and -0.23, respectively.
The income elasticities are also computed at -0.029 and -0.56, respectively.
For the equation of U.S. export demand, all of the independent variables are statistically
significant at the 5% level except for government export program.

U.S. export demand

estimation shows the expected signs for all explanatory variables. A reduction in world price
relative to the U.S. domestic price received by U.S. producers make U.S. rice less competitive
in the world market. A dummy variable for the years of 1980 and 1994 is used to explain
unusual high exports caused by Japan and Korea due to unexpected cold weather in 1980 and
1993. In addition, there is no autocorrelation in the equation (D-W = 1.7).
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Table 4.1 Empirical Results of Production and Consumption.
Production:
JYIED = 3.5579 + 0.0313*TECH – 0.8874*DM8093
(54.84)
(11.52)
(-5.96)
AdjR2 = 0.80 D-W = 1.78 Method = 2SLS
KYIED = 3.7415 + 0.0293*TECH – 0.8369*DM8093
(18.04)
(4.10)
(-4.41)
AdjR2 = 0.87 D-W = 2.13 Method = 2SLS
JARHV = 294.176 + 0.843*JARHVt-1 + 0.175*JPRODP – 0.027*JPRODC
(1.63)
(13.07)
(2.35)
(-2.57)
2
AdjR = 0.96 D-h = 0.59 Method = 2SLS
KARHV = 50.76 + 0.932*KARHVt-1 + 0.000059*KGROP – 0.006*KDIVR
(0.42)
(10.93)
(2.34)
(-4.34)
2
AdjR = 0.96 D-h = 0.97 Method = 2SLS
Consumption:
LnJPCCON = 1.8133 + 0.8202*LnJPCCONt-1 – 0.0963*LnJRETP – 0.029*LnJINCOM
(4.77)
(15.42)
(-3.65)
(-2.15)
2
AdjR = 0.99 D-h = 1.25 Method = OLS/AR(1)
LnKPCCON = 5.461 + 0.7203*LnKPPCCONt-1 - 0.23*LnKRETP
(4.1)
(10.27)
(-2.42)
- 0.56*LnKINCOM + 0.2073*DM1
(-3.4)
(2.96)
AdjR2 = 0.99 D-h = 0.72 Method = OLS/AR(1)
U.S. Export Demand:
LUEXDEM = 2.681 + 0.4902*LWENSTK + 0.036*L(WOLDP/UPRODP)
(3.26)
(6.09)
(1.97)
+ 0.031*LUGEXP+ 0.274*DM8094
(1.72)
(3.2)
AdjR2 = 0.84 D-W = 1.7 Estimator = OLS/AR(1)
Note: numbers in the parentheses represent t-statistics.

4.1.2 Model Specification and Validation
In this section, tests for detecting error structure in the single equation context are
conducted to identify whether the estimators used in the models are appropriate. Statistical tests
for autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, and other specification problems are described.
Autocorrelation usually occurs in the analysis of economic time series where random
shocks have effects that persist for more than one time period. Although estimates from the
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estimators, especially from the conventional OLS, and forecasts for those estimates are still
unbiased and consistent with serially correlated errors, they are no longer minimum variance
among all linearly unbiased estimators. There are several ways of testing for autocorrelation.
By far the most widely used test is the Durbin-Watson (D-W) test. However, the D-W test is
not likely to be valid here because of a lagged dependent variable in the equations. When one
or more lagged endogenous variables are present, the D-W statistic will often be close to 2 even
when the errors are serially correlated. Of course, one could simply look at the D-W statistic as
providing an indicator of serial correlation when the D-W statistic is low, but this approach is
strongly biased against finding serial correlation.

Fortunately, there is a relatively easy

alternative test provided by Durbin, which is strictly valid for large samples of data but can be
used for small samples as well (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991; Judge, et. al., 1988). In this
circumstance, the Durbin’s h statistic is used for the autocorrelation test.
Heteroscedasticity arises in numerous applications. In this study, the White’s test for
heteroscedasticity is conducted, which is the most common procedure for detecting
heteroscedasticity in the error term. White’s test for the general structure of heteroscedasticity
is general since it does not require any prior knowledge of the structure of the
heteroscedasticity. This test could be regarded as a general test for misspecification as it is
likely to pick up other specification errors such as multicollinearity and zero mean of
disturbance (Judge, et.al., 1985).
In addition, it is convenient to assume that errors are distributed normally, but there
exists justification for this normality assumption. When errors are not distributed normally, the
estimators used in this study, particularly the OLS, are no longer efficient or asymptotically
efficient. The respective distribution of the estimators is no longer normal and chi-squared, and
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consequently, the F and t test on the estimated parameters are not necessarily valid in finite
sample. The consequences of non-normality of the fat-tailed kind, implying infinite variance,
are quite serious since hypothesis testing and interval estimation cannot be undertaken
meaningfully. Because of the possible consequences of non-normal disturbances, it is worth
testing to see if the disturbances could have come from a normal distribution. Several tests for
normality exist. In this study, Bera and Jarque test is used to test the normality assumption for
the OLS residual (Judge, et.al., 1988).
Based upon these various statistical tests for autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, and
normality, the model specification tests are conducted in the single equation context.
A criterion that is commonly used to evaluate a simulation model is the fit of the
individual variables in a simulation context. One would expect the results of a historical
simulation to match the behavior of the real world rather closely.

One way to test the

performance of the model is to perform historical simulation and examine how closely each
endogenous variable tracks its corresponding historical data series. It is therefore desirable to
have some quantitative measure of how closely individual variables track their corresponding
data series. The measure that is most often used is called the rms (root-mean-square) simulation
error. The rms simulation error for the variable Yt is defined as
rmse =

1 T
2
Yt s − Yt a )
(
∑
T t =1

(4.1.12)

where Yts = simulated value of Yt
Yta = actual value of Yt
T = number of periods in the simulation
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The rms error is thus a measure of the deviation of the simulated variable from its actual
time path (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991). Of course, the magnitude of this error can be
evaluated only by comparing it with the average size of the variable in question.
Other measures of simulation fit exist and are often used. Another simulation error
statistic is the rms percent error, which is defined as
rms percent e =

1 T  Yt s − Yt a 

∑
T t = 1  Yt a 

2

(4.1.13)

This is also a measure of the deviation of the simulated variable from its actual time path.
but in percentage terms. Other measures are the mean simulation error, defined as
Mean e =

1 T
∑ (Y s − Yt a )
T t =1 t

(4.1.14)

and the mean percent error, defined as
1 T  Yt s − Yt a 

Mean percent e = ∑ 
T t = 1  Yt a 

(4.1.15)

The problem with mean errors is that they may be close to 0 if large positive errors
cancel out large negative errors. Therefore, the rms simulation error is considered to be a better
measure of the simulation performance.
Low rms simulation errors are only one desirable measure of simulation fit. Another
important criterion is how well the model simulates turning points in the historical data. A
model must predict turning points to be judged better than a simple trend model (Pindyck and
Rubinfeld, 1991). Thus the ability of a simulation model to duplicate turning points or rapid
changes in the actual data is an important criterion for model evaluation.
A useful simulation statistic related to the rms simulation error and applied to the
evaluation of historical simulations is Theil s inequality coefficient. Note that the numerator of
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U is just the rms simulation error, but the scaling of the denominator is such that U will always
fall between 0 and 1. If U = 0, Yst = Yat for all t and there is a perfect fit. If U = 1, on the other
hand, the predictive performance of the model is as bad as it possibly could be (Pindyck and
Rubinfeld, 1991). The Theil’s inequality coefficient can be shown with a little algebra that

(

1 T
2
Yt s − Yt a ) = Y s − Y a
(
∑
T t =1

) + (σ
2

− σ a ) + 2(1 − ρ )σ sσ a
2

s

(4.1.16)

where Y s , Y a , σ s , and σ a are the means and standard deviations of the series Yts and Yta ,
respectively, and ρ is their correlation coefficient. The proportions of inequality are defined as

UM =

U =
S

UC =

(Y

s

− Ya

)

2

(1 / T )∑ (Yt s − Yt a )

(4.1.17)

2

(σ s − σ a ) 2

(1 / T ) ∑ (Yt s − Yt a )

(4.1.18)

2

2(1 − ρ )σ sσ a

(1 / T ) ∑ (Yt s − Yt a )

(4.1.19)

2

The proportions, UM, US, and UC are called the bias, the variance, and the covariance
proportions, respectively, and they are useful as a means of breaking the simulation error down
into its characteristic sources (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991).
The bias proportion UM is an indication of systematic error, since it measures the extent
to which the average values of the simulated and actual series deviate from each other.
Whatever the value of the inequality coefficient U, it is preferred that UM would be close to
zero. A large value of UM (above .1 or .2) would be quite troubling, since it would mean that a
systematic bias is present, so that revision of the model is necessary.
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The variance proportion US indicates the ability of the model to replicate the degree of
variability in the variable of interest. If US is large, it means that the actual series has fluctuated
considerably while the simulated series shows little fluctuation. Finally, the covariance
proportion measures what we might call unsystematic error; i.e., it represents the remaining
error after deviations from average values and average values have been accounted for. Since it
is unreasonable to expect predictions that are perfectly correlated with actual outcomes, this
component of error is less worrisome (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991).
Table 4.2 Specification and Model Validation Test.
Specification Tests
Autocorrelation
D-W
D-h
JYIELD
1.78
2.01 0.59(1.65)
JARHV
JPCCON
1.78 1.25(1.65)
2.15
KYIELD
KARHV
1.88 0.97(1.65)
KPCCON 2.13 0.72(1.65)
UEXDEM 1.70
Model Validation Tests
rms % error
5.01
JYIELD
JARHV
3.18
JPCONP
0.26
KYIELD
4.05
KARHA
1.86
2.41
KPCCON
1.44
UEXDEM

UM
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Heteroscadasticity
White
Breusch-Pagan
3.12(9.49)
4.10(5.99)
1.23(9.49)
3.27(5.99)
2.02(9.49)
2.11(5.99)
3.51(9.49)
1.14(5.99)
4.31(9.49)
2.06(5.99)
4.51(9.49)
4.25(5.99)
4.65(9.49)
2.21(5.99)
US
0.06
0.01
0.00
0.04
0.03
0.00
0.04

UC
0.94
0.99
1.00
0.96
0.97
1.00
0.96

Theil-U1
0.047
0.030
0.003
0.065
0.019
0.022
0.014

Normality
Bera-Jarque
1.55(5.99)
1.41(5.99)
2.41(5.99)
1.42(5.99)
1.41(5.99)
1.50(5.99)
0.94(5.99)
U
0.024
0.015
0.001
0.032
0.009
0.011
0.007

Note: 1. numbers in the parentheses represent the critical values of each testing statistic.
2. we fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation, heteroscadasticity, and the error
terms are distributed normally in all of specification tests at the 5% level of significance.

This study uses two goodness-of-fit measures to evaluate the overall predictive ability of
the model: 1) root-mean-square percent error (rms %) and 2) Theil s inequality coefficient (U).
The validation statistics show that the models basically do an excellent job of
representing the rice economies. The rms and Theil-U measures indicate that the models
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simulate the data well over the historical period. The rms indicates that the models have rms
from 0.26% root-mean-square error to 5.01%. And UM, US, UC and Theil-U illustrate that we
are able to use the models to explain the historical rice economies with very low values for UM
reflecting no systematic bias in the models.
4.2 Derivation of Political Weights
To derive the political weights of interest groups in the three rice sectors, it is assumed
that there are three interest groups: producers, consumers, and taxpayers. We are interested in
the net effect on producers and consumers of price policies in the three countries. Hence if PS
and PD are the prices for producers and consumers, then the net producer benefit from having a
price PS instead of PW, which is defined as no intervention or border price, is measured by the
change in producer surplus. Similarly, the net consumer welfare is measured by the change in
consumer surplus. On the other hand, the taxpayers or government net expenditure is defined
as: GS= PD*QD - PS*QS - PW*M; where QS, QD and M denote the levels of production,
consumption, and net imports, respectively. The first term on the right hand side of the
equation is the government revenue from selling to consumers, the second term is the cost of
purchasing from producers, and the third term is the payment for imported rice.
Now suppose that the policy maker seeks to maximize a political preference function
consisting of producer’s surplus, consumer’s surplus and taxpayer’s expenditures by choosing
the optimal domestic producer and consumer prices. The political preference function for the
policymaker in the three rice sectors is:
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Maximize PPF
PS , Pd

PS

= λP

∫ S ( P )dP - λC

PW

Pd

∫ D( p)dp + λG {[PD D(PD) -

PS S(PS)]

PW

- [ PW(D(PD)- S(PS)) ]},

(4.2.1)

For simplicity, it is assumed that there is no intertemporal storage activity. Assuming no stock
changes, the net imported quantity for Japan and South Korea (the net exported quantity for the
U.S.) can be expressed as D(PD) - S(PS).
variables.

Consumer and producer prices are the policy

Then, the optimal price policy can be obtained by differentiating the political

preference function with respect to producer price, PS and consumer price, PD, respectively. To
solve the optimization problem, the governments must choose the instruments PS and PD so as to
satisfy the following necessary conditions:

∂PPF
= S(PS)( λP - λG) - S’(PS)* λG (PS - PW) = 0
∂PS

(4.2.2)

∂PPF
= D(PD)(λG - λC) + D’(PD)* λG (PD - PW) = 0
∂PD

(4.2.3)

To be consistent with the maximization hypothesis, second-order conditions require that
the Hessian matrix be negative semi-definite at the optimal producer price (PS) and consumer
price (PD), i.e.,

∂ 2 PPF
∂ 2 PPF
≤
and
0
≤ 0.
∂PS2
∂PD2

In addition, we have additional normalization

equations such that λP + λC + λG = 3 and λG = 1 in order to compare with the social welfare
function that has unit equal weight to each interest group (λP = λC = λG = 1) and for simplicity.
Once we have established functional relations between the political weights and the
levels of rice policies, we can derive the formulas for describing endogenous domestic prices
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for producers and consumers. Arranging the above first order conditions (4.2.2) and (4.2.3), we
have the following equations for endogenous price determination:
PS* = PW +

λ P − λG S ( PS )
*
λG
S ’( PS )

(4.2.4)

PD* = PW +

λC − λG D( PD )
*
λG
D’( PD )

(4.2.5)

From these equations, it is possible to evaluate how political and economic factors
contribute to the establishment of endogenous price levels. First, the border price for rice
impacts domestic pricing policies. Second, the domestic market situations in terms of the
production and consumption functions also have impacts on the formation of producer and
consumer prices. Third, the above equations imply that political weights of the producer,
consumer and taxpayer are all involved in the process of rice price decisions. For example, a
larger political weight for producers relative to taxpayers would increase the producer price.
Moreover, if we move the border price variable to the left-hand side of equations (4.2.4)
and (4.2.5), we can see how political economic factors influence the difference between the
domestic and border prices in (4.2.6) and (4.2.7):
PS*- PW =

λ P − λG S ( PS )
*
λG
S ’( PS )

(4.2.6)

PD* - PW =

λC − λG D( PD )
*
λG
D’( PD )

(4.2.7)

These equations suggest the potential role of the political weights in evaluating the level
of domestic protection in the three rice sectors. For example, if the producers’ welfare is valued
higher than the taxpayers’ welfare, the domestic producer price would be above the
international price, which is likely to lead to an increase in the level of protection. In addition,
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we know that if all political weights are the same, λP = λC = λG, then PD* = PS* = PW. In other
words, the optimal domestic prices for consumer and producer are equal to the world price.
Thus, if there are no special preferences among interests groups, free trade is the optimal policy.
The difference between the domestic and world price only depends on the relative political
weights. For example, if λP > λG then it would imply that PS* > PW, and λC > λG implies that PW
> PD*.
The difference between producer and consumer prices is not affected by the world price
in equation (4.2.8):
PS* - PD* =

λ P − λG S ( PS ) λC − λG D( PD )
*
*
λG
S ’( PS )
λG
D’( PD )

(4.2.8)

The equation (4.2.8) implies that the price difference is purely determined by domestic
supply and demand factors, and the relative political weights of producers and consumers to that
of taxpayers. In particular, assuming supply and demand elasticities are constant, the optimal
price wedges are derived as follows:
α = (PS* - PW) / PS* = (λP - λG)/λG * (1/ε)

(4.2.9)

β = (PD* - PW) / PD* = (λC - λG)/λG * (1/η)

(4.2.10)

where α and β represent the optimal producer and consumer price wedge, ε and η denote the
supply and demand elasticity. The optimal price wedges are simple forms of implicit political
weights and elasticities of demand and supply. All of the elements of these optimal conditions,
except the political weights, are typically observable either directly or from econometric
estimates. Therefore, assuming that policymakers have chosen the optimal level of a given
policy tool so as to maximize an implicit political preference, one can easily determine the
political weights used by policymakers. The above equations show that the optimal price
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wedges depend not only on the elasticity of supply and demand but also on the political
weights. The more inelastic the supply (or demand) and the more deviation of the producer (or
consumer) political weight from the taxpayer weight, the more the optimal price wedges tend to
diverge (Im, 2000, Gardner, 1987).
Given the estimated elasticities of demand and supply from the domestic production and
consumption functions, we can derive the political weights of the three major interest groups in
the three countries’ rice economies. The estimated results from the rice market models are
shown in Table 4.3. These estimates are the results of applying equations (4.2.9) and (4.2.10)
with the normalization equations. To derive these estimates, supply and demand elasticities
were combined with annual producer and consumer price, and world price data from 1960 to
1999.
The estimated political weights as shown in Table 4.3 indicate that the Japanese and
Korean policies have favored rice producers more than the other interest groups.

In the

Japanese and Korean rice sectors, the political weights are particularly high for producers,
lowest for consumers.

The average weights for producers exceed unity while those for

consumers are less than unity. Table 4.3 shows that a political willingness to redistribute
income in favor of producers at the expense of consumers and taxpayers. This implies that rice
producers have generally been preferred to consumers and taxpayers. In other words, the
Japanese and Korean policymakers have placed more weights on the welfare of rice producers
rather than those of consumers and taxpayers.
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Table 4.3 Political Weights for the Three Countries.
Japan
Korea
Year
Producer
Consumer
Producer Consumer
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Average

1.08
1.06
1.06
1.08
1.10
1.12
1.13
1.13
1.15
1.16
1.16
1.16
1.17
1.09
1.09
1.16
1.20
1.19
1.22
1.21
1.19
1.22
1.23
1.24
1.24
1.24
1.26
1.26
1.26
1.26
1.26
1.26
1.26
1.26
1.27
1.27
1.26
1.26
1.26
1.25
1.19

0.92
0.94
0.94
0.92
0.90
0.88
0.87
0.87
0.85
0.84
0.84
0.84
0.83
0.91
0.91
0.84
0.80
0.81
0.78
0.79
0.81
0.78
0.77
0.76
0.76
0.76
0.74
0.74
0.74
0.74
0.74
0.74
0.74
0.74
0.73
0.73
0.74
0.74
0.74
0.75
0.81

1.19
0.92
0.89
1.14
0.99
0.81
0.82
0.87
0.94
1.04
1.04
1.10
1.14
0.68
0.88
1.07
1.23
1.16
1.21
1.24
1.20
1.34
1.40
1.39
1.38
1.38
1.42
1.40
1.43
1.45
1.44
1.44
1.44
1.41
1.45
1.44
1.46
1.46
1.45
1.37
1.21
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0.81
1.08
1.11
0.86
1.01
1.19
1.18
1.13
1.06
0.96
0.96
0.90
0.86
1.32
1.12
0.93
0.77
0.84
0.79
0.76
0.80
0.66
0.60
0.61
0.62
0.62
0.60
0.57
0.55
0.56
0.56
0.56
0.59
0.55
0.55
0.56
0.54
0.54
0.55
0.63
0.79

U.S.
Exporter
1.15
1.15
0.87
0.86
0.85
0.84
0.82
0.82
0.87
0.80
1.18
1.17
1.08
1.19
1.19
1.32
1.25
1.24
1.36
1.19
1.17
1.30
1.22
1.19
1.22
1.31
1.56
1.31
1.29
1.25
1.30
1.29
1.41
1.33
1.31
1.24
1.23
1.23
1.19
1.30
1.17

In the meantime, the political weight for the U.S. rice exporters is derived at 1.17 on
average. It is higher than the weight for the taxpayers that we normalized at unity in order to
compare with different interest groups. Overall, table 4.3 illustrates the time trend in the
political weight.

A change in the political weight could be interpreted as policymaker’s

preferences changing overtime.
4.3 Empirical Game Theoretic Analysis
4.3.1 Game Theoretic Procedure
In this section, the econometric estimation and the political weights are incorporated into
the game theoretic analysis to obtain the Nash equilibrium as a base. Using the base as a
foundation, a scenario analysis is conducted. The base is an analysis with respect to the existing
import and export policies in the three countries, which include tariffication and export
programs. The goal of this analysis is to look at the implications of changes from minimum
access to tariffication of imports.
4.3.2 The Base
To develop the framework, it is necessary to determine the import tariff equivalents of
Japan and Korea. Import tariffs are defined as the difference between the domestic price and
the world price. For example, if the domestic price is $3000/MT and the world price is
$500/MT, the tariff equivalent is the difference, which is $2500/MT. Depending upon the
world price path, future domestic prices are likely to decrease because the Japanese and Korean
governments will have to reduce the import tariffs annually. The domestic price is the world
price plus the tariff equivalent, and the price that producers received is the government
procurement price plus some type of producer support programs, such as direct payments for
Japan and Korea. For the U.S. price, we consider the world price plus the difference between
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the loan rate and the world price for the base. The reason is that the target-price/deficiency
payment program has been a major policy instrument for supporting producer income by paying
directly the amount of deficiency payment to rice farmers during the 1976-1995 period. The
level of deficiency payment, the difference between the announced target price and actual
market price (or loan rate) for rice, has been much higher than for other program commodities
such as wheat and corn. Due to the favorable incentives, the program participation rate has
been over 90 percent for rice, which is much higher than for other program commodities.
However, the 1996 FAIR Act terminated the target-price/deficiency payment program; the
marketing loan program will continue to provide income support to rice producers by allowing
them to pay back their nonrecourse loans at prices below the loan rate when USDA announces
world trading prices are less than the loan rate (Childs, 1996).
In terms of surplus, this study considers consumer, producer, and government surpluses
for Japan and Korea in the base. For the U.S., exporter surplus is considered in the base. The
equations are as follows:
Pd

CSURPit =

∫ D( p)dP

(4.3.1)

Pw

Ps

PSURPit =

∫ S ( p)dP

(4.3.2)

Pw

GSURPit = (TARIFit*IMPTit) – {(GPURPit*GPURit) + (EQUILit*GPURPit)}

(4.3.3)

For U.S. exporter’s surplus, U.S. export revenue from Japan and Korea is taken into
account because this study specifically looks at U.S. exports to Japan and Korea only. The
export surplus equation is the sum of exporter’s surplus from Japan and Korea. The export
surplus equation is as follows:
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Ps

UEXSURt =

∫E

Ps
J

( p)dP +

Pw

Ps

where

∫E

∫E

K

(4.3.4)

( p)dP

Pw

Ps
J

( p)dP and

Pw

∫E

K

( p)dP are the U.S. exporter’s surplus from Japan and Korea,

Pw

respectively. In addition, the equilibrium is derived using the empirical econometric estimation
equations for aggregated production and consumption for Japan and Korea and export demand
for the U.S. The other variables are exogenously given within the equation. The equilibrium
equation is as follows:
EQUILit = PRODit + BESTKit + IMPTit – CONPit – EXPOTit – ENSTKit

(4.3.5)

where CSURPit = consumer surplus at time t in country i
PSURPit = producer surplus at time t in country i
GSURPit = government surplus at time t in country i
GPURPit = government purchase price in country i
GPURit = government purchase amount at time t in country i
EQUILit = equilibrium quantity at time t in country i
PRODit = total production at time t in country i
BESTKit = beginning stock at time t in country i
IMPTit = import at time t in country i
CONPit = total consumption at time t in country i
EXPOTit = export at time t in country i
ENSTKit = ending stock at time t in country i
UEXSURt = U.S. export surplus at time t
In economic theory, the equilibrium should be zero in equilibrium. However, in reality,
that has not happened for the last four decades in Korea and Japan. Therefore, we consider the
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amount they need to import if the sign for the equilibrium is negative. If the sign for the
equilibrium is positive we consider the amount either to be in year ending stock or for foreign
aid. The reason is that there is no country that would be able to import rice from Japan and
Korea due to the high prices, which are almost five to ten times higher than the world price. For
U.S. equilibrium, this study incorporates equation (4.1.7) into the equilibrium identity including
U.S. exports to Japan and Korea.
Depending upon the surplus and equilibrium, we consider the political weights derived in
the previous section for the payoff functions. The payoff functions include surplus, equilibrium
quantity, and political weights to obtain the Nash equilibrium for the base.
Vpi = Wci*CSURPit (PDi)+ Wpi* PSURPit (PSi)+ Wgi * GSURPit(SQi)

(4.3.6)

where Vpi is the political payoff in country i, SQi is decoupled producer support (or direct
payment) in region i. Political weights are Wpi for producer, Wci for consumers, and Wgi for
government.
Using GAMS, the simulation results for the base are presented in Table 4.4. GAMS is
useful because it can substantially expand the extent and usefulness of mathematical
programming applications in policy analysis and decision making.
The base year is 1999 because the year represents an important turning point for Japan
and South Korea for the next negotiation, and because Japan adopted a tariffication policy in
1999. In the meantime, Korea is assumed to follow the tariffication policy since it has had
tremendous political pressure from the major exporters. As a result, we assume that the two
countries’ major import policy is tariffication.
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Table 4.4 Simulation Results of the Payoff Functions for the Base.
Japan
Korea

U.S.

Production (1000MT)

8356

4635

6502

Consumption (1000MT)

8720

4750

3846

Export (1000MT)

200

0

1804*

Import (1000MT)

170**

52**

321

Ending Stock (1000MT)

1210

73

867

Beginning Stock (1000MT)

1302

137

694

-22

99

600

Producer Surplus (Million $)

21.133

6.489

Consumer Surplus (Million $)

38.25

7.2

N/A

54.853

13.369

N/A

Tariff Equivalent ($/MT)

3428

1385

N/A

Payoffs

2.508

0.572

6.63

Equilibrium Quantity (1000MT)

Government Surplus (Million $)

5.1***

*: total U.S. exports.
**: imports from the U.S.
***: U.S. exporter surplus.
N/A: not available.

As seen in Table 4.4, Japanese and Korean production is estimated at 8356 thousand MT
and 4635 thousand MT, respectively. The 200 thousand MT of Japanese export is for foreign
aid to North Korea and some countries in Africa. The Japanese and Korean imports are derived
at 170 thousand MT and 52 thousand MT, respectively. The imports are from the U.S. only.
This study does not take imports from the ROW into account because it focuses on trade flow
between the U.S. and Japan and Korea. The equilibrium quantity for Japan, Korea, and the U.S.
are –22 thousand MT, 99 thousand MT, and 600 thousand MT, respectively. The U.S. export
quantity is derived at 1804 thousand MT, including exports to Japan, Korea, and the rest of the
world (ROW). In the meantime, the payoffs for Japan and Korea are derived at 2.508 and
0.572, respectively. And the U.S. export payoff from U.S. exports to Japan and Korea is
derived at 6.63.
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4.3.3 Scenario Analysis
The next round of negotiations will likely require that the import requirements be made
more transparent through tariffication. Based on these requirements, several realistic scenarios
are developed. According to WTO agreement, Japan has to reduce import tariffs by 36%, and
continue to reduce its import tariff by 6% annually. However, the tariff reduction will likely
change in the next negotiation. The possible range of the reduction would be from 2% to 8%
annually. Therefore, this possibility of reduction is taken into account for scenario analysis.
Under MA, Japan would have increased imports by 8%-12% of domestic consumption, from
2001 to 2006, and 12%-14% by 2010. However, the Japanese government announced that they
replaced the existing minimum access policy for tariffication beginning April 1, 1999. Thus,
the import policy scenario for Japan focuses on tariffication.

In the meantime, Korean

government tends to maintain the minimum access policy until 2004. However, as mentioned
earlier, the government has had tremendous political and economic pressure from major
exporters such as the U.S. and CAIRNS group. Therefore, tariffication policy is considered in
the scenario analysis for Korea as well. For the U.S., the existing CCC Credit Guarantee
Programs (CCC), Market Access Program (MAP), and Foreign Market Development Program
(FMDP) are considered in the scenario analysis to obtain the Nash equilibrium.
The normal-form representation of an extensive-form game is a summarized description
of the extensive form. The normal form is a collection of the pure strategies available to each
player at each of his/her information sets in the extensive form (Tirole, 1989). Therefore, the
normal-form representation is used for the scenario analysis. In this study, there are three
players in the game: the United States (US), Japan (JP), and Korea (KO). Let Ak denote the set
of actions available to player k, for k = US, JP, and KO, and let Ak denote an arbitrary member

109

of this action set. Let (AJP, AKO, AUS) denote a combination of actions, and let Pk denote player
k’s payoff function where Pk(AJP, AKO, AUS) is player k’s payoff resulting from action (AJP,
AKO, AUS).
Definition 4.1:

The normal-form representation of a two-player game specifies the
player’s action spaces A1, A2 and their payoff functions P1, P2.
This game is denoted by G = {A1, A2 ; P1, P2}.

The solution to each game will involve the concept of elimination of strictly dominated
strategies. At each stage, the elimination of dominated strategies for some players at the
previous stage uncovers dominated strategies for other players. The process stops when no
more dominated strategies can be found.
Definition 4.2:

In the normal-form game G = { A1, A2 ; P1, P2} let A1i, and A1j, ∀
i ≠ j, be feasible strategies for player 1, i.e., A1i, and A1j are
members of A1. Action A1j is strictly dominated by A1i if, for all
actions available to the other player, player 1’s payoff from
playing A1j is strictly less than the payoff from playing A1i, such
that: P1(A1j, A2i) < P1(A1i, A2i) ∀ A2i ∈ A2.

If a unique solution to a two-player normal-form game non-cooperative game is to be
found, it must be self-enforcing.

Since there are no appropriate authorities to enforce

international agreements, this is clearly the situation in any international trade negotiation.
Thus, each player’s predicted action must be that player’s best response to the predicted action
of the other player. This is the Nash equilibrium definition (Kennedy, 1994).
Definition 4.3:

In the two-player normal-form game G = {A1, A2 ; P1, P2}, the
actions (A1*, A2*) are a Nash equilibrium if, for players 1 and 2,
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A1* is player 1’s best response to the actions specified for the
other player, 2, and vice versa, such that P1(A1j, A2i) < P1(A1i, A2i)
∀ A2i ∈ A2.
In this three-payer, normal-form, noncooperative dynamic game, defined by G = {AJP,
AKO, AUS ; PJP, PKO, PUS}, each country chooses some action Ak ∈ Ak in order to maximize its
payoff function given the action choices of the other countries. The action space AUS =
{CCCUS, MAPUS, FMPUS, CMPUS, CFPUS, MFPUS} for the U.S., and AC = {T2C, T4C, T6C,
T8C} for C = Japan, Korea. The scenario analysis includes six U.S. actions and four actions of
Japan and Korea. The actions of each country are as follows:
CCCUS: U.S. Credit Guarantee Programs
MAPUS: U.S. Market Access Program
FMPUS: U.S. Foreign Market Development Program
CMPUS: combination of U.S. CCC and MAP
CFPUS: combination of U.S. CCC and FMP
MFPUS: combination of U.S. MAP and FMP
T2C: 2% reduction of Japanese and Korean tariff equivalents
T4C: 4% reduction of Japanese and Korean tariff equivalents
T6C: 6% reduction of Japanese and Korean tariff equivalents
T8C: 8% reduction of Japanese and Korean tariff equivalents.
The simulation results for the scenario analysis of each country’s action are presented
from Table 4.5 to Table 4.17. For the purpose of comparison, the payoffs for the two countries
are presented under each U.S. action, and the Nash equilibrium is obtained for each U.S. action.
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Moreover, ten-year average political weights are used, five years prior to WTO
agreement implementation and five years after the implementation. The political weights used
for Japan are 1.261 and 0.739 for the producer and consumer groups, respectively. For Korea,
1.436 and 0.564 for the producer and consumer groups, respectively, are used for the scenario
analysis. The political weight for U.S. exporter group is 1.283.
Table 4.5 Simulation Payoffs under CCCUS.
Korea

Japan

Action

T2KO

T4KO

T6KO

T8KO

T2JP

1.38 ; 0.24

1.38 ; 0.27

1.38 ; 0.28

1.38 ; 0.36

(5.42)

(5.47)

(5.49)

(5.52)

1.71 ; 0.24

1.71 ; 0.27

1.71 ; 0.28

1.71 ; 0.36

(5.50)

(5.53)

(5.57)

(5.62)

1.72 ; 0.24

1.72 ; 0.27

1.72 ; 0.28

1.72 ; 0.36

(5.85)

(5.89)

(5.92)

(5.96)

2.25 ; 0.24

2.25 ; 0.27

2.25 ; 0.28

2.25 ; 0.36

(5.95)

(6.01)

(6.08)

(6.14)

T4JP

T6JP

T8JP

Note: numbers in a solution cell represent Japanese and Korean payoffs, respectively.
numbers in parentheses represent U.S. payoffs.

Under the U.S. action of CCCUS, this study considers U.S. export programs through the
Commodity Credit Corporation Credit guarantee programs (CCC), including Export Credit
Guarantee Program and Supplier Credit Guarantee Program with changes in Japanese and
Korean tariff equivalents from 2% to 8% annually. The results of the simulation for the U.S.
Credit guarantee programs are presented in Table 4.5. The results under the CCC credit
guarantee programs, as indicated by the Nash equilibrium, show that the U.S. would be better
off if Japan and Korea reduce their tariff equivalent by 8%. The Nash equilibrium solution is
shown in bold letters of the results tables. In the Nash equilibrium, Japanese and Korean
payoffs are 2.25 and 0.36, respectively, and U.S. payoff is 6.14.
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Table 4.6 Simulation Results of the Nash Equilibrium under CCCUS.
Japan
Korea

U.S.

Production (1000MT)

8173

4532

6502

Consumption (1000MT)

8306

4403

3846

Export (1000MT)

171

0

1804*

Import (1000MT)

97**

21**

321

-23

50

320

Producer Surplus (Million $)

23.183

5.762

4.79***

Consumer Surplus (Million $)

34.247

6.455

N/A

Government Surplus (Million $)

52.291

11.555

N/A

3154

1274

N/A

Equilibrium Quantity (1000MT)

Tariff Equivalent ($/MT)
*: total U.S. exports.
**: imports from the U.S.
***: U.S. exporter surplus.
N/A: not available.

Under the Nash equilibrium for U.S. action, CCCUS, Japanese and Korean production is
derived at 8173 thousand MT and 4532 thousand MT, respectively (Table 4.6). The two
importing countries’ consumption is derived at 8306 thousand MT and 4403 thousand MT. In
the meantime, Japanese and Korean imports are decreased by 73 thousand MT and 31 thousand
MT, respectively, compared to the base. That causes U.S. exporter’s surplus decrease slightly
by 0.22 million dollars. However, Japanese and Korean total surpluses are increased by 0.61
and 0.342 million dollars, respectively. In addition, the U.S., Japanese, and Korean payoffs are
decreased slightly by 0.49, 0.258, and 0.212, respectively.
In U.S. actions of MAPUS, this study considers Market Access Program (MAP) with
changes in Japanese and Korean tariff equivalent from 2% to 8% annually. The results of
MAPUS presented in Tables 4.7 and 4.8. A Nash equilibrium is obtained at an 8% reduction of
Japanese and Korean tariff rate. The Japanese and Korean payoffs are derived at 16.1 and 3.7,
respectively, and the U.S. payoff is derived at 16.74.
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Table 4.7 Simulation Payoffs under MAPUS.
Korea

Japan

Action

T2KO

T4KO

T6KO

T8KO

T2JP

13.5 ; 1.8

13.5 ; 3.2

13.5 ; 3.6

13.5 ; 3.7

(15.1)

(15.3)

(15.5)

(15.6)

14.8 ; 1.8

14.8 ; 3.2

14.8 ; 3.6

14.8 ; 3.7

(15.5)

(15.7)

(15.9)

(16.0)

16.0 ; 1.8

16.0 ; 3.2

16.0 ; 3.6

16.0 ; 3.7

(15.8)

(16.0)

(16.2)

(16.26)

16.1 ; 1.8

16.1 ; 3.2

16.1 ; 3.6

16.1 ; 3.7

(16.3)

(16.45)

(16.57)

(16.74)

T4JP

T6JP

T8JP

Note: numbers in a solution cell represent Japanese and Korean payoffs, respectively.
numbers in parentheses represent U.S. payoffs.

Table 4.8 Simulation Results of the Nash Equilibrium under MAPUS.
Japan
Korea

U.S.

Production (1000MT)

8154

4500

6502

Consumption (1000MT)

8210

4653

3846

Export (1000MT)

178

0

2484*

Import (1000MT)

116**

27**

321

Equilibrium Quantity (1000MT)

-20

101

Producer Surplus (Million $)

34.253

6.85

13.05***

Consumer Surplus (Million $)

32.547

6.92

N/A

Government Surplus (Million $)

51.15

10.04

N/A

Tariff Equivalent ($/MT)

3154

1274

N/A

295

*: total U.S. exports.
**: imports from the U.S.
***: U.S. exporter surplus.
N/A: not available.

Under the U.S. action, MAPUS, Japanese and Korean production is derived at 8154
thousand MT and 4500 thousand MT, respectively.

Japanese and Korean production is

decreased by 202 thousand MT and 135 thousand MT, respectively, compared to the base.
Regarding the two countries’ consumption, Japanese consumption is decreased to 8210
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thousand MT.

Also, Korean consumption is decreased to 4653 thousand MT from 4750

thousand MT, compared to the base. Meanwhile, U.S. total export is increased by 680 thousand
MT. However, U.S. exports to Japan and Korea are decreased by 54 thousand MT and 25
thousand MT, respectively. Due to an increase in U.S. total export, U.S. exporter’s surplus is
increased to 13.05 million dollars from 5.1 million dollars, compared to the base.
Table 4.9 Simulation Payoffs under FDPUS.
Korea

Japan

Action

T2KO

T4KO

T6KO

T8KO

T2JP

17.6 ; 3.4

17.6 ; 3.1

17.6 ; 3.3

17.6 ; 3.4

(52.2)

(52.8)

(53.1)

(53.3)

17.2 ; 3.4

17.2 ; 3.1

17.2 ; 3.3

17.2 ; 3.4

(52.9)

(53.4)

(54.2)

(54.9)

14.2 ; 3.4

14.2 ; 3.1

14.2 ; 3.3

14.2 ; 3.4

(53.0)

(53.9)

(54.7)

(55.6)

16.7 ; 3.4

16.7 ; 3.1

16.7 ; 3.3

16.7 ; 3.4

(54.5)

(55.1)

(55.3)

(56.0)

T4JP

T6JP

T8JP

Note: numbers in a solution cell represent Japanese and Korean payoffs, respectively.
numbers in parentheses represent U.S. payoffs.

In the U.S action of FDPUS, a dominant strategy for Japan is obtained at the 2% of tariff
reduction. The payoff is derived at 17.6. Also, two dominant strategies for Korea are obtained
at both a 2% reduction and a 8% reduction with the payoff of 3.4. As a result, there exist
multiple equilibria under the U.S. action of FDPUS at both a 2% and a 8% reduction of Japanese
and Korean tariff equivalents. The FDPUS action has the largest payoffs for the U.S., compared
to the base, CCCUS, and MAPUS, but the payoffs for Japan and Korea are almost the same as the
other two U.S. actions and the base. Thus, the U.S. would be better off under the action of
FDPUS dealing with Japanese and Korean import policies, compared to the previous two actions
in terms of single policy action.
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Table 4.10 Simulation Results of the Nash Equilibrium under FDPUS.
Japan
Korea
U.S.(T2C)

U.S.(T8C)

Production (1000MT)

8146

4116

6502

6502

Consumption (1000MT)

8320

4550

3846

3846

Export (1000MT)

0

0

1906*

1973*

Import (1000MT)

475**

134**

321

321

Equilibrium Quantity (1000MT)

-20

49

453

386

Producer Surplus (Million $)

38.33

7.23

Consumer Surplus (Million $)

32.52

6.58

N/A

N/A

Government Surplus (Million $) 55.663

10.66

N/A

N/A

40.69***

41.54***

*: total U.S. exports.
**: imports from the U.S.
***: U.S. exporter surplus.
N/A: not available.

Table 4.10 shows the simulation results of the Nash equilibrium under the U.S. action of
FDPUS. The results show that Japanese production is decreased slightly by 110 thousand MT,
but Korean production is decreased dramatically by 513 thousand MT, compared to the base.
Possibly, this dramatic change in production causes some structural changes in the Korean rice
industry. For example, the Korean government would attempt to increase its target diversion
program on the production side, which is basically an increase in planted area reduction
program. The government diversion program has caused a positive impact on area harvested
due to the fact that farmers tend to divert paddy fields of lower productivity from rice
production, thus improving the average rice yields of the remaining rice land (Lee, 1997).
However, as time has gone and they divert more paddy fields to plant high-revenue crops and
vegetables, farmers had to divert higher productivity paddy fields. As a result, the government
diversion program became a negative impact on rice production (MAFF, 2000).
Japanese and Korean total consumption is decreased substantially by 400 thousand MT
and 200 thousand MT, respectively. Producer surplus in Japan and Korea is increased by 17.2
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million dollars and 0.741 million dollars, respectively. However, consumer surplus in Japan
and Korea is decreased by 5.73 million dollars and 0.62 million dollars, respectively. In the
meantime, Japanese government surplus is increased slightly, but Korean government surplus is
decreased by 2.709 million dollars, compared to the base.
For the U.S., the payoff with T8C is larger than that of T2C under FDPUS. In addition,
U.S. total export is increased slightly with T8C. This may reflect the fact that the higher tariff
rates would result in lower exports.
Table 4.11 Simulation Payoffs under CMPUS.
Korea

Japan

Action

T2KO

T4KO

T6KO

T8KO

T2JP

9.9 ; 2.3

9.9 ; 3.0

9.9 ; 4.6

9.9 ; 2.5

(30.8)

(30.9)

(31.1)

(31.4)

13.3 ; 2.3

13.3 ; 3.0

13.3 ; 4.6

13.3 ; 2.5

(30.9)

(31.4)

(31.9)

(32.2)

21.1 ; 2.3

21.1 ; 3.0

21.1 ; 4.6

21.1 ; 2.5

(31.6)

(32.2)

(32.7)

(32.7)

17.1 ; 2.3

17.1 ; 3.0

17.1 ; 4.6

17.1 ; 2.5

(32.0)

(32.4)

(32.55)

(32.7)

T4JP

T6JP

T8JP

Note: numbers in a solution cell represent Japanese and Korean payoffs, respectively.
numbers in parentheses represent U.S. payoffs.

Under the U.S. action of CMPUS, CCC and MAP with changes in Japanese and Korean
tariff equivalent from 2% to 8% are taken into account. The results of the action are presented
in Tables 4.11 and 4.12. The results under the action show that the U.S. would be better off if
Japan and Korea reduce their tariff equivalent by 8% or 6%. The U.S. payoffs do not change
under the 8% and 6% reduction with the payoff of 32.7. A dominant strategy for Japan is a 6%
reduction of its tariff equivalent with a payoff of 21.1. In addition, a dominant strategy for
Korea is a 6% reduction of tariff equivalent with a payoff of 4.6 as well. However, the Nash
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equilibrium is obtained at a 6% of reduction strategy for both the U.S. and the two importing
countries with the payoffs of 32.7 and 25.7, respectively.
Table 4.12 Simulation Results of the Nash Equilibrium under CMPUS.
Japan
Korea

U.S.

Production (1000MT)

8156

4432

6502

Consumption (1000MT)

8287

4518

3846

Export (1000MT)

0

0

2484*

Import (1000MT)

252**

32**

321

Equilibrium Quantity (1000MT)

-22

50

270

Producer Surplus (Million $)

36.23

6.42

25.49***

Consumer Surplus (Million $)

34.89

7.83

N/A

54.365

11.14

N/A

3222

1302

N/A

Government Surplus (Million $)
Tariff Equivalent ($/MT)
*: total U.S. exports.
**: imports from the U.S.
***: U.S. exporter surplus.
N/A: not available.

Japanese production as well as consumption is almost the same as under the single
actions of CCCUS and MAPUS. However, the sum of payoffs for Japan and Korea is increased
under the combination of CCCUS and MAPUS. That means the two importing countries would
be better off under the U.S. action of both CCCUS and MAPUS together by a payoff of 3.29. In
terms of total surplus, Japan and Korea would be worse off by 4.034 million dollars under the
combination of CCCUS and MAPUS. However, the U.S. total exporter’s surplus is increased by
7.65 million dollars. Moreover, U.S. export to Japan is increased by 39 thousand MT under the
combination as opposed to Korea that would import 16 thousand MT less.
Comparing with the base, Japanese and Korean production is decreased by 200 thousand
MT and 203 thousand MT, respectively. In addition, Japanese and Korean consumption is
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decreased as well, by 433 thousand MT and 232 thousand MT, respectively. However, the sum
of the two countries’ surplus is increased by almost 20 million dollars.
Table 4.13 Simulation Payoffs under CFPUS.
Korea

Japan

Action

T2KO

T4KO

T6KO

T8KO

T2JP

16.7 ; 3.0

16.7 ; 3.4

16.7 ; 2.8

16.7 ; 2.6

(68.1)

(68.3)

(68.6)

(67.3)

17.5 ; 3.0

17.5 ; 3.4

17.5 ; 2.8

17.5 ; 2.8

(68.2)

(69.8)

(70.6)

(71.0)

17.0 ; 3.0

17.0 ; 3.4

17.0 ; 2.8

17.0 ; 2.8

(70.2)

(70.5)

(71.3)

(71.9)

17.1 ; 3.0

17.1 ; 3.4

17.1 ; 2.8

17.1 ; 2.8

(71.6)

(72.2)

(72.5)

(73.0)

T4JP

T6JP

T8JP

Note: numbers in a solution cell represent Japanese and Korean payoffs, respectively.
numbers in parentheses represent U.S. payoffs.

In U.S. action CFPUS, CCCUS and FDPUS are taken into account with change in Japanese
and Korean tariff equivalent from 2% to 8% annually. The results are presented in Tables 4.13
and 14. The Nash equilibrium under the action is obtained at a 4% reduction of Japanese and
Korean tariff equivalents. The U.S. payoff in the Nash equilibrium is 69.8, and Japanese and
Korean payoffs are 17.5 and 3.4, respectively. The U.S. payoff under CPFUS is increased
substantially to 69.8 from 6.63 under the base. Even though Japanese and Korean payoffs are
increased to 17.5 and 3.4, respectively, the payoffs are similar to those under FMPUS.
Looking at the Table 4.14, which presents the simulation results under CFPUS, we can
realize that Japanese production is decreased slightly, but Korean production is decreased by
519 thousand MT along with an decrease in consumption by 333 thousand MT. However, the
two countries’ imports from the U.S. are increased substantially by 407 thousand MT. That
causes U.S. exporter’s surplus to increase by 50.47 million dollars, compared to the base. In
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addition, the sum of the two countries’ surplus is increased by 13.21 million dollars, compared
to the base.
Table 4.14 Simulation Results of the Nash Equilibrium under CFPUS
Japan
Korea

U.S.

Production (1000MT)

8225

4116

6502

Consumption (1000MT)

8006

4417

3846

Export (1000MT)

200

0

1906*

Import (1000MT)

481**

148**

321

Equilibrium Quantity (1000MT)

-20

50

629

Producer Surplus (Million $)

51.83

8.32

Consumer Surplus (Million $)

48.23

6.23

N/A

Government Surplus (Million $)

83.89

12.66

N/A

Tariff Equivalent ($/MT)

3222

1302

N/A

55.57***

*: total U.S. exports.
**: imports from the U.S.
***: U.S. exporter surplus.
N/A: not available.

Under the final action, MFPUS, MAP and FMDP are taken into account with change in
Japanese and Korean tariff equivalent from 2% to 8% annually. The outcome of the action is
presented in Tables 4.15 and 4.16. MAP and FADP are major programs in U.S. market
development program. These two programs benefit U.S. farmers, processors, and exporters by
assisting their organizations in developing new markets and increasing market share in existing
markets. These programs support growth in U.S. agricultural exports by enlisting private sector
involvement and resources in coordinated efforts to promote U.S. products to foreign buyers.
In this action, the Nash equilibrium is obtained at a 4% reduction. The U.S. payoff is
derived at 140.6, and Japanese and Korean payoffs are obtained at 45.0 and 14.7, respectively.
Comparing to the base, the U.S. payoff is increased substantially by 133.97. Also, Japanese and
Korean payoffs are increased dramatically by 42.5 and 14.128, respectively. However, a
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dominant strategy for the U.S. is an 8% reduction with a payoff of 147.1, and a dominant
strategy for Japan and Korea is a 4% reduction with payoffs of 45.0 and 14.7, respectively.
Table 4.15 Simulation Payoffs under MFPUS.
Korea

Japan

Action

T2KO

T4KO

T6KO

T8KO

T2JP

34.1 ; 8.2

34.1 ; 14.7

34.1 ; 13.7

34.1 ; 12.3

(137.4)

(138.3)

(139.2)

(140.3)

45.0 ; 8.2

45.0 ; 14.7

45.0 ; 13.7

45.0 ; 12.3

(139.5)

(140.6)

(141.2)

(142.0)

43.9 ; 8.2

43.9 ; 14.7

43.9 ; 13.7

43.9 ; 12.3

(142.2)

(142.9)

(143.8)

(145.3)

40.2 ; 8.2

40.2 ; 14.7

40.2 ; 13.7

40.2 ; 12.3

(144.9)

(145.7)

(146.2)

(147.1)

T4JP

T6JP

T8JP

Note: numbers in a solution cell represent Japanese and Korean payoffs, respectively.
numbers in parentheses represent U.S. payoffs.

In terms of production and consumption in the two importing countries, some substantial
changes can be found (Table 4.16).

Firstly, both countries’ production is decreased

dramatically due to an increase in import. An increase in import primarily causes domestic
production to decrease. If they would keep the levels of production in both countries, the
governments would have to deal with over-supply, which is eventually becoming burdensome
stock. A result of this burdensome stock would incur rice surpluses in both countries, requiring
expensive acreage diversion programs to help curb the over-supply. However, secondly, the
main beneficiary would be the U.S. since the exporter’s surplus is increased substantially.
Similarly, the two countries total surplus is increased dramatically as well, compared to the
base.

121

Table 4.16 Simulation Results of the Nash Equilibrium under MFPUS.
Japan
Korea

U.S.

Production (1000MT)

7760

3863

6502

Consumption (1000MT)

7953

4390

3846

Export (1000MT)

0

0

1906*

Import (1000MT)

659**

221**

321

Equilibrium Quantity (1000MT)

-18

40

456

Producer Surplus (Million $)

75.67

18.82

112.08***

Consumer Surplus (Million $)

48.93

11.94

N/A

Government Surplus (Million $)

87.69

20.05

N/A

Tariff Equivalent ($/MT)

3222

1302

N/A

*: total U.S. exports.
**: imports from the U.S.
***: U.S. exporter surplus.
N/A: not available.

Table 4.17 Payoff Summary.
J & K*

U.S.

Action

T2C

T4C

T6C

T8C

CCCUS

5.42 ; 1.62

5.53 ; 1.98

5.92 ; 2.0

6.14 ; 2.61

MAPUS

15.1 ; 15.3

15.7 ; 18.0

16.2 ; 19.5

16.4 ; 19.7

FDPUS

52.2 ; 20.5

53.4 ; 20.3

54.7 ; 17.5

56.0 ; 20.1

CMPUS

30.8 ; 12.2

31.4 ; 16.3

32.7 ; 25.7

32.7 ; 19.6

CFPUS

68.1 ; 19.7

69.8 ; 20.4

71.3 ; 19.8

73.0 ; 19.9

MFPUS

137.4 ; 42.3

140.6 ; 59.7

143.8 ; 57.6

147.1 ; 52.5

*: represents sum of Japanese and Korean payoffs.

Overall, Table 4.17 reports a summary of the entire U.S. actions. Each action has a Nash
equilibrium with changes in Japanese and Korean tariff equivalents. Table 4.17 shows that the
overall Nash equilibrium for both trade parties is obtained at a 4% tariff reduction under
MFPUS.
For Japan and Korea, a dominant strategy is 4% reduction with the payoff of 59.7. Since
they have tried to protect their import markets, they would try to keep their tariff rates as high as

122

possible to restrict their import markets. For the U.S., a dominant strategy is 8% reduction with
the payoff of 147.1. It is preferable for the U.S. to export to Japan and Korea with lower tariff
rates because the higher tariff rates would result in lower U.S. exports to Japan and Korea.
Under the MAP and FMDP programs, according to USDA, the U.S. can advertise U.S.
rice through the Japanese telecommunication channels, such as national television and radio
commercials (USDA, 2000).

That means the U.S. rice federation can promote U.S. rice

throughout the nation, which increases opportunities for U.S. rice exports to Japan.
Unfortunately, promotional activities are not yet allowed in Korea. However, the main question
for U.S. exports to Japan and Korea is how to handle heavy competition with major exporters
such as Australia, China, and other exporters in both markets and how to penetrate Japanese and
Korean domestic markets and consumer table competition.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter summarizes the research, states conclusion remarks, and describes the
research limitations and future research opportunities. The organization of the Chapter is as
follows: section 5.1 summaries the entire research and makes some concluding remarks. In
section 5.2, the limitations of the study and future research opportunities are stated.
5.1 Summary and Concluding Remarks
As a result of WTO agreement on agricultural commodities, the impact of trade
liberalization on the international rice market is profound because rice trade has been highly
restricted in both developed and developing countries. In addition, another round of the WTO
trade negotiations has started and the impacts of potential policy changes on rice production and
trade flows in the world rice industry are unknown.
The Uruguay Round negotiations resulted in an agreement by Japan and South Korea to
relax their rice import bans with minimum access requirements. Japan agreed to imports equal
to 4% of consumption in 1995, increasing to 8% by the year 2001. Korea agreed to a minimum
access of 1% of consumption in 1995, increasing to 2% by 2000 and 4% by 2004 based on the
consumption of the year of 1986-88.
However, in December 1998, the Japanese government notified the WTO of its decision
to introduce rice tariffication beginning April 1, 1999. Under tariffication, a specific duty of
351.17 yen per kilogram (kg) was applied to imports outside of the MA volume. In and after
Japanese fiscal year 2000, April to March, a specific duty of 341 yen per kg was applied to
imports outside of MA.
The impact of the UR agreement on the U.S. rice industry has been favorable. The major
benefit has been access to the Japanese market. The U.S. share of this market has been about
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50% as opposed to the Korean market, in which its market share is zero. However, the U.S.
share of the Japanese market has gradually decreased and been unstable due to strong
competition with major exporters.
Nevertheless, the U.S. rice industry can potentially increase its market share in Japanese
and Korean rice import markets, given that both countries will likely be required to expand their
imports in the next round of the WTO negotiations. Expanded market access remains one of the
most important issues for rice trade.
Looking at the historical and recent structural changes in both countries, it is useful for
the U.S. rice industry, especially the export market, to examine how much market share the U.S.
can potentially obtain in the Japanese and Korean markets. In addition, it is important to
examine how changes in Japanese and Korean rice policies, as related to their WTO
commitments, will impact U.S. export industry.
The general objective of this study was to determine the potential for U.S. rice exports to
Japan and Korea. The goal of the analysis was to determine the implications for U.S. export
policies. The specific objectives to accomplish this were to estimate econometric models of
supply and consumption behavior, to determine the political weights of relevant interest groups,
to conduct a game theoretic analysis to determine the optimal policy options for U.S. rice
exports.
Chapter two described Japanese and Korean rice economies and U.S. export situation. A
general feature of both countries is an aging farm population (generally over 55) with rice
farming being mostly a part-time farming operation with high dependence on off-farm income.
Currently these two countries have high rice production costs compared to border prices due to
the small-scale of farming, relatively high labor costs, and high land costs. The farm structure
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is dominated by small-scale rice farms and mostly operator-owned rather than rented rice farms.
They produce high quality japonica medium-grain rice as a staple food. During the past several
decades, they have been experiencing a decrease in per capita rice consumption, and normally
produce rice surpluses as a result of highly protectionist government programs.
Rice supply and demand in Japan and Korea share many similarities. The production
structure and policies for the rice sector have many common characteristics. As these countries
have become more wealthy industrial countries, they have experienced a similar long-term
decline in per capita rice consumption.
In terms of production, rice is the major crop grown in Japan and Korea, accounting for
37 percent and 56 percent of the total planted acreage in 1999, respectively. Although rice
production has been relatively stable during the past 20 years, it has come from improved yield.
The supply of paddy land for rice production has been stable over time due to the limited
availability of land, as well as the low substitutability in land use between paddy and upland.
Improvements in rice yields are mainly due to the adoption of new varieties, mechanization, and
improved production practices in both countries.
On the consumption side, an increase in per capita income created a change in food
consumption patterns in both countries. In addition, as per capita income has grown, per capita
consumption of rice has declined gradually. This is mainly due to the change in the dietary
pattern of consumers in favor of protein food such as meat and vegetables. However, the total
consumption in rice has been stable in both countries due to an increase in population and
higher demand in processing industries.
The U.S. is a leading exporter of rice in the international market, accounting for about 12
percent of global rice trade although the U.S. accounts for less than 2 percent of global rice

126

production. The U.S. currently ranks fourth among major exporters, behind Thailand, Vietnam,
and China. More than 40 percent of the U.S. rice crop is exported each year, making the U.S.
market sensitive to movements in international prices.
From 1967 to 1982, Korea imported 8 million metric tons (MMT) of rice and U.S. rice
exports supplied 65% of that market-mostly from California. However, by the mid-1980’s,
Korea attained self-sufficiency in rice due to generous government programs, and imports were
essentially banned. After losing its largest importer, Korea, in 1983, California accumulated
rice stocks, relative to the southern states. Since 1983, the U.S. exported no rice to Korea.
In the meantime, Japan accounts for the bulk of U.S. medium grain brown rice exports.
In 1999/2000, Japan imported nearly 150 thousand MT of medium grain brown rice from the
U.S., down from a year earlier record 250 thousand MT. Japan divides its rice purchases
between milled and brown rice, with each type’s share varying each year. The U.S. typically
supplies half of Japan’s total rice purchases.

The U.S. exports about 10 thousand to 14

thousand MT of short grain brown rice each year. Japan accounts for two-thirds, most of it sold
under the Simultaneous-Buy-Sell (SBS) portion of their total WTO commitments.
There are four types of government programs for U.S. rice exports. First, under PL 480,
the U.S. sells rice on concessional credit terms and donates rice to needy countries either
bilaterally or through the World Food Program. Second, USDA provides Credit Guarantee
Program such as export credit guarantees (GSM-102) and intermediate Export Credit Guarantee
(GSM-103) for commercial financing of U.S. agricultural exports. Third, the Market Access
Program facilitates U.S. rice sales to markets where the U.S. competes with subsidized exports
from other countries. Finally, USDA funds Foreign Market Development Program, which is for
the creation, expansion, and maintenance of foreign markets for U.S. agricultural products.
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In Chapter three, the theoretical framework was considered. The dynamic econometric
model specified in this study was characterized by a combination of a partial adjustment process
both in supply and demand, and cobweb type price expectations in supply response. The longrun adjustment responses were embodied in this model due to factor fixity in supply and habit
formation in demand.
Supply and demand responses for rice were specified in terms of domestic production
and consumption. The dynamics and the relationship between short-run and long-run responses
can be seen by the specified market model within the partial adjustment model framework.
For the study, the supply parameters were estimated using two-stage least squares
(2SLS). The demand equations, per capita consumption and U.S. export demand, are estimated
by ordinary least square (OLS).
Given the estimated elasticities of demand and supply from the domestic production and
consumption functions, we could derive the political weights of the three major interest groups
in the three countries’ rice economies. The policy analysis in the game theoretic approach
looked specifically at the behavior of the rice price, import policy, and export policy variables.
This study addressed policy analysis including several reasonable scenarios with respect to
tariff equivalents. Overall, a game theoretic approach was adopted to determine politically
feasible policy options for U.S. exports on each policy change in Japan and Korea.
In Chapter four, the empirical results were presented.

Based on the theoretical

considerations and the market structure concerning the dynamic commodity model in the
previous section, the empirical econometric models for the three countries’ rice markets were
specified for the period 1960-1999.
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The results of the acreage response estimation showed the expected signs for all
explanatory variables that were implied in the theory of production. Except for the constant
terms, all parameter estimates were different from zero at the 5% level of significance. The
prices received by rice farmers in both countries had a positive impact on the acreage response,
as expected. The production costs for Japan and the diversion program for Korea had a
negative impact on the supply response. The coefficient estimate of the lagged dependent
variables showed a stable geometric lag process and supported the existence of a lagged
distribution of the dependent variables. The short-run supply elasticities with respect to the
output at the mean for Japan and Korea were 0.11 and 0.13, respectively. However, the longrun supply elasticities were estimated as 0.75 and 0.89, respectively.
Except for the constant terms, all independent variables in the per capita consumption
equations showed strong statistical significance and expected signs. All coefficient estimates
were significant at the 5% level of significance. Rice consumption was negatively related to
own price as well as income, which implied that rice is an inferior good in Japan and Korea.
This is a phenomenon, which has been experienced over the last decade in Japan and Korea as
their income levels have risen. The coefficients on the one year lagged dependent variables
were also significant at the 5% level of significance. It implies that there exist gradual changes
in diet patterns, which impact rice consumption. In fact, the increases in the income levels have
transformed the Japanese and Korean diet by substituting rice with consumption of meats,
fruits, and vegetables. The price elasticities for Japan and Korea were -0.096 and -0.23,
respectively. The income elasticities were also computed at -0.029 and -0.56, respectively.
For the equation of U.S. export demand, all of the independent variables were
statistically significant at the 5% level except for government export program. U.S. export
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demand estimation showed the expected signs for all explanatory variables. When the gap
between world price and domestic price received by producers are widened, the producers’
willingness to export rice tends to be higher.
The validation statistics showed that the models basically did a good job of representing
the rice economies. The rms and Theil-U measures indicated that the models simulated the data
well over the historical period. The rms indicated that the models had rms from 0.26% rootmean-square error to 5.01%. And UM, US, UC and Theil-U illustrated that we were able to use
the models to explain the historical rice economies with very low values for UM reflecting no
systematic bias in the models.
The estimated political weights as shown in Table 4.3 indicated that the Japanese and
Korean policies have favored rice producers more than the other interest groups.

In the

Japanese and Korean rice sectors, the political weights were particularly high for producers,
lowest for consumers. The average weights for producers exceeded unity while those for
consumers were less than unity. Table 4.3 showed a political willingness to redistribute income
in favor of producers at the expense of consumers and taxpayers. This implies that rice
producers have generally been preferred to consumers and taxpayers. In other words, the
Japanese and Korean policymakers have placed more weights on the welfare of rice producers
rather than those of consumers and taxpayers. In the meantime, the political weight for the U.S.
rice exporters was derived at 1.17 on average. It was higher than the weight for the taxpayers
that we normalized at unity in order to compare with different interest groups. Overall, table
4.3 illustrated the time trend in the political weight. A change in the political weight could be
interpreted as policymaker’s preferences changing overtime.
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Using GAMS, the simulation results for the base were presented in Table 4.4. The year
1999 was selected as the base because it was an important turning point for Japan and South
Korea for the next negotiation is the year 1999 and because Japan has adopted tariffication
policy in 1999. In the meantime, Korea was assumed to follow the tariffication policy since it
has had tremendous political pressure from the major exporters. As a result, we assumed that
the two countries’ major import policy was the tariffication policy.
Under the base, Japanese and Korean production was estimated at 8356 thousand MT
and 4635 thousand MT, respectively. The Japanese and Korean imports were derived at 450
thousand MT and 150 thousand MT, respectively. The imports were from the U.S. only. The
equilibrium quantity for Japan, Korea, and the U.S. were –22 thousand MT, 99 thousand MT,
and 600 thousand MT, respectively. The U.S. export quantity was derived at 1804 thousand
MT, including exports to Japan, Korea, and the rest of the world (ROW). In the meantime, the
payoffs for Japan and Korea were derived at 2.508 and 0.572, respectively. And the U.S. export
payoff was derived at 6.63.
The scenario analysis included six U.S. actions. The actions were 1) CCC with 2% to
8% reduction in Japan and Korea (CCCUS), 2) Market Access Program with 2% to 8% reduction
in Japan and Korea (MAPUS), 3) Foreign Market Development Program with 2% to 8%
reduction in Japan and Korea (FDPUS), 4) CCC and Market Access Program with 2% to 8%
reduction in Japan and Korea (CMPUS), 5) CCC and Foreign Market Development Program
with 2% to 8% reduction in Japan and Korea (CFPUS), and 6) Market Access Program and
Foreign Market Development Program with 2% to 8% reduction in Japan and Korea (MFPUS).
Moreover, ten-year average political weights were used, five years prior to WTO
agreement implementation and five years after the implementation. The political weights used
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for Japan were 1.261 and 0.739 for producer group and consumer group, respectively. For
Korea, 1.436 and 0.564 for producer group and consumer group, respectively, were used for the
scenario analysis. The political weight for U.S. exporter group was 1.283.
The results under the CCCUS showed that a Nash equilibrium was obtained at an 8%
reduction of Japanese and Korean tariff rate. In the Nash equilibrium, Japanese and Korean
payoffs were 2.25 and 0.36, respectively, and U.S. payoff was 6.14. In U.S. action of MAPUS, a
Nash equilibrium was obtained at an 8% reduction of Japanese and Korean tariff rate. The
Japanese and Korean payoffs were derived at 16.1 and 3.7, respectively, and the U.S. payoff
was derived at 16.74. Under the MAPUS, Japanese and Korean production was decreased by
202 thousand MT and 135 thousand MT, respectively. However, U.S. exports to Japan and
Korea were decreased by 54 thousand MT and 25 thousand MT, respectively. Due to an
increase in U.S. total exports, U.S. exporter’s surplus was increased to 13.05 million dollars
from 5.1 million dollars, compared to the base. In FDPUS, a dominant strategy for Japan was
obtained at the 2% of tariff reduction. Also, two dominant strategies for Korea were obtained at
both a 2% reduction and an 8% reduction with the payoff of 3.4. As a result, there existed
multiple equilibria under FDPUS at both a 2% and an 8% reduction. The FDPUS action had the
largest payoffs for the U.S., compared to the base, CCCUS, and MAPUS, but the payoffs for
Japan and Korea were almost the same as the other two U.S. actions and the base. The results
under FDPUS showed that Japanese production was decreased slightly by 110 thousand MT, but
Korean production was decreased dramatically by 513 thousand MT, compared to the base.
Possibly, this dramatic change in production causes some structural changes in the Korean rice
industry. Under the U.S. action of CMPUS, the U.S. payoffs did not change under the 8% and
6% reduction with the payoff of 32.7. A dominant strategy for Japan was a 6% reduction of its
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tariff equivalent with a payoff of 21.1. In addition, a dominant strategy for Korea was a 6%
reduction of tariff equivalent with a payoff of 4.6 as well. However, the Nash equilibrium was
obtained at a 6% of reduction strategy for both the U.S. and the two importing countries with
the payoffs of 32.7 and 25.7, respectively. In U.S. action of CFPUS, the Nash equilibrium under
the action was obtained at a 4% reduction of Japanese and Korean tariff equivalents. The U.S.
payoff in the Nash equilibrium was 69.8, and Japanese and Korean payoffs were 17.5 and 3.4,
respectively. The U.S. payoff under CPFUS was increased substantially to 69.8 from 6.63 under
the base. Under the final action, MFPUS, the Nash equilibrium was obtained at a 4% reduction.
The U.S. payoff was derived at 140.6, and Japanese and Korean payoffs were derived at 45.0
and 14.7, respectively. Comparing to the base, the U.S. payoff was increased substantially by
133.97. Also, Japanese and Korean payoffs were increased dramatically by 42.5 and 14.128,
respectively.
Table 4.17 showed that the overall Nash equilibrium for all trade parties was a 4% tariff
reduction under MFPUS. For Japan and Korea, a dominant strategy was a 4% reduction with the
payoff of 59.7. Since they have tried to protect their import markets, they would try to keep
their tariff rates as high as possible to restrict their import markets. For the U.S., an 8%
reduction on the part of Japan and Korea is preferable, given the payoff of 147.1. This is logical
given that the U.S. would prefer to export to Japan and Korea with lower tariff rates because the
higher tariff rates would result in lower U.S. exports to Japan and Korea.
Moreover, the U.S. actions that included the Foreign Market Development Programs
(FMDP) dominated the other actions that did not include the FMDP. The payoffs of the actions
with FMDP were larger than those of the actions without FMDP for the U.S. Even though,
under the U.S. actions of CFPUS and MFPUS, the Nash equilibrium was obtained at a 4%
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reduction, which is not preferable to the U.S., the payoffs were increased substantially,
compared to the other actions and the base. In addition, under the single action scenarios,
FDPUS dominated the other single policy scenarios, CCCUS and MAPUS.

Therefore, the

implication of the findings would be the U.S. policy priority on U.S. rice exports to Japan and
Korea. These findings suggest that the U.S. policy makers on U.S. exports to Japan and Korea
might need to weigh more on the U.S. export policy options than the tariff reduction of Japan
and Korea.
This study has analyzed the impacts of Japanese and Korean import policies on U.S.
exports, including various changes in Japanese and Korean tariff rates. In addition, it has
analyzed the possible policy options for U.S. exports with respect to the changes in Japanese
and Korean tariff rates, incorporating econometric estimation and political weights for the
interest groups into a game theoretic analysis.
Since Japan and South Korea became regular importers by the WTO agreement, the two
governments had to reallocate their agricultural resources due to either international pressures
or internal problems, which exist within their rice industries.

Therefore, the U.S. export

industry has to take those changes into account. This study concludes with some suggestions
regarding Japanese and Korean import policy changes for U.S. exports.
Both Korea and Japan strictly implemented the WTO commitments on rice. However,
several issues arose from how these countries managed rice imported. The State Trading
Enterprises (STEs) of both countries kept most imported rice away from domestic consumers.
The Food Agency of Japan allocated rice across national suppliers with results roughly
mimicking commercial trade. Japan also used markups to keep imported rice away from
domestic consumers. In Korea, rice has been imported through tenders where the lowest bidder
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wins. This results in low-quality rice imports from suppliers who were unlikely to have been
successful in commercial trade. As a result, consumer benefits are reduced, and allocation
across import suppliers has been affected. The next round of WTO negotiations will face these
issues if quantitative market access is to improve in the interim while tariffs are reduced.
Subsequent meetings will also face STE issues regarding possible manipulations within
approved market methods and the ways to encourage market results through market
mechanisms.
The best export policy option from the scenario analysis turned out to be the combination
of MAP and FMDP for U.S. exports to Japan and Korea. However, it depends on how the
policies are implemented by the U.S. in Japanese and Korean domestic markets. There are
many obstacles in the two markets such as STEs and implicit trade barriers. The implicit trade
barriers are even worse than STEs because the consumers are willing to buy domestic rice at a
higher price than the border price due to cultural and traditional backgrounds. To overcome
those obstacles, the U.S. has to investigate some new marketing strategies in the domestic
markets, including wide variety of advertisements and private commercial contract with
franchise restaurants and convenient stores along with political and economic pressures on the
Japanese and Korea governments. However, the U.S. could not be able to export any rice to
Korea since 1980s. Korea has imported its WTO commitments mostly from India and China
because of lower prices and transportation costs.

Many international trade experts have

expected that China will be a major exporter to Korea.

However, according to WTO

agreement, Korea is supposed to import from 154 thousand MT in 2002 to 205 thousand MT in
2004. That means that every rice exporters still have chances to export to Korea, including the
U.S.
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In addition, when making political decisions, economic studies of this nature can help
policy makers to determine the welfare impacts of various policy actions. However, it must be
kept in mind that empirical analyses are not the only criterion available in the policy making
process.

Empirical studies can provide input for policy makers facing various decision-

makings. If the study suggests that a policy action causes changes that may be acceptable,
alternative policies can be used as well.
5.2 Study Limitations and Further Research Opportunities
This study attempted to analyze U.S. export policy options to Japan and Korea.
However, it has faced some limitations that must be considered for future research. One
limitation was analyzing rice trade between the U.S. and the two countries by rice type and
quality because there is no standard classification to differentiate among rice products in use
and because of data unavailability on U.S. exports to Japan and Korea by type and quality.
The second limitation of the study is that it did not consider the entire U.S. rice industry.
This study focused on the political and economic relationships between U.S. exports to Japan
and Korea and the two importing countries. If this study considered the entire U.S. export
industry, the world import markets would have had to be considered since the U.S. has exported
rice to the world, including some countries in Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, and East
Asia. That is not within the scope of this study. In addition, there needs to be a more detailed
specification of U.S. export demand in the model. World ending stock and the relative price
ratio could be endogenized by rice type and quality. However, due to data availability, this
study considered those variables exogenous. Therefore, there remains considerable room to
improve the specification of U.S. export demand.
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The third limitation of the study is the data structure of the model. Although most of the
data was obtained from USDA and Japanese and Korean Ministry of Agriculture, Fishery, and
Forestry, some financial and specific regional data were very difficult to obtain due to some
language barriers and official confidentiality.
The fourth limitation of the study is that it used a linear additive political preference
function with unequal weights assigned to three interest groups. However, in principle, the
nature and the number of interest groups that can be included in a political preference function
is unrestricted.

Thus, if possible, it is required to consider various functional forms and

potential interest groups, which might be influenced by the policy.
Lastly, there is no previous research attempting to incorporate econometric estimation
and PPF analysis into a game theoretic analysis. Therefore, it was hard to justify the framework
theoretically and empirically. However, the idea of the combination of the three methodologies
was worth performing the model for the export market. In addition, this study did not consider
potential cooperative game behavior that might change the Nash equilibrium solution in the
scenario analysis. For example, the overall Nash equilibrium would be at a 6% reduction under
the cooperative game, which would be Pareto superior to the solution under the noncooperative
game.
In addition to those limitations, this study can be extended to examine U.S. export policy
options with respect to Japanese and Korean import policies if their import policies are known.
As long as we can forecast econometric estimation and political weights, this study can examine
any type of policy options for the exporting and the importing countries’ policy options as well.
However, examining additional policy options are beyond the scope of the study. It is now left
for future research.
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APPENDIX 1. GAMS PROGRAM USED FOR THE MODEL
$title game theoretic approach on U.S. rice exports to Japan and Korea
sets
i country /Japan, Korea, US/
y year
/1960*1999/;
*****parameter declaration**********
parameters
********production parameters************
jarharvo
area harvested in Japan(1000ha)
jprodpo
Japanese producer price(yen MT)
jlarharvo
lagged area harvested in Japan(1000ha)
jprodco
Japanese production cost(yen MT)
jyieldo
yield in Japan(MT ha)
Japanese technology
jtecho
jydummyo
Japanese yield dummy
jprodo
Japanese production (1000MT)
karharvo
Korean area harvested (1000ha)
klarharvo
Korean lagged area harvested (1000ha)
kprodo
Korean production (1000MT)
kgpurpo
Korean government purchase price(won MT)
kdiverto
Korean diversion program (ha)
kyieldo
Korean yield (MT ha)
klyieldo
Korean lagged yield (MT ha)
ktecho
Korean technology
kydummyo
Korean yield dummy
uprodjo
us japonica production
*********Consumption parameters***************
jpconpo
Japanese per capita consumption(kg person)
ljpconpo
Japanese lagged per capita consumption(kg person)
jretpo
Japanese retail price(yen MT)
jincomo
Japanese income (billion yen)
jcothero
Japanese other consumption (1000MT)
jpoconpo
Japanese processing consumption(1000MT)
jadconpo
Japanese foreign aid consumption(1000MT)
jgovconpo Japanese government use(1000MT)
jconpo
Japanese consumption (1000 MT)
jpopo
Japanese population(million)
lkpconpo
lagged Korean per capita consmption
kpconpo
Korean per capita consumption(kg person)
Kincomo
Korean income (billion won)
Kretpo
Korean retail price(won MT)
Kcdummyo Korean consumption dummy
kcothero
Korean other consumption (1000MT)
kpoconpo
Korean processing consumption(1000MT)
kadconpo
Korean aid consumption (1000MT)
kconpo
Korean consumption (1000 MT)
kpopo
Korean population(million)
uconpo
us total consumption (1000MT)
us aid consumption (1000MT)
uadconpo
uexdemo
us export demand(1000MT)
woldpjo
world price of japonica($ MT)
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uexotpjo
uexotpio
woldpio
upl480o
uccco
ueepo
uothero
ugexpo
uxdummyo

us export price of japonica($ MT)
us export price of indica($ MT)
world price of indica($ MT)
us PL480(1000MT)
us CCC(1000MT)
us EEP(1000MT)
us other programs(1000MT)
us government export programs (1000MT)
us export dummy

**********price parameters****************
woldpjo
world price of japonica($ MT)
jtarif1o
Japanese tariff(percent)
jtarif2o
Japanese tariff ($)
ktarif1o
Korean tariff(percent)
ktarif2o
Korean tariff ($)
jgpropo
Japanese government procurement price(yen MT)
jdirecto
Japanese direct payment (yen MT)
jgselpo
J gov selling price
kprodpo
Korean producer price (won MT)
kdirecto
Korean direct payment (wonn MT)
kgselpo
Korean gov selling price
uretpo
us retail price ($ MT)
uprodpjo
us producer price of japonica($ MT)
uprodpio
us producer price of indica($ MT)
utarpo
us target price($ MT)
uloano
us loan rate ($ MT)
utranspo
us transition payment($ MT)
uexpp1o
us first export price ($ MT)
uexpp2o
us second export price ($ MT)
***********welfare parameters****************
jpwelo
Japanese producer welfare
jpprinto
Japanese producer price intercept
jcwelo
Japanese consumer welfare
jcprinto
Japanese consumer price intercept
jgwelo
Japanese government welfare
jgovpuro
Japanese government purchase amount(MT)
jscosto
Japanese social cost
kpwelo
Korean producer welfare
kpprinto
Korean producer price intercept
kcwelo
Korean consumer welfare
kcprinto
Korean consumer price intercept
kgwelo
Korean government welfare
kgovpuro
Korean government purchase amount(MT)
kscosto
Korean social cost
uexwel1o
us export welfare of the first
uexwel2o
us export welfare of the second
uexwel3o
us export welfare of the third
uexwel4o
us export welfare of the fourth
jequilo
Japanese equilibrium
kequilo
Korean equilibrium
uexinto
us export intercept
upwelo
us producer welfare
upprinto
us producer price intercept
ucwelo
us consumer welfare
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ucprinto
ugwelo
ugovpuro
uscosto

us consumer price intercept
us government welfare
us government purchase amount(MT)
us social cost

**********us export capacity parameters**********
uexpotjo
us export to Japan (1000MT)
uexpotko
us export to Korea (1000MT)
uexpotj1o
us export to Japan estimated
uexpotk1o
us export to Korea estimated
uexpotwo
us export to row
uprodo
us production (1000MT)
ubestko
us beginning stock (1000MT)
uimpoto
us imports (1000MT)
utconpo
us total consumption (1000MT)
uenstko
us ending stock (1000MT)
utexpto
us total exports (1000MT)
utexpt1o
us export demand
uojkto
us export capacity under tariff (1000MT)
uojkqo
us export capacity under quota (1000MT)
jquotao
Japanese quota (1000MT)
kquotao
Korean quota (1000MT)
woenstko
world ending stock(1000MT)
jimpotwo
J import from row
jimpotuo
J import from us
kimpotwo
k import from row
kimpotuo
k import from us
******equilibrium parameters**********
jprodo
Japanese production (1000MT)
jbestko
Japanese beginning stock (1000MT)
jimpoto
Japanese imports (1000MT)
jimpotuo
J import from row
jenstko
Japanese ending stock (1000MT)
jexpoto
Japanese exports (1000MT)
kprodo
Korean production (1000MT)
Korean beginning stock (1000MT)
kbestko
kimpoto
Korean imports (1000MT)
kenstko
Korean ending stock (1000MT)
kexpoto
Korean exports (1000MT)
**********payoff parameters*************
jpayo
Japanese payoff
jpoweico
Japanese consumer political weights
jpoweipo
Japanese producer political weights
jpoweigo
Japanese government political weights
kpayo
Korean payoff
kpoweico
Korean consumer political weights
kpoweipo
Korean producer political weights
kpoweigo
Korean government political weights
upayo
us payoff
upoweieo
export producer political weights
jquota1o
Japanese first quota(1000MT)
jquota2o
Japanese second quota(1000MT)
uexequilo
us export equil
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******elasticity************
jpelaso
Japanese price elasticity
jinelaso
Japanese income elasticity
jimdelaso
Japanese import demand elasticity
kpelaso
Korean price elasticity
kinelaso
Korean income elasticity
kimdelaso
Korean import demand elasticity
uexdelaso
us export demand elasticity
******demographic parameters********
jexchano
Japanese exchange rate to a dollar(yen $)
jfpopo
Japanese farm population(1000)
kexchano
Korean exchange rate to a dollar(won $)
upopo
us population(1000)
jgnpdo
Japan gnp deflator
kgdpdo
Korea gdp deflator
********fixed parameter declaration***********
jazero
Japanese area harvested intercept
jaone
Japanese area harvested parameter on lagged
jatwo
Japanese area harvested parameter on producer price(cpi)
jathree
Japanese area harvested parameter on prod cost(cpi)
kazero
Korean area harvested intercept
kaone
Korean area harvested parameter on lagged
katwo
Korean area harvested parameter on diversion area
uxzero
us export demand intercept
uxone
us export demand parameter on log world ending stock
us export demand parameter on w price(j) procuer price(J)
uxtwo
uxthree
us export demand parameter on log export program(ccc+eep)
uxfour
us export demand parameter on 8094 dummy
jyzero
Japanese yield intercept
jyone
Japanese yield parameter on tech
jytwo
Japanese yield parameter on 8093 dummy
kyzero
Korean yield intercept
kyone
Korean yield parameter on tech
kytwo
Korean yield parameter on 8093 dummy
jczero
Japanese per capita consumption intercept
jcone
Japanese per capita consumption parameter on log lagged
jctwo
Japanese per capita parameter on log retail price(gnp defla)
jcthree
Japanese per capita parameter on log income(nominal)
kczero
Korean per capita consumption intercept
kcone
Korean per capita parameter on log lagged
kctwo
Korean per capita parameter on log income(cpi)
kcthree
Korean per capita parameter on log retail(gdp defla)
uekzero
us ex to ko intercept
uekone
us ex to ko us japonica production
uektwo
us ex to ko price difference
uekthree
us ex to ko tariff
uejzero
us ex to ja intercept
uejone
us ex to ja price difference
uejtwo
us ex to ja ccc+eep
uejthree
us ex to ja tariff
parameter fixed(*) /jazero = 294.176, jaone = 0.843, jatwo = 0.175, jathree = -0.027, kazero = 50.76, kaone =
0.932, katwo = 0.000059, kathree = -0.006, uxzero = 2.680757, uxone = 0.490176,
uxtwo = 0.036, uxthree = 0.031, uxfour = 0.274, jyzero = 3.5579, jyone = 0.0313,
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jytwo = -0.8874, kyzero = 3.741473, kyone = 0.02928, kytwo = -0.83687, jczero = 1.8133
jcone = 0.8202, jctwo = -0.0963, jcthree = -0.0291, kczero = 5.461, kcone = 0.7203,
kctwo = -0.023, kcthree = -0.56, kcfour = 0.2073, uekzero = -38.5617, uekone = 6.6703,
uektwo = 3.6268, uekthree = -1.3318, uejzero = -31.7671, uejone = 6.1103, uejtwo =
3.7505, uejthree = 0.9217, jpprint = 802.6, kpprint = 76.6, kcprint = 157.4, jpelas = -0.0291
jinelas = -0.0963, kpelas = -0.0268, kinelas = -0.1064, uexprint = 73.3552, uexdelas =
0.036/;
**********data tables**************
DATA
***************parameter assignment*******************
jarharvo(y) = arha("jarharv", y); jprodpo(y) = price("jprodp", y)/demo("jcpi",y);
jlarharvo(y) = arha("jlarharv", y); jprodco(y) = prodt("jprodc", y)/demo("jcpi", y);
jyieldo(y) = yield("jyield", y); jtecho(y) = dummy("jtech", y);
jydummyo(y) = dummy("jydummy", y); jprodo(y) = prodt("jprod", y);
karharvo(y) = arha("karharv", y); klarharvo(y) = arha("klarharv", y);
kdiverto(y) = arha("kdivert", y); kprodo(y) = prodt("kprod", y);
kgpurpo(y) = price("kgpurp", y)/demo("kcpi", y); kyieldo(y) = yield("kyield", y);
klyieldo(y) = yield("klyield", y); ktecho(y) = dummy("ktech", y);
kydummyo(y) = dummy("kydummy", y); uprodjo(Y) = prodt("uprodj", y);
jpconpo(y) = conp("jpconp", y); ljpconpo(y) = conp("ljpconp", y);
jretpo(y) = price("jretp", y)/demo("jgnpd", y); jincomo(y) = demo("jincom", y);
jpoconpo(y) = conp("jpoconp", y); jadconpo(y) = conp("jadconp", y);
jgovconpo(y) = conp("jgovconp", y); jconpo(y) = conp("jconp", y);
jpopo(y) = demo("jpop", y); kpconpo(y) = conp("kpconp", y);
lkpconpo(y) = conp("lkpconp", y); kincomo(y) = demo("kincom", y)/demo("kcpi", y);
kretpo(y) = price("kretp", y)/demo("kgdpd", y);
kcdummyo(y) = dummy("kcdummy", y); kpoconpo(y) = conp("kpoconp", y);
kadconpo(y) = conp("kadconp", y); kconpo(y) = conp("kconp", y);
utconpo(y) = conp("utconp", y); uadconpo(y) = conp("uadconp", y);
utexpto(y) = export("utexpt", y); uexdemo(y) = export("uexdem", y);
jimpotwo(y) = impot("jimpotw", y); utconpo(y) = conp("utconp", y);
woldpjo(y) = price("woldpj", y); uexotpio(y) = price("uexotpi", y);
upl480o(y) = export("upl480", y); uccco(y) = export("uccc", y);
ueepo(y) = export("ueep", y); uothero(y) = export("uother", y);
uxdummyo(y) = dummy("uxdummy", y);
jgpropo(y) = price("jgprop", y)/demo("jcpi", y);
jdirecto(y) = price("jdirect", y)/demo("jcpi", y);
kprodpo(y) = price("kprodp", y)/demo("kcpi", y);
kgpurpo(y) = price("kgpurp", y)/demo("kcpi", y);
kdirecto(y) = price("kdirect", y)/demo("kcpi", y);
uprodpjo(y) = price("uprodpj", y); uprodpio(y) = price("uprodpi", y);
utarpo(y) = price("utarp", y); uloano(y) = price("uloan", y);
utranspo(y) = price("utransp", y); uretpo(y) = price("uretp", y);
kgselpo(y) = price("kgselp", y)/demo("kcpi", y);
jgselpo(y) = price("jgselp", y)/demo("jcpi", y);
uprodo(y) = prodt("uprod", y); uexpotjo(y) = export("uexpotj", y);
uexpotj1o(y) = export("uexpotj1", y); uexpotko(y) = export("uexpotk", y);
uexpotk1o(y) = export("uexpotk1", y); uexpotwo(y) = export("uexpotw", y);
ubestko(y) = stock("ubestk", y); uimpoto(y) = impot("uimpot", y);
woenstko(y) = stock("woenstk", y); uenstko(y) = stock("uenstk", y);
utexpto(y) = export("utexpt", y); utexpt1o(y) = export("utexpt1", y);
jquota1o(y) = gdemo("jquota1", y); jquota2o(y) = gdemo("jquota2", y);
kquotao(y) = gdemo("kquota", y); jtarif1o(y) = gdemo("jtarif1", y);
jtarif2o(y) = gdemo("jtarif2", y); ktarif1o(y) = gdemo("ktarif1", y);
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ktarif2o(y) = gdemo("ktarif2", y); jexpoto(y) = export("jexpot", y);
kexpoto(y) = export("kexpot", y); uexequilo(y) = export("uexequil", y);
kimpotwo(y) = impot("kimpotw", y); kimpotuo(y) = impot("kimpotu", y);
jbestko(y) = stock("jbestk", y); jimpoto(y) = impot("jimpot", y);
jenstko(y) = stock("jenstk", y); jexpoto(y) = export("jexpot", y);
kbestko(y) = stock("kbestk", y); kimpoto(y) = impot("kimpot", y);
kenstko(y) = stock("kenstk", y); kexpoto(y) = export("kexpot", y);
jexchano(y) = demo("jexchan", y); kexchano(y) = demo("kexchan", Y);
jpoweico(y) = polweights("jpoweic", y); jpoweipo(y) = polweights("jpoweip", y);
jpoweigo(y) = polweights("jpoweig", y); kpoweico(y) = polweights("kpoweic", y);
kpoweipo(y) = polweights("kpoweip", y);
kpoweigo(y) = polweights("kpoweig", y);
upoweieo(y) = polweights("upoweie", y);
jazero = fixed("jazero"); jaone = fixed("jaone"); jatwo = fixed("jatwo");
jathree = fixed("jathree"); kazero = fixed("kazero"); kaone = fixed("kaone");
katwo = fixed("katwo"); uxzero = fixed("uxzero"); uxone = fixed("uxone");
uxtwo = fixed("uxtwo"); uxthree = fixed("uxthree"); uxfour = fixed("uxfour");
jyzero = fixed("jyzero"); jyone = fixed("jyone"); jytwo = fixed("jytwo");
kyzero = fixed("kyzero"); kyone = fixed("kyone"); kytwo = fixed("kytwo");
jczero = fixed("jczero"); jcone = fixed("jcone"); jctwo = fixed("jctwo");
jcthree = fixed("jcthree"); kczero = fixed("kczero"); kcone = fixed("kcone");
kctwo = fixed("kctwo"); kcthree = fixed("kcthree"); uekzero = fixed("uekzero");
uekone = fixed("uekone"); uektwo = fixed("uektwo"); uekthree = fixed("uekthree");
uejzero = fixed("uejzero"); uejone = fixed("uejone"); uejtwo = fixed("uejtwo");
uejthree = fixed("uejthree");
**************Variable Definition********
VARIABLES
Z
objective function
JARHARV(y)
area harvested in Japan(1000ha)
JPRODP(y)
Japanese producer price(yen MT)
JLARHARV(y)
lagged area harvested in Japan(1000ha)
JPRODC(y)
Japanese production cost(yen MT)
JYIELD(y)
yield in Japan(MT ha)
JTECH(y)
Japanese technology
JYDUMMY(y)
Japanese yield dummy
JPROD(y)
Japanese production (1000MT)
KARHARV(y)
Korean area harvested (1000ha)
Korean lagged area harvested (1000ha)
KLARHARV(y)
KPROD(y)
Korean production (1000MT)
KDIVERT(Y)
Korean divertion area(ha)
KGPURP(y)
Korean government purchase price(won MT)
KYIELD(y)
Korean yield (MT ha)
Korean lagged yield (MT ha)
KLYIELD(y)
KTECH(y)
Korean technology
KYDUMMY(y) Korean yield dummy
UPRODJ(y)
U.S. japonica production
JPCONP(y)
Japanese per capita consumption(kg person)
JLPCONP(y)
Japanese log per capita consumption(kg person)
LJPCONP(y)
Japanese lagged per capita consumption
JRETP(y)
Japanese retail price(yen MT)
JINCOM(y)
Japanese income (billion yen)
JCOTHER(y)
Japanese other consumption (1000 MT)
JPOCONP(y)
Japanese processing consumption(1000MT)
JADCONP(y)
Japanese foreign aid consumption(1000MT)
JGOVCONP(y) Japanese government use(1000MT)
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JCONP(y)
JTCONP(y)
JPOP(y)
KLPCONP(y)
LKPCONP(y)
KPCONP(y)
KCONP(y)
KINCOM(y)
KRETP(y)
KCDUMMY(y)
KCONTHER(y)
KPOCONP(y)
KADCONP(y)
KCONP(y)
KTCONP(y)
KPOP(y)
UTEXPT(Y)
UEXDEM(y)
WOLDPJ(y)
UEXOTPJ(y)
UEXOTPI(y)
WOLDPI(y)
UPL480(y)
UCCC(y)
UEEP(y)
UOTHER(y)
UGEXP(y)
UXDUMMY(y)
JRETP(y)
WOLDPJ(y)
JTARIF1(y)
JTARIF2(y)
KRETP(y)
KTARIF1(y)
KTARIF2(y)
JPRODP(y)
JGPROP(y)
JGSELP(y)
JDIRECT(y)
KPRODP(y)
KGPURP(y)
KGSELP(y)
KDIRECT(y)
URETP(y)
UPRODPJ(y)
UPRODPI(y)
UTARP(y)
ULOAN(y)
UTRANSP(y)
UEXPP1(y)
UEXPP2(y)
KIMPOTW(y)
KIMPOTU(Y)
JIMPOTW(y)
JPWEL(y)
JCWEL(y)

Japanese consumption (1000 MT)
Japanese total consumption (1000 MT)
Japanese population(million)
Korean log per capita consumption(kg person)
lagged Korean per capita consumption
Korean per capita consumption(kg person)
Korean consumption (1000MT)
Korean income (billion won)
Korean retail price(won MT)
Korean consumption dummy
Korean other consumption (1000MT)
Korean processing consumption(1000MT)
Korean foreign aid consumption(1000MT)
Korean consumption (1000 MT)
Korean total consumption (1000 MT)
Korean population(million)
U.S. total export (1000MT)
U.S. export demand(1000MT)
world price of japonica($ MT)
U.S. export price of japonica($ MT)
U.S. export price of indica($ MT)
world price of indica($ MT)
U.S. PL480(1000MT)
CCC(1000MT)
EEP(1000MT)
other programs(1000MT)
government export programs (1000MT)
export dummy
Japanese domestic retail price (yen MT)
world price of japonica($ MT)
Japanese tariff(percent)
Japanese tariff($)
Korean domestic retail price (won MT)
Korean tariff(percent)
Korean tariff($)
Japanese producer price (yen MT)
Japanese government procurement price(yen MT)
J GOV SELLING PRICE
Japanese direct payment (yen MT)
Korean producer price (won MT)
Korean government purchase price(won MT)
K GOV SELLING PRICE
Korean direct payment (won MT)
U retail price ($ MT)
U producer price of japonica($ MT)
U producer price of indica($ MT)
U target price($ MT)
U loan rate ($ MT)
U transition payment($ MT)
U first export price ($ MT)
U second export price ($ MT)
K IMPORT FROM ROW
K IMPORT FROM US
J IMPORT FROM ROW
Japanese producer welfare
Japanese consumer welfare
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JGWEL(y)
JGOVPUR(y)
JSCOST(y)
JTOWEL(y)
KPWEL(y)
KCWEL(y)
KGWEL(y)
KGOVPUR(y)
KSCOST(y)
KTOWEL(y)
UEXWEL1(y)
UEXWEL2(y)
UEXWEL3(y)
UEXWEL4(y)
JEQUIL(y)
KEQUIL(y)
UEXEQUIL(y)
UEXINT(y)
UPWEL(y)
UPPRINT(y)
UCWEL(y)
UCPRINT(y)
UGWEL(y)
UGOVPUR(y)
USCOST(y)
UEXPOTJ(y)
UlEXPOTJ(y)
UEXPOTJ1(y)
UEXPOTK(Y)
UleXPOTK(y)
UEXPOTK1(y)
UEXPOTW(y)
UPROD(y)
UBESTK(y)
UIMPOT(y)
UTCONP(y)
UENSTK(y)
UTEXPT(y)
UlTEXPT(y)
UTEXPT1(y)
UOJKT(y)
UOJKQ(y)
JQUOTA1(y)
JQUOTA2(y)
KQUOTA(y)
JEXPOT(y)
KEXPOT(y)
JPROD(y)
JBESTK(y)
JIMPOT(y)
JTCONP(y)
JENSTK(y)
JTEXPT(y)
KPROD(y)
KBESTK(y)
KIMPOT(y)

Japanese government welfare
Japanese government purchase amount(MT)
Japanese social cost
Japanese total welfare
Korean producer welfare
Korean consumer welfare
Korean government welfare
Korean government purchase amount(MT)
Korean social cost
Korean total welfare
us export welfare of the first
us export welfare of the second
us export welfare of the third
us export welfare of the fourth
Japanese equilibrium
Korean equilibrium
us export equilibrium
us export intercept
us producer welfare
us producer price intercept
us consumer welfare
us consumer price intercept
us government welfare
us government purchase amount(MT)
us social cost
us export to Japan (1000MT)
us log
us export to Japan estimated
us export to Korea (1000MT)
us log to Korea
us export to Korea estimated
us export to row
us production (1000MT)
us beginning stock (1000MT)
us imports (1000MT)
us total consumption (1000MT)
us ending stock (1000MT)
us total exports (1000MT)
us log ex demand
us export demand
us export capacity under tariff (1000MT)
us export capacity under quota (1000MT)
Japanese first quota (1000MT)
Japanese second quota (1000MT)
Korean quota (1000MT)
Japanese export(1000MT)
Korean export (1000MT)
Japanese production (1000MT)
Japanese beginning stock (1000MT)
Japanese imports (1000MT)
Japanese total consumption (1000MT)
Japanese ending stock (1000MT)
Japanese total exports (1000MT)
Korean production (1000MT)
Korean beginning stock (1000MT)
Korean imports (1000MT)
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KTCONP(y)
KENSTK(y)
KTEXPT(y)
WOENSTK(y)
JPAY(y)
JPOWEIC(y)
JPOWEIP(y)
JPOWEIG(y)
KPAY(y)
KPOWEIC(y)
KPOWEIP(y)
KPOWEIG(y)
UXPAY(y)
UPOWEIE(y)
JEXCHAN(y)
JFPOP(y)
KEXCHAN(y)
KFPOP(y)
UPOP(y)

Korean total consumption (1000MT)
Korean ending stock (1000MT)
Korean total exports (1000MT)
world ending stock (1000MT)
Japanese payoff
Japanese consumer political weights
Japanese producer political weights
Japanese government political weights
Korean payoff
Korean consumer political weights
Korean producer political weights
Korean government political weights
us export payoff
export producer political weights
Japanese exchange rate to a dollar(yen $)
Japanese farm population(1000)
Korean exchange rate to a dollar(won $)
Korean farm population (1000)
us population(1000);

**********varialbe initialization****************
JARHARV.L(y) = JARHARVO(y); JPRODP.L(y) = JPRODPO(y);
JLARHARV.L(y) = JLARHARVO(y); JPRODC.L(y) = JPRODCO(y);
JYIELD.L(y) = JYIELDO(y); JTECH.L(y) = JTECHO(y);
JYDUMMY.L(y) = JYDUMMYO(y); JPROD.L(y) = JPRODO(y);
KARHARV.L(y) = KARHARVO(y); KLARHARV.L(y) = KLARHARVO(y);
KPROD.L(y) = KPRODO(y); KDIVERT.L(y) = KDIVERTO(y);
KGPURP.L(y) = KGPURPO(y); KYIELD.L(y) = KYIELDO(y);
KLYIELD.L(y) = KLYIELDO(y); KTECH.L(y) = KTECHO(y);
KYDUMMY.L(y) = KYDUMMYO(y);
JPCONP.L(y) = JPCONPO(y); LJPCONP.L(y) = LJPCONPO(y);
JRETP.L(y) = JRETPO(y); JINCOM.L(y) = JINCOMO(y);
JPOCONP.L(y) = JPOCONPO(y); JADCONP.L(y) = JADCONPO(y);
JGOVCONP.L(y) = JGOVCONPO(y); JCONP.L(y) = JCONPO(y);
JPOP.L(y) = JPOPO(y); LKPCONP.L(y) = LKPCONPO(y);
KPCONP.L(y) = KPCONPO(y); KINCOM.L(y) = KINCOMO(y);
KRETP.L(y) = KRETPO(y); KCDUMMY.L(y) = KCDUMMYO(y);
KPOCONP.L(y) = KPOCONPO(y); KADCONP.L(y) = KADCONPO(y);
KCONP.L(y) = KCONPO(y); UEXDEM.L(y) = UEXDEMO(y);
WOLDPJ.L(y) = WOLDPJO(y); UTEXPT.L(y) = UTEXPTO(y);
UEXOTPI.L(y) = UEXOTPIO(y); UPL480.L(y) = UPL480O(y);
UCCC.L(y) = UCCCO(y); UEEP.L(y) = UEEPO(y); UOTHER.L(y) = UOTHERO(y);
UXDUMMY.L(y) = UXDUMMYO(y);
JRETP.L(y) = JRETPO(y); WOLDPJ.L(y) = WOLDPJO(y);
JTARIF1.L(y) = JTARIF1O(y); JTARIF2.L(y) = JTARIF2O(y);
KRETP.L(y) = KRETPO(y); KTARIF1.L(y) = KTARIF1O(y);
KTARIF2.L(y) = KTARIF2O(y); JPRODP.L(y) = JPRODPO(y);
JGPROP.L(y) = JGPROPO(y); JGSELP.L(y) = JGSELPO(y);
JDIRECT.L(y) = JDIRECTO(y); KPRODP.L(y) = KPRODPO(y);
KGPURP.L(y) = KGPURPO(y); KGSELP.L(y) = KGSELPO(y);
KDIRECT.L(y) = KDIRECTO(y); URETP.L(y) = URETPO(y);
UPRODPJ.L(y) = UPRODPJO(y); UPRODPI.L(y) = UPRODPIO(y);
UTARP.L(y) = UTARPO(y); ULOAN.L(y) = ULOANO(y);
UTRANSP.L(y) = UTRANSPO(y);
UPROD.L(y) = UPRODO(y); UPRODJ.L(y) = UPRODJO(y);
UEXPOTJ.L(y) = UEXPOTJO(y); UEXPOTJ1.L(y) = UEXPOTJ1O(y);
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UEXPOTK.L(y) = UEXPOTKO(y); UEXPOTK1.L(y) = UEXPOTK1O(y);
UEXPOTW.L(y) = UEXPOTWO(y); UBESTK.L(y) = UBESTKO(y);
UIMPOT.L(y) = UIMPOTO(y); UTCONP.L(y) = UTCONPO(y);
UENSTK.L(y) = UENSTKO(y); UTEXPT.L(y) = UTEXPTO(y);
UTEXPT1.L(y) = UTEXPT1O(y); JIMPOTW.L(y) = JIMPOTWO(y);
JQUOTA1.L(y) = JQUOTA1O(y); JQUOTA2.L(y) = JQUOTA2O(y);
KQUOTA.L(y) = KQUOTAO(y); UEXEQUIL.L(y) = UEXEQUILO(y);
JBESTK.L(y) = JBESTKO(y); JIMPOT.L(y) = JIMPOTO(y);
JENSTK.L(y) = JENSTKO(y); KPROD.L(y) = KPRODO(y);
KBESTK.L(y) = KBESTKO(y); KIMPOT.L(y) = KIMPOTO(y);
KENSTK.L(y) = KENSTKO(y); WOENSTK.L(y) = WOENSTKO(y);
JEXPOT.L(y) = JEXPOTO(y); KEXPOT.L(y) = KEXPOTO(y);
KIMPOTW.L(y) = KIMPOTWO(y); KIMPOTU.L(y) = KIMPOTUO(y);
JEXCHAN.L(y) = JEXCHANO(y); KEXCHAN.L(y) = KEXCHANO(y);
JPOWEIC.L(y) = JPOWEICO(y); JPOWEIP.L(y) = JPOWEIPO(y);
JPOWEIG.L(y) = JPOWEIGO(y); KPOWEIC.L(y) = KPOWEICO(y);
KPOWEIP.L(y) = KPOWEIPO(y); KPOWEIG.L(y) = KPOWEIGO(y);
UPOWEIE.L(y) = UPOWEIEO(y);
equations
EQZ
eJARHARV(y)
eJYIELD(y)
eJPROD(y)
eKARHARV(y)
eKPROD(y)
eKYIELD(y)
eJPCONP(y)
eJLPCONP(y)
eJCONP(y)
eJTCONP(y)
eKLPCONP(y)
eKPCONP(y)
eKCONP(y)
eKTCONP(y)
eUGEXP(y)
eULEXDEM(y)
eUEXDEM(y)
eUEXPOTK(Y)
eULEXPOTK(y)
eULEXPOTJ(y)
eUEXPOTJ(y)
eJRETP(y)
eKRETP(y)
eJPRODP(y)
eKPRODP(y)
eUEXPP1(y)
eUEXPP2(y)
ejequil(y)
ekequil(y)
euexequil(y)
eJPWEL(y)
eJCWEL(y)
eJGWEL(y)
eJSCOST(y)
eJTOWEL(y)

objective function
area harvested in Japan(1000ha)
yield in Japan(MT ha)
Japanese production (1000MT)
Korean area harvested (1000ha)
Korean production (1000MT)
Korean yield (MT ha)
Japanese per capita consumption(kg person)
Japanese log per capita consumption
Japanese consumption (1000MT)
Japanese total consumption (1000 MT)
Korean log per capita consumption
Korean per capita consumption(kg person)
Korean capita consumption
Korean total consumption (1000 MT)
us govt export program (1000MT)
us log export demand (1000MT)
us export demand(1000MT)
us export to Korea(1000MT)
log of export to Korea
log of export to Japan
us export to Japan(1000MT)
Japanese domestic retail price (yen MT)
Korean domestic retail price (won MT)
Japanese producer price (yen MT)
Korean producer price (won MT)
us first export price ($ MT)
us second export price ($ MT)
Japanese equilibrium (1000MT)
Korean equilibrium (1000MT)
us export equilibrium (1000MT)
Japanese producer welfare
Japanese consumer welfare
Japanese government welfare
Japanese social cost
Japanese total welfare
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eKPWEL(y)
eKCWEL(y)
eKGWEL(y)
eKSCOST(y)
eKTOWEL(y)
eUEXWEL1(y)
eUEXWEL2(y)
eJPAY(y)
eKPAY(y)
eUXPAY(y)

Korean producer welfare
Korean consumer welfare
Korean government welfare
Korean social cost
Korean total welfare
us export welfare
us export welfare to Korea ;
Japanese payoff
Korean payoff;
us export payoff;

EQZ..
Z =e= (uexwel1(y)*upoweie(y));
ejprodp(y).. JPRODP(y) =e= JGPROP(y) + DIRECT(y);
ekprodp(y).. KPRODP(y) =e= KGPURP(y) + KDIRECT(y);
ejarharv(y).. JARHARV(y) =e= jazero + jaone*JLARHARV(y) + jatwo*JPRODP(y) + jathree*JPRODC(y);
ejyield(y).. JYIELD(y) =e= jyzero + jyone*JTECH(y) + jytwo*jydummy(y);
ejprod(y).. JPROD(y) =e= JARHARV(y)*JYIELD(y);
ekarharv(y).. KARHARV(y) =e= kazero + kaone*KLARHARV(y) + katwo*KDIVERT(y);
ekyield(y).. KYIELD(y) =e= kyzero + kyone*KTECH(y) + kytwo*kydummy(y);
ekprod(y).. KPROD(y) =e= KARHARV(y)*KYIELD(y);
ejretp(y).. JRETP(y) =e= WOLDPJ(y) + JTARIF2(y);
ekretp(y).. KRETP(y) =e= WOLDPJ(y) + KTARIF2(y);
ejlpconp(y).. JLPCONP(y) =e=jczero+(jcone*log(LJPCONP(y))) + (jctwo*log(JRETP(y)))
+ (jcthree*log(JINCOM(y)));
ejpconp(y).. JPCONP(y) =e= exp(JLPCONP(y));
ejconp(y).. JCONP(y) =e= JPCONP(y)*JPOP(y);
ejtconp(y).. JTCONP(y) =e= JCONP(y)+ JGOVCONP(y) + JPOCONP(y) +JADCONP(y);
eklpconp(y).. KLPCONP(y) =e= kczero+kcone*log(LKPCONP(y)) + kctwo*log(KINCOM(y))
+ kcthree*log(KRETP(y));
ekpconp(y).. KPCONP(y) =E= EXP(KLPCONP(y));
ekconp(y).. KCONP(y) =e= KPCONP(y)*KPOP(y);
ektconp(y).. KTCONP(y) =e= KCONP(y)+ KADCONP(y) + KPOCONP(y);
eugexp(y).. UGEXP(y) =e= UCCC(y) + UEEP(y);
euexpp1(y).. UEXPP1(y) =e= ULOAN(y);
euexpp2(y).. UEXPP2(y) =e= ULOAN(y) + UTRANSP(y);
eulexdem(y). ULTEXPT(y) =e= uxzero + uxone*log(WOENSTK(y)) + uxtwo*log(WOLDPJ(y)/UPRODPJ(y))
+ uxthree*log(UGEXP(y))+ uxfour*(UXDUMMY(y));
euexdem(y).. UTEXPT(y) =E= EXP(ULTEXPT(y));
euLexpotj(y).. ULEXPOTJ(y) =e= uejzero + uejone*log(WOLDPJ(y)/UPRODPJ(y)) + uejtwo*log(UGEXP(y))
+ uejthree*log(JTARIF2(y));
euexpotj(y).. UEXPOTJ(y) =e= exp(ulexpotj(y));
euLexpotk(y).. ULEXPOTK(y) =e= uekzero + uekone*log(UPRODJ(y))
+ uektwo*log(WOLDPJ(y)/UPRODPJ(y)) + uekthree*log(KTARIF2(y));
euexpotk(y).. UEXPOTK(y) =e= exp(ulexpotk(y));
ejequil(y)..
JEQUIL(y) =e= JPROD(y) - JTCONP(y) + JBESTK(y) - JENSTK(y) + UEXPOTJ1(y)
+ JIMPOTW(y) - JEXPOT(y);
ekequil(y).. KEQUIL(y) =e= KPROD(y) - KTCONP(y) + KBESTK(y) - KENSTK(y) + UEXPOTK1(y)
+ KIMPOTW(y) - KEXPOT(y);
euexequil(y).. UEXEQUIL(y) =e= UPROD(y) + UIMPOT(y) + UBESTK(y) – UTCONP(y) - UENSTK(y)
- UEXPOTK1(y)-UEXPOTJ1(y) - UEXPOTW(y);
ejpwel(y).. JPWEL(y) =e= (JPRODP(y)*JPROD(y));
ejcwel(y).. JCWEL(y) =e= (JRETP(y)*JCONP(y));
ejgwel(y).. JGWEL(y) =e= (JTARIF2(y)*UEXPOTJ1(y))
- ((JGSELP(y)-JGPROP(y))*(JPROD(y)*0.15)*(jequil(y)));
ejscost(y).. JSCOST(y) =e= (JRETP(y) - JPRODP(y))*0.5*(JPROD(y) - JTCONP(y));
ekpwel(y).. KPWEL(y) =e= (KPRODP(y)*KPROD(y));
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ekcwel(y).. KCWEL(y) =e= (KRETP(y)*KCONP(y));
ekgwel(y).. KGWEL(y) =e= (KTARIF2(y)*UEXPOTK1(y)) + ((KGPURP(y)
- KGSELP(y))*(KPROD(y)*0.15)*(kequil(y)));
ekscost(y).. KSCOST(y) =e= (KRETP(y) - KPRODP(y))*0.5*(KPROD(y) - KTCONP(y));
ejtowel(y).. JTOWEL(y) =e= JCWEL(y) + JPWEL(y) - JGWEL(y);
ektowel(y).. KTOWEL(y) =e= KCWEL(y) + KPWEL(y) - KGWEL(y);
euexwel1(y).. UEXWEL1(y) =e= (UEXPOTK1(y)+ UEXPOTJ1(y))*WOLDPJ(y);
euexwel2(y).. UEXWEL2(y) =e= (UEXPP1(y) - UEXPRINT)*UEXPOTK(y)*0.5;
ejpay(y).. JPAY(y) =e= (jpoweic(y)*jcwel(y)) + (jpoweip(y)*jpwel(y)) - (jpoweig(y)*jgwel(y));
ekpay(y).. KPAY(y) =e= (kpoweic(y)*kcwel(y)) + (kpoweip(y)*kpwel(y)) - (kpoweig(y)*kgwel(y));
euxpay(y).. UXPAY(y) =e= (UEXPOTJ(y) + UEXPOTK(y)*upoweie(y)) + (uexwel1(y));
********variable bounds********
ARHARV.LO(y) = 0.001; JPRODP.LO(y) = 0.001; JLARHARV.LO(y) = 0.001;
JPRODC.LO(y) = 0.001; JYIELD.LO(y) = 0.001; JTECH.LO(y) = 0.001;
JYDUMMY.LO(y) = 0.001; JPROD.LO(y) = 0.001; KARHARV.LO(y) = 0.001;
KLARHARV.LO(y) = 0.001; KPROD.LO(y) = 0.001; KDIVERT.LO(y) = 0.001;
KGPURP.LO(y) = 0.001; KYIELD.LO(y) = 0.001; KLYIELD.LO(y) = 0.001;
KTECH.LO(y) = 0.001; KYDUMMY.LO(y) = 0.0001;
JPCONP.LO(y) = 0.001; LJPCONP.LO(y) = 0.001; JRETP.LO(y) = 0.001;
JINCOM.LO(y) = 0.001; JPOCONP.LO(y) = 0.001; JADCONP.LO(y) = 0.001;
JGOVCONP.LO(y) = 0.001; JCONP.LO(y) = 0.001; JPOP.LO(y) = 0.001;
LKPCONP.LO(y) = 0.001; KPCONP.LO(y) = 0.001; KINCOM.LO(y) = 0.001;
KRETP.LO(y) = 0.001; KCDUMMY.LO(y) = 0.001; KPOCONP.LO(y) = 0.001;
KADCONP.LO(y) = 0.001; KCONP.LO(y) = 0.001; KPOP.LO(y) = 0.001;
UEXDEM.LO(y) = 0.001; WOLDPJ.LO(y) = 0.001; UTEXPT.LO(y) = 0.001;
UEXOTPI.LO(y) = 0.001; UPL480.LO(y) = 0.001; UCCC.LO(y) = 0.001;
UEEP.LO(y) = 0.001; UOTHER.LO(y) = 0.001; UXDUMMY.LO(y) = 0.001;
JTARIF1.LO(y) = 0.001; JTARIF2.LO(y) = 0.001; KTARIF1.LO(y) = 0.001;
KTARIF2.LO(y) = 0.001; JGPROP.LO(y) =0.001; JGSELP.LO(Y) = 0.001;
JDIRECT.LO(y) = 0.001; KPRODP.LO(y) = 0.001; KGPURP.LO(y) = 0.001;
KGSELP.LO(y) = 0.001; KDIRECT.LO(y) = 0.001; URETP.LO(y) = 0.001;
UPRODPJ.LO(y) = 0.001; UPRODPI.LO(y) = 0.001; UTARP.LO(y) = 0.001;
ULOAN.LO(y) = 0.001; UTRANSP.LO(y) = 0.001;
PROD.LO(y) = 0.001; UPRODJ.LO(y) = 0.001; UEXPOTJ.LO(y) = 0.001;
UEXPOTJ1.LO(y) = 0.001; UEXPOTK.LO(y) = 0.001; UEXPOTK1.LO(y) = 0.001;
UBESTK.LO(y) = 0.001; UIMPOT.LO(y) = 0.001; UTCONP.LO(y) = 0.001;
UENSTK.LO(y) = 0.001; UTEXPT1.LO(y) = 0.001; JIMPOTW.LO(y) = 0.001;
JQUOTA1.LO(y) = 0.001; JQUOTA2.LO(y) = 0.001; KQUOTA.LO(y) = 0.001;
UEXEQUIL.LO(y) = 0.001;
JBESTK.LO(y) = 0.001; JIMPOT.LO(y) = 0.001; JENSTK.LO(y) = 0.001;
KBESTK.LO(y) = 0.001; KIMPOT.LO(y) = 0.001; KENSTK.LO(y) = 0.001;
WOENSTK.LO(y) = 0.001; JEXPOT.LO(y) = 0.001; KEXPOT.LO(y) = 0.001;
KIMPOTW.LO(y) = 0.001; KIMPOTU.LO(y) = 0.001;
JEXCHAN.LO(y) = 0.001; KEXCHAN.LO(y) = 0.001; JPOWEIC.LO(y) = 0. 0.001;
JPAY.LO(y) = 0.0001; KPAY.LO(y) = 0.0001; Z.LO = 0.0001;
option limrow = 0;
option limcol = 0;
option reslim = 2000;
option iterlim = 1000;
option solprint = off;
model SBASE99/all/;
option decimals = 4;
Sbase99.optfile = 1;
solve SBASE99 using NLP maximizing Z;
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DISPLAY JARHARV.L, JARHARV.L, JPRODP.L, LARHARV.L JPRODC.L, JYIELD.L, JTECH.L,
JYDUMMY.L, JPROD.L, KARHARV.L, KLARHARV.L, KPROD.L, KDIVERT.L, KGPURP.L, KYIELD.L,
KLYIELD.L, KTECH.L, KYDUMMY.L, JPCONP.L, LJPCONP.L, JRETP.L, JINCOM.L,
JPOCONP.L, JADCONP.L, JGOVCONP.L, JCONP.L, JPOP.L, LKPCONP.L, KPCONP.L, KINCOM.L,
KRETP.L, KCDUMMY.L, KPOCONP.L, KADCONP.L, KCONP.L, UEXDEM.L, WOLDPJ.L, UTEXPT.L,
UEXOTPI.L, UPL480.L, UCCC.L, UEEP.L, UOTHER.L, JRETP.L, WOLDPJ.L, JTARIF1.L, JTARIF2.L,
KRETP.L, KTARIF1.L, KTARIF2.L, JPRODP.L, JGPROP.L, JGSELP.L,
JDIRECT.L, KPRODP.L, KGPURP.L, KGSELP.L, KDIRECT.L, URETP.L, UPRODPJ.L, UPRODPI.L,
UTARP.L, ULOAN.L, UTRANSP.L, UPROD.L, UPRODJ.L, UEXPOTJ.L, UEXPOTJ1.L, UEXPOTK.L,
UEXPOTK1.L, UEXPOTW.L, UBESTK.L, UIMPOT.L, UTCONP.L, UENSTK.L, UTEXPT.L, UTEXPT1.L,
JIMPOTW.L, JQUOTA1.L, JQUOTA2.L, KQUOTA.L, UEXEQUIL.L,
JBESTK.L, JIMPOT.L, JENSTK.L, KPROD.L, KBESTK.L, KIMPOT.L, KENSTK.L, WOENSTK.L, JEXPOT.L,
KEXPOT.L, KIMPOTW.L, KIMPOTU.L, JEXCHAN.L, KEXCHAN.L, JPOWEIC.L, JPOWEIP.L, JPOWEIG.L,
KPOWEIC.L, KPOWEIP.L, KPOWEIG.L, UPOWEIE.L;
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APPENDIX 2. SAS PROGRAM USED FOR THE ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION
Appendix 2. SAS Program for Japan
dm ’log;clear;output;clear’;
data Japan;
input x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12 x13 x14 x15 x16 x17 x18 x19 x20 x21 x22 x23 x24 x25 x26 x27
x28 x29 x30 x31 x32 x33 x34 x35 x36 x37 x38 x39 x40 x41 x42;
tech = x1-1959; x2_=lag(x2); x3_=lag(x3); if x1=1980 then dm80=1; else dm80=0;
if x1=1993 then dm93=1; else dm93=0; dm8093=dm80+dm93; x10_=x10/x36; x19_=x19/x36;
x19r = lag(x19_); lx42=log(x42); lx42_=lag(lx42); x42_=lag(x42); x11_=x11/x35; lx11_=log(x11_);
x34_=x34/x36; lx34_=log(x34_); X34R = LOG(X34);
cards;
;
run;
data test;
set japan;
keep X11 X11_ X34 x42 LX11_ X34r;
run;
proc print data=test;
run;
proc model data=japan;
parameters a1-a5 b1-b5 c1-c5;
model1: x3 = a1 + a2*tech + a3*dm8093;
model2: x2 = b1 + b2*x2_ + b3*x10_ + b4*x19r;
fit x3 x2 /2sls DW gf=1 white breusch=(tech dm8093 x2_ x10_ x19r lx42_ lx11_ x34r) normal
OUTEST=OUTEST1;
proc autoreg data=japan;
model lx42 =lx42_ lx11_ x34r/normal nlag=1 dw=1 dwprob lagdep=lx42_ archtest godfrey=1;
solve x3 x2 lx42/DYNAMIC THEIL DETAILS STATS OUTACTUAL OUTPREDICT OUT=OUT1 ;
run;
/*proc syslin 2sls data=japan outest=x3;
endogenous x2 x3;
instruments tech x2_ x3_ x4 x10;*/
/*proc autoreg data=japan;
model x3 = dm8093 tech/normal dw=1 dwprob archtest godfrey=1;
hetero x3/link=linear std=nonneg test=lm;
model x2 = x2_ x10_ x19r/normal nlag=1 dw=1 dwprob lagdep=x2_ archtest godfrey=1;
hetero x2/link=linear std=nonneg test=lm;*/
goptions reset=(axis,legend,pattern,symbol,title,footnote) hpos=0
norotate vpos=0 htext= ctext= target= gaccess= gsfmode=;
goptions device=win ctext=black interpol=join;
symbol1 c=default l=1 ci=blue v=plus cv=blue;
symbol2 c=default l=1 ci=red v=plus cv=red;
axis1 major=(n=2) minor=(n=2) color=black order=1960 to 2000 by 2 width=2.0 style=1;
axis2 color=black width=2.0 style=1;
axis3 color=black width=2.0;
proc gplot data=work.japan;
plot x3*x1;
plot x2*x1;
plot x42*x1;
run;
quit;
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Appendix 2. SAS Program for Korea
dm ’log;clear;output;clear’;
data korea;
input x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12 x13 x14 x15 x16 x17 x18 x19 x20 x21 x22 x23 x24 x25 x26 x27
x28 x29 x30 x31 x32 x33 x34 x35 x36 x37 x38 x39 x40 x41 x42 x43 x44 x45 x46 x47 x48 x49 x50 ;
tech = x1-1959; x2_=lag(x2); x3_=lag(x3); x4_ = lag(x4); X10_ = lag(x10); x17_ = x17/x33;
x33_ = lag(x33); x10r = x10_/x33_; x15_ = x15/x33; lx27= log(x27); x27r = lag(lx27); lx28 = log(x28);
x28_ = lag(x28); x28r = log(x28_); x18_ = x18/x31; lx18_ = log(x18_); rx32 = log(x32); x32_=x32/x33;
x42_=x42/x33; x29_=x29/x31; x43_ = x43/x33; lx43_ = log(x43_); x48_=x48/x33; lx48_=log(x48_);
rx28=1/x28_; lx29_=log(x29_); lx32=log(x32_); lx42_=log(x42_); x26_=x26/x33;
if x1=1970 then dm70=1; else dm70=0; if x1=1971 then dm71=1; else dm71=0;
if x1=1972 then dm72=1; else dm72=0; if x1=1973 then dm73=1; else dm73=0;
if x1=1974 then dm74=1; else dm74=0; if x1=1975 then dm75=1; else dm75=0;
if x1=1976 then dm76=1; else dm76=0; if x1=1977 then dm77=1; else dm77=0;
dm1=dm70+dm71+dm72+dm73+dm74+dm75+dm76;
dm7677=dm76+dm77;
if x1=1980 then dm80=1; else dm80=0; if x1=1993 then dm93=1; else dm93=0;
dm8093=dm80+dm93; if x1=1996 then dm96=1; else dm96=0; if x1=1997 then dm97=1; else dm97=0;
dm9697=dm96+dm97;
cards;
run;
;
data test;
set korea;
keep lx27 x27r x18 x18_ lx18_ lx32;
run;
proc print data=test;
run;
proc model data=korea;
parameters a1-a5 b1-b5 d1-d5;
model1: x3 = a1 + /*a2*x3_ +*/ a3*tech + a4*dm8093;
model2: x2 = b1 + b2*x2_ /*+ b3*x16*/ + b4*x38;
model: lx27 =d1 + d2*x27r + d3*lx32 + d4*lx18_;
fit x3 x2 lx27/2sls DW=1 gf=1 white breusch=(tech dm8093 x2_ x38) normal OUTEST=OUTEST1;
solve x3 x2 lx27/DYNAMIC THEIL DETAILS STATS OUTACTUAL OUTPREDICT OUT=OUT1 ;
run;
/*proc syslin 2sls data=korea outest=x3;
endogenous x2 x3;
instruments tech x2_ x3_ x4 x10;*/
/*proc autoreg data=korea;
model lx27 = x27r lx32 lx18_ /normal nlag=1 dw=1 dwprob lagdep=x28r archtest godfrey=1;
run;
quit;*/
goptions reset=(axis,legend,pattern,symbol,title,footnote) hpos=0
norotate vpos=0 htext= ctext= target= gaccess= gsfmode=;
goptions device=win ctext=black interpol=join;
symbol1 c=default l=1 ci=blue v=plus cv=blue;
symbol2 c=default l=1 ci=red v=plus cv=red;
axis1 major=(n=2) minor=(n=2) color=black order=1960 to 1999 by 2 width=2.0 style=1;
axis2 color=black width=2.0 style=1;
axis3 color=black width=2.0;
proc gplot data=work.korea;
plot x3*x1;
plot x2*x1;
polt x27*x1;
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/*parameters ko1-ko10;
x3 = ko1 + ko2*x3_ + ko3*tech + ko4*dm8093;
x2 = ko6 + ko7*x2_ + ko8*x17_ + ko9*x38;
fit x3 x2/2sls hausman dw=1 dwprob lagdep=x2 godfrey=1 ;*/
/*model x3=x3_ tech/stats dw ;*/
/*proc reg data=korea;
model x2=x2_ x4 x10;
output out=b p=x2hat;
data c;
x2hatlag=x2hat;
set b;
retain x2hat;
proc autoreg data=c;
model x2=x2hatlag x4 x10/nlag=1;*/
run;
quit;
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Appendix 2. SAS Program for the U.S.
dm ’log;clear;output;clear’;
data us;
input x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12 x13 x14 x15 x16 x17 x18 x19 x20 x21 x22 x23 x24 x25 x26 x27
x28 x29 x30 x31 x32 x33 x34;
tech = x1-1959; lx6 = log(x6); x23_ = x23/x24; lx23_ = log(x23_); x15_ = x23/x15; lx15_ = log(x15_);
lx30 = log(x30); x30_=x28+x30+x31; lx30_ = log(x30_); if x1=1960 then lx6=1;
if x1=1960 then lx12_=1; if x1=1980 then dm80=1; else dm80=0; if x1=1991 then dm91=1; else dm91=0;
if x1=1985 then dm85=1; else dm85=0; if x1=1994 then dm94=1; else dm94=0;
dm1=dm80+dm85; dm2=dm91+dm94; dm3=dm80+dm94; lx6 =log(x6); lx23_ = log(x23_);
lx30_ = log(x30_); lx12 = log(x12); lx28 = log(x28); lx30 = log(x30); lx31 = log(x31);
x33_ = x33+x34;
cards;
;
run;
data test;
set us;
keep lx6 lx12 lx23_ lx30_ ;
run;
proc print data=test;
run;
/*proc autoreg data=us;
model lx6 = lx12 lx23_ lx30_ dm3/normal nlag=1 dw=2 dwprob archtest godfrey=1;*/
proc model data=us;
parameters a1-a5;
model1: lx6 = a1 + a2*lx12 + a3*lx23_ + a4*lx30 + a5*dm3;
fit lx6/OLS DETAILS DW=1 gf=1 white breusch=(lx12 lx23_ lx30 dm3) normal OUTEST=OUTEST1;
solve lx6/DYNAMIC THEIL DETAILS STATS ;
/*goptions reset=(axis,legend,pattern,symbol,title,footnote) hpos=0
norotate vpos=0 htext= ctext= target= gaccess= gsfmode=;
goptions device=win ctext=black interpol=join;
symbol1 c=default l=1 ci=blue v=plus cv=blue;
symbol2 c=default l=1 ci=red v=plus cv=red;
axis1 major=(n=2) minor=(n=2) color=black order=1960 to 1999 by 2 width=2.0 style=1;
axis2 color=black width=2.0 style=1;
roc gplot data=work.us;
plot x6*x1;
run;
quit;*/
run;
quit;
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APPENDIX 3. DATA USED IN THE STUDY
Table 1 Appendix 3. Japanese Data.
YEAR JARHAV JYIELD JPROD
1960
3308
3.54
11700
1961
3301
3.42
11301
1962
3285
3.60
11838
1963
3272
3.56
11659
1964
3260
3.51
11451
1965
3255
3.47
11292
1966
3254
3.56
11598
1967
3263
4.03
13152
1968
3280
4.01
13148
1969
3274
3.89
12743
1970
2923
3.95
11547
1971
2695
3.68
9907
1972
2640
4.10
10819
1973
2622
4.22
11056
1974
2724
4.11
11186
1975
2764
4.33
11980
1976
2779
3.85
10713
1977
2757
4.32
11916
1978
2584
4.43
11456
1979
2497
4.36
10882
1980
2377
3.73
8873
1981
2278
4.10
9337
1982
2257
4.14
9346
1983
2273
4.15
9433
1984
2315
4.67
10809
1985
2342
4.53
10612
1986
2303
4.60
10599
1987
2146
4.51
9671
1988
2110
4.31
9041
1989
2097
4.49
9416
1990
2074
4.61
9554
1991
2049
4.27
8740
1992
2106
4.57
9621
1993
2139
3.33
7129
1994
2212
4.93
10903
1995
2118
4.62
9781
1996
1977
4.76
9413
1997
1953
4.67
9123
1998
1801
4.53
8154
1999
1788
4.67
8350

JIMOPT
140
173
177
410
880
893
475
298
52
15
10
0
24
57
35
20
21
64
18
14
75
66
14
169
18
20
17
16
16
18
17
18
18
2623
250
500
500
499
554
639

JEXPOT
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
300
508
910
217
572
305
42
0
0
91
467
648
909
304
223
230
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
410
200
30
574
210
200

JCONP
11900
11090
12115
12061
12186
11880
11700
11555
11187
10480
11690
12459
11829
11017
10924
10700
10466
10026
10299
10102
10100
10642
10774
10192
10199
10150
9706
9805
9619
9720
9620
9523
9500
9400
9350
9300
9320
9200
9100
9450

JARHAV = area harvested(1000ha), JYIELD = yield(MT/ha), JPROD = production(1000MT),
JIMOPT = import(1000MT), JEXPOT = export(1000MT), JCONP = consumption(1000MT),
JENSTK = ending stock(100MT).
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JENSTK
1426
991
891
899
1044
1349
1722
3617
5330
7100
6057
3288
1730
1521
1776
3076
3344
5207
5915
6061
4000
2457
820
0
628
1110
2020
1902
1340
1054
1005
240
379
731
2534
3354
3246
3094
2492
1831

Table 2 Appendix 3. Japanese Data.
YEAR JPRODP JRETP JGSELP JEXCHAN JGPROP JDIVERT JPRODC
1960
N/A
99000
72517
360
69367
0
177120
1961
N/A.
97000
72100
360
73683
0
N/A
1962
55000
98000
71900
360
81100
0
N/A
1963
65000 110000
80317
360
87800
0
N/A
1964
72000 118000
79717
361.97
99750
0
N/A
1965
83000 136000
93867
361.49
108967
0
292445
1966
87000 146000 101783
362.35
119000
0
N/A
1967
93000 151000 100150
362.15
129950
0
N/A
1968 102000 170000 115650
360.55
137600
0
N/A
1969 108000 181000 124950
358.37
137600
0
N/A
1970 109000 186000 124033
358.07
137867
0
534599
1971 108000 188000 122950
347.86
142350
541
N/A
1972 114000 192000 130767
303.17
149233
566
N/A
1973 109000 207000 130100
271.7
171683
562
672186
1974 167000 232000 170933
292.08
226917
313
865433
1975 193000 299000 203417
296.79
259500
264
1022738
1976 216000 342000 224183
296.55
276200
194
1220303
1977 238000 379000 246183
268.51
287200
212
1289654
1978 246000 403000 256517
210.44
287517
438
1416261
1979 242000 408000 264850
219.14
287983
472
1487741
1980 253000 414000 264850
226.74
294567
585
1580378
1981 273000 425000 273183
220.54
295933
668
1660005
1982 278000 440000 283883
249.08
299183
672
1698227
1983 281000 448000 294550
237.51
304433
639
1745699
1984 294000 464000 305450
237.52
311133
620
1740072
1985 293000 479000 309967
238.54
311133
594
1766866
1986 263000 483000 309967
168.52
311133
618
1777043
1987 259000 483000 302167
144.64
292617
791
1773142
1988 258000 477000 302167
128.15
279050
794
1755655
1989 279050 478000 306600
137.96
279050
795
1735190
1990 275000 496300 306600
144.11
275000
849
1748910
1991 272870 494466 303383
134.43
274100
852
1683110
1992 271090 548900 302050
126.53
273200
751
1670290
1994 271090 564400 302050
111.20
273200
713
1726330
1994 271090 695300 302050
102.21
273200
588
1667990
1995 271090 570000 302050
94.06
273200
659
1692045
1996 271090 537400 302050
108.78
270280
673
1689245
1997 268200 521800 297180
120.99
263420
685
1678978
1998 262350 499500 294100
130.91
258800
955
1678930
1999 259170 487800 294100
130.91
256820
950
1700270
JPRODP = producer price(yen/MT), JRETP = retail price(yen/MT), JGSELP = government selling rice(yen/MT),
JEXCHAN = exchange rate(yen/$), JGPROP = government procurement price(yen/MT),
JDIVERT = diversion program(ha), JPRODC = production costs(yen/ha)
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Table 3 Appendix 3. Japanese Data.
YEAR JPCONP JPOP JPOCONP
1960 114.9
93.4
470
1961 117.4
94.3
535
1962 118.3
95.2
536
1963 117.3
96.2
597
1964 115.8
97.2
609
1965 111.7
98.3
606
1966 105.8
99.1
636
1967 103.4 100.2
714
1968 100.1 101.4
707
1969
97
103.0
640
1970
95.1
103.7
712
1971
93.1
105.0
718
1972
91.5
107.3
744
1973
90.8
108.7
807
1974
89.7
110.1
754
1975
88
111.9
758
1976 86.2
112.2
729
1977 83.4
113.2
676
1978 81.6
114.3
685
1979 79.8
115.3
685
1980 78.9
117.1
711
1981 77.8
117.0
697
1982 76.4
118.0
671
1983 75.7
119.0
671
1984 75.2
119.3
625
1985 74.6
121.1
570
1986 73.4
121.0
628
1987 71.9
121.4
643
1988
71
122.0
677
1989 70.4
123.0
671
1990
70
123.6
650
1991 69.9
123.6
659
1992 69.7
124.5
643
1993 69.2
124.0
665
1994 66.3
124.3
602
1995 67.8
125.5
598
1996 67.3
125.4
359
1997 66.7
125.6
461
1998 65.2
126.3
543
1999 64.5
126.8
621

JINCOM JGCONP JADCON JTARIF JCPI
17859
0
0
78
45.9
18965
0
0
58
47.0
21547
0
0
53
47.3
26512
0
0
85
48.6
29895
0
0
108
49.9
33765
0
0
154
50.3
38085
0
0
179
52.0
44629
0
0
188
52.1
52922
0
300
238
55.2
62260
0
508
271
56.8
75299
252
910
282
59.6
80701
1474
217
297
61.3
92394
1254
572
373
67.6
122498
480
305
228
69.0
134244
0
42
234
70.6
152362
0
0
552
71.2
166573
0
0
783
72.5
185622
0
91
931
73.1
204404
0
467
1473
73.5
221547
0
648
1349
74.3
245547
0
909
1215
76.3
257363
192
304
1465
80.0
269629
829
223
1416
82.3
280257
510
230
1546
93.8
297948
10
0
1617
85.7
324159
33
0
1663
87.4
330024
75
0
2580
88.0
343422
0
0
2968
88.0
365087
0
0
3355
88.6
402311
0
0
3107
90.7
432588
0
0
3089
93.5
455888
0
0
3282
96.5
464191
0
0
3943
98.1
466764
0
0
4589
99.4
470030
0
410
6412 100.1
514390
0
200
5595 100.0
459550
208
30
4509 100.1
419510
24
574
3900 100.9
419510
0
210
3323 102.5
419510
0
200
3428 102.2

JPCONP = per capita consumption(kg/person), JPOP = population (million people), JPOCONP = processing
Consumption(1000MT), JINCOM =income(billion yen), JGCONP = government consumption(1000MT),
JADCON = additional consumption(1000MT), JTARIF = tariff equivalent($/MT), JCPI = consumer price index.

165

Table 4 Appendix 3. Korean Data.
YEAR KARHAV KYIELD KPROD KIMOPT KEXPOT
1960
1121
2.72
3047
5
4
1961
1128
3.07
3463
0
60
1962
1139
2.65
3015
117
5
1963
1155
3.25
3758
0
13
1964
1195
3.31
3954
0
19
1965
1228
2.85
3501
18
40
1966
1231
3.18
3919
139
0
1967
1235
2.92
3603
247
0
1968
1151
2.78
3195
631
0
1969
1220
3.35
4090
254
0
1970
1203
3.27
3939
937
0
1971
1190
3.36
3998
584
0
1972
1191
3.32
3957
437
0
1973
1182
3.56
4212
206
0
1974
1204
3.69
4445
489
0
1975
1218
3.83
4669
168
0
1976
1215
4.29
5215
55
0
1977
1230
4.88
6006
0
80
1978
1230
4.71
5797
501
0
1979
1233
4.17
5136
580
0
1980
1233
3.24
4000
2245
0
1981
1224
4.14
5063
269
0
1982
1188
4.36
5175
216
0
1983
1228
4.40
5404
7
135
1984
1231
4.62
5682
0
0
1985
1237
4.55
5626
0
0
1986
1236
4.54
5607
0
0
1987
1262
4.35
5493
1
0
1988
1260
4.80
6053
2
0
1989
1257
4.69
5898
11
1
1990
1244
4.51
5606
2
17
1991
1209
4.45
5385
1
2
1992
1157
4.61
5331
1
2
1993
1136
4.18
4750
4
0
1994
1103
4.59
5060
3
150
1995
1056
4.45
4694
115
0
1996
1050
5.07
5320
0
0
1997
1052
5.18
5450
77
0
1998
1059
4.82
5100
113
0
1999
1066
4.94
5263
115
0

KCONP
3121
3442
3127
3740
3913
3444
4119
3811
3866
4271
4945
3973
4296
4641
4707
4699
5100
5784
6764
5786
5402
5404
5404
5303
5540
5501
5805
5617
5611
5602
5444
5478
5524
5509
5414
5244
5178
5112
5038
5003

KARHAV = area harvested(1000ha), KYIELD = yield(MT/ha), KPROD = production(1000MT),
KIMOPT = import(1000MT), KEXPOT = export(1000MT), KCONP = consumption(1000MT),
KENSTK = ending stock(100MT).
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KENSTK
39
0
0
5
27
62
1
40
0
73
4
613
711
488
715
906
1076
1218
752
682
1495
423
1511
1247
1432
1251
1158
1146
1610
2050
2151
2141
1999
1820
1156
245
390
805
980
1355

Table 5 Appendix 3. Korean Data.
YEAR KPRODP KRETP KGPURP KGSELP KPRODC KPCONP
1960
12000
19000
10000
11597
N/A
N/A
1961
15000
23000
14000
12000
N/A
N/A
1962
16000
24000
15000
15000
N/A
110
1963
25000
38000
19000
16000
58630
110
1964
31000
46000
24000
25000
80660
127
1965
29000
44000
28000
31000
93450
121.8
1966
34000
46000
30000
29000
97070
113.9
1967
40000
50000
32000
31000
109230
131.1
1968
49000
58000
38000
34000
126600
117.8
1969
55000
72000
46000
40000
145870
119.7
1970
69000
80000
63000
49000
171600
130.4
1971
88000 100000
79000
55000
200080
134.8
1972 133000 135000
89000
69000
241780
134.5
1973 168000 135000
102000
88000
271850
129.4
1974 203000 187000
142000
133000
376440
127.8
1975 224000 253000
197000
162500
532910
123.6
1976 263000 303000
243750
209125
706350
120.1
1977 341000
324000
290000
243750
889200
126.4
1978 441000
343000
325000
280000 1036030
134.7
1979 501000
438000
375000
331250 1254300
135.6
1980 518000
574000
457500
400000 1437520
132.4
1981 642000
811000
571875
550000 1781690
131.5
1982 667939
888000
652000
666000 1999930
130.2
1983 742300
865000
699625
653500 2274440
129.5
1984 758675
865000
699625
650000 2394210
130.1
1985 764550
928000
720625
678250 2521400
128.1
1986 810525
999000
756625
612500 2640820
127.7
1987 890650 1043000
802000
689000 2778850
126.2
1988 926912 1142000
914250
620125 3231700
124.8
1989 1224210 1192000 1060500
597125 3603140
121.4
1990 1073550 1213520 1209000
694000 3858510
119.6
1991 1189450 1302150 1329875 1150000 4000650
116.3
1992 1216140 1402000 1423000 1207500 3972960
112.9
1993 1246025 1473750 1508375 1207500 3975340
110.2
1994 1341350 1549583 1583750 1306250 4005020
108.3
1995 1430375 1638917 1583750 1306250 4119750
106.5
1996 1708600 1858333 1583750 1550000 4424410
104.9
1997 1773950 1984250 1647125 1562500 4582400
102.4
1998 1857400 2067250 1647125 1650000 5107920
99.2
1999 1998425 2211500 1737750 1815000 5227000
96.9

KINCOM
243
291
352
500
711
798
1024
1259
1630
2130
2771
2898
4210
5420
7669
10302
14101
18074
24327
31323
38041
47482
54443
62574
71332
79170
92638
109588
131061
147770
178628
216303
245388
277108
322812
376316
417108
450853
437871
478251

KPRODP = producer price(won/MT), KRETP = retail price(won/MT), KGPURP = government purchase
price(won/MT), KGSELP = government selling price(won/MT), KPRODC = production costs(won/ha),
KPCONP = per capita consumption(kg/person), KINCOM = income(billion won).
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Table 6 Appendix 3. Korean Data.
YEAR KPOP KGDPD KCPI KEXCHAN
1960 24.70
N/A
11.1
63.13
1961 25.42
N/A
11.3
124.79
1962 26.51
N/A
11.5
130.00
1963 26.90
N/A
11.7
130.00
1964 27.68
N/A
12.0
213.85
1965 28.70
N/A
12.2
266.40
1966 28.96
N/A
12.8
271.34
1967 30.13
N/A
13.2
270.52
1968 30.84
N/A
13.5
276.65
1969 31.54
N/A
14.0
288.16
1970 32.24
N/A
15.2
310.56
1971 32.88
5.50
16.2
340.15
1972 33.51
6.42
16.5
392.89
1973 34.10
7.98
17.0
398.32
1974 34.69
9.80
17.6
404.47
1975 35.28 12.40
18.2
484.00
1976 35.85 14.20
23.2
484.00
1977 36.41 18.60
27.8
484.00
1978 36.97 23.40
32.2
484.00
1979 37.53 28.20
36.5
484.00
1980 38.12 31.80
40.4
607.43
1981 38.72 35.80
43.9
681.03
1982 39.33 38.20
49.0
731.08
1983 39.93 43.90
54.3
775.75
1984 40.46 46.40
55.5
805.98
1985 40.80 48.50
56.8
870.02
1986 41.18 51.00
58.4
881.45
1987 41.58 53.90
60.2
822.57
1988 41.98 58.00
64.5
731.47
1989 42.38 61.30
68.2
671.46
1990 42.87 67.90
74.0
707.76
1991 43.30 75.20
80.9
733.30
1992 43.75 81.00
86.0
780.60
1993 44.20 86.70
90.1
802.60
1994 44.64 93.30
95.7
803.60
1995 45.09 100.00 100.0
771.00
1996 45.55 103.90 104.9
804.80
1997 45.99 107.20 109.6
951.10
1998 46.43 112.60 117.8 1398.90
1999 46.86 110.80 118.8 1189.50

KDIVRT KPOCON KADCON KTARIF
0
0
4
103.65
0
0
60
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
13
71.85
0
0
19
0
0
0
40
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
16.17
0
0
0
20.60
0
0
0
50.38
0
0
0
83.46
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
515
0
0
67.48
590
0
0
255.88
690
0
80
188.82
774
0
0
267.10
869
0
0
391.73
975
0
0
333.63
1521
0
0
729.2
1233
0
0
863.67
1987
0
135
774.66
1933
0
0
737.03
2122
0
0
721.18
2563
0
0
846.98
3542
16
0
896.72
4844
29
0
1193.73
7096
21
1
1417.87
10593
33
17
1360.09
11861
114
2
1379.57
12255
245
2
1400.77
13207
304
0
1349.44
11984
278
150
1538.09
16274
144
0
1660.75
16611
140
0
1878.28
15395
150
0
1673.79
15141
123
0
985.04
12017
210
0
1384.53

KPOP = population(million people), KGDPD = GDP deflator, KCPI = consumer price index, KEXCHAN =
exchange rate(won/$), KDIVRT = diversion program(ha). KPOCON = processing consumption(1000MT),
KADCON = additional consumption(1000MT), KTARIF = tariff equivalent($/MT).
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Table 7 Appendix 3. U.S. Data.
YEAR UARHAV UYIELD UPROD
1960
N/A
N/A
N/A
1961
643
2.74
1763
1962
718
2.97
2133
1963
717
3.20
2295
1964
723
3.30
2386
1965
725
3.44
2497
1966
796
3.52
2805
1967
797
3.70
2950
1968
952
3.63
3459
1969
861
3.49
3003
1970
734
3.81
2796
1971
736
3.86
2838
1972
736
3.84
2828
1973
878
3.46
3034
1974
1024
3.58
3667
1975
1140
3.60
4099
1976
1004
3.77
3781
1977
910
3.43
3120
1978
1202
3.55
4271
1979
1161
3.72
4324
1980
1340
3.61
4838
1981
1535
3.89
5974
1982
1320
3.75
4948
1983
878
3.66
3216
1984
1134
3.86
4382
1985
1008
4.30
4332
1986
955
4.51
4307
1987
944
4.35
4109
1988
1174
4.42
5186
1989
1087
4.68
5087
1990
1142
4.46
5098
1991
1125
4.53
5096
1992
1267
4.50
5704
1993
1146
4.57
5240
1994
1342
4.95
6648
1995
1252
4.49
5628
1996
1135
4.80
5453
1997
1256
4.58
5750
1998
1318
4.40
5798
1999
1421
4.58
6502

UIMOPT UEXPOT UCONP
N/A
N/A
N/A
13
936
997
1
1119
937
1
1385
917
15
1387
1008
22
1418
1081
0
1719
1079
0
1816
1190
0
1729
1420
7
1786
1220
48
1461
1308
36
1804
1309
17
1726
1324
7
1604
1349
0
2194
1496
0
1732
1394
3
2097
1618
3
2270
1248
3
2431
1708
3
2706
1794
7
3028
2113
13
2682
2248
21
2219
2049
27
2272
1793
51
1960
1911
70
1885
2078
83
2719
2493
95
2289
2580
121
2786
2649
139
2537
2690
151
2331
2981
169
2128
3064
195
2515
3008
220
2564
3283
256
3322
3396
245
2694
3420
334
2488
3243
294
2755
3278
336
2730
3587
321
2804
3846

UENSTK
N/A
173
251
245
251
271
278
222
532
536
611
372
167
255
232
1205
1274
879
1014
841
545
1602
2303
1481
2043
2482
1660
995
867
866
803
876
1252
865
1051
810
866
877
694
867

UARHAV = area harvested(1000ha), UYIELD = yield(MT/ha), UPROD = production(1000MT),
UIMOPT = import(1000MT), UEXPOT = export(1000MT), UCONP = consumption(1000MT),
UENSTK = ending stock(100MT).
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Table 8 Appendix 3. U.S. Data.
YEAR UPRDI URPDJ WESTK UPODPI UPODPJ ULOAN UDIRT UEXPOTK
1960
842
904
N/A
138.92 139.55
97.44
N/A
0
1961
803
969
8500
163.80 150.57 103.84
N/A
0
1962
943
1215 12500
160.65 160.97 103.84
N/A
0
1963
845
1453 16300
154.98 159.71 103.84
N/A
0
1964
896
1494 17200
153.41 154.98 103.84
N/A
0
1965 1072
1421 18100
156.87 153.72
99.21
N/A
0
1966 1156
1623 18600
151.20 149.63
99.21
N/A
67
1967 1426
1515 21300
161.28 152.46 100.31
N/A
235
1968 1603
1822 24500
154.35 173.57 101.41
N/A
376
1969 1472
1532 26400
167.58 151.20 104.06
N/A
251
1970 1350
1388 28800
170.42 158.13 107.14
N/A
397
1971 1474
1328 28000
177.03 165.06 111.77
N/A
500
1972 1402
1390 23800
226.80 215.15 116.18
N/A
245
1973 1400
1631 28800
481.95 349.65 133.82
N/A
252
1974 1829
1844 28000
359.10 368.55 166.23
N/A
415
1975 2159
1922 38800
269.01 240.98 187.83
N/A
156
1976 2290
1489 37800
209.48 217.67 136.46
N/A
54
1977 1977
1176 44200
252.63 288.23 136.46
N/A
0
1978 2695
1558 54100
265.86 222.39 141.10 17.20
144
1979 2639
1673 53700
343.35 333.90 149.69
0
787
1980 2877
1966 48500
393.75 418.95 156.96
0
859
1981 3607
2365 43300
305.55 253.89 176.59
6.17
223
1982 3053
1913
43500
269.64 217.67 179.46 59.74
216
1983 2066
1182
47900
294.84 224.60 179.46 61.07
0
1984 3052
1358
55600
272.79 209.79 176.36 82.90
0
1985 3235
1128
54400
212.63 184.91 176.36 85.98
0
1986 3129
1185
50700
120.33 111.83 158.73 103.62
1
1987 2829
1289
44800
244.76 200.34 150.79 106.26
0
1988 3844
1327
48800
219.24 203.81 146.16 95.02
0
1989 3570
1479
54500
239.09
211.37 143.30 78.48
11
1990 3525
1576
59200
218.61 194.99 143.30 91.71
0
1991 3517
1580
57200
246.65 220.50 143.30 67.68
1
1992 4070
1638
55200
184.91 186.17 143.30 92.81
0
1993 3414
1759
52500
249.80 254.84 143.30 87.74
0
1994 4424
2136
50400
216.41 211.05 143.30 83.55
0
1995 3978
1705
50400
295.16 277.83 143.30 70.99
8
1996 3610
1843
51200
333.90
263.66 143.30 61.07
18
1997 3954
1860
54700
321.30
268.38 143.30 59.75
14
1998 4425
1436
60000
321.30 268.38 143.30 64.37
0
1999 4825
1722
62600
189.00 201.60 143.30 62.17
0
UPRDI = indica production(1000MT), URPDJ = japonica production(1000MT), WESTK = world ending
Stock(1000MT), UPODPI = producer price of indica($/MT). UPODPJ = producer price of japonica($/MT),
ULOAN = loan rate($/MT), UDIRT = direct payment($/MT), UEXPOTK = export to Korea(1000MT).
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Table 9 Appendix 3. U.S. Data.
YEAR WOLDPJ UPL480
1960
197.3
N/A
1961
211.6
N/A
1962
219.4
N/A
1963
220.5
N/A
1964
218.3
N/A
1965
222.7
N/A
1966
223.8
N/A
1967
229.3
N/A
1968
233.7
N/A
1969
233.7
N/A
1970
237.0
N/A
1971
243.6
N/A
1972
260.1
N/A
1973
533.5
N/A
1974
560.0
N/A
1975
455.2
745
1976
370.2
509
1977
480.6
676
1978
441.6
502
1979
513.2
442
1980
611.3
500
1981
461.6
320
1982
351.0
332
1983
340.4
429
1984
336.2
366
1985
345.5
500
1986
286.4
411
1987
371.3
370
1988
367.5
338
1989
357.4
355
1990
354.5
276
1991
396.2
210
1992
395.3
382
1993
486.8
421
1994
390.2
315
1995
465.0
131
1996
430.8
200
1997
412.5
204
1998
492.7
184
1999
474.7
536

UCCC
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
48
60
15
50
42
168
452
14
328
571
359
476
636
443
826
663
183
220
235
155
321
141
80
499
192

UEEP
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
23
28
120
20
0
76
358
278
46
113
23
0
0
0

UMAP
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
795
569
691
552
484
668
772
346
757
986
1039
887
1066
810
1181
939
397
623
832
476
463
353
298
694
777

UFMDP
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
1419
1315
1570
1645
1849
2191
2225
2430
1452
1226
869
1350
1346
1315
1069
1562
2020
1656
1878
1958
3300
2473
2262
2616
2299

UEPOTJ
0
0
0
106
290
156
99
2
2
1
0
0
0
9
16
11
11
3
2
3
1
0
2
1
1
0
18
1
1
1
2
2
30
481
66
215
232
213
311
350

WOLDPJ = world japonica price($/MT), UPL480 = PL480(1000MT), UCCC = credit guarantee(1000MT),
UEEP = export enhancement(1000MT), UMAP = export program(1000MT), UFMDP = outside specified export
program (1000MT), UEPOTJ = export to Japan(1000MT).
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